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ABSTRACT 
 This report examines the transport and delivery of logistics in contested 
environments within the context of great-power competition (GPC). Across the 
Department of Defense (DOD), it is believed that GPC will strain our current supply lines 
beyond their capacity to maintain required warfighting capability. Current DOD efforts 
are underway to determine an appropriate range of platforms, platform quantities, and 
delivery tactics to meet the projected logistics demand in future conflicts. This report 
explores the effectiveness of various platforms and delivery methods through analysis in 
developed survivability, circulation, and network optimization models. Among other 
factors, platforms are discriminated by their radar cross-section (RCS), noise level, speed, 
cargo capacity, and self-defense capability. To maximize supply delivered and minimize 
the cost of losses, the results of this analysis indicate preference for utilization of 
well-defended convoys on supply routes where bulk supply is appropriate and smaller, 
and widely dispersed assets on shorter, more contested routes with less demand. 
Sensitivity analysis on these results indicates system survivability can be improved by 
applying RCS and noise-reduction measures to logistics assets. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
A. BOTTOM LINE UPFRONT 
With the rise of great-power competition and emerging anti-access area denial 
capabilities over the last decade, the United States military has adopted strategies which 
include distributed maritime operations and expeditionary advances base operations. While 
these concepts maintain conventional warfighting advantages against peer adversaries like 
China and Russia, they place increased demands on logistics support infrastructure which 
currently lacks the capacity and resiliency necessary to sustain a protracted campaign. 
Logistics during a fight against a peer adversary will be quite a daunting task. Most 
supply carriers will attrite before they make a second delivery. Our recommended strategy 
is to utilize well-defended convoy operations on any supply route where bulk supply is 
appropriate. When smaller deliveries are necessary, assets must be widely dispersed to 
minimize the chance that they are detected and engaged. To keep up with high attrition 
rates, future logistics systems must be inexpensive, rapidly replaceable, and either 
unmanned or minimally manned to reduce the loss of life. Finally, as championed by 
Captain Wayne Hughes in his book Fleet Tactics and Naval Operations, we must “attack 
effectively first” (2018, 17). In doing so, we can greatly improve our odds by degrading 
enemy capabilities before they have an opportunity to target our logistics system. 
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The tasking statement for this work was assigned by Director, Warfare Integration 
(OPNAV N9I), the project sponsor, and by the Naval Postgraduate School Chair of 
Systems Engineering Analysis. Their broad scope tasking was refined using a Systems 
Engineering Waterfall method, incorporating background research, stakeholder analysis, 
functional analysis to generate the following problem statement: 
Design a cost effective, deployable, and resilient unmanned and manned system of 
systems to provide logistics in contested environments by near-peer competitors in the 
2030–2035 timeframe. 
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• Consider system delivery rates of dry stores, fuel, and ammunition at sea 
and to forward operating areas ashore. 
• Where possible, include joint contributions in the system of systems. 
• Develop alternative architectures and their operational employment 
concepts. 
• Investigate current commercially available lift and technologies for rapid 
acquisition as one alternative. 
By near pear competitors we specifically mean the pacing threats of China and 
Russia. The fictional scenario, “The Global War of 2030—Two Years In,” was generated 
to support the 2019–2020 Naval Postgraduate School Warfare Innovation Continuum and 
served as the reference mission for our logistics system. System delivery rates were 
addressed via measures of effectiveness and performance that we were utilized to compare 
one architecture to another. Lastly, many architectural variations and associated concepts 
of operations were evaluated, with final recommendations including elements from each 
of them, arranged in such a way to emphasize strengths and mitigate the weaknesses of 
each component. 
C. METHODOLOGY 
To compare the performance of one logistics system to another, a Monte-Carlo 
simulation-based circulation model was the primary analysis tool. Systems were 
differentiated by their radar cross section, acoustic signature, size, carrying capacity, self-
defense capability, unit cost, and speed. As many of these attributes were not readily 
available through unclassified sources, sub-models were employed to estimate the 
interaction between logistics carriers and threat assets. The model estimated the probability 
that a logistics asset was detected on each route, performed engagement analysis, and 
ultimately generated the expected number of deliveries and tonnage throughput before the 
asset was attrited. 
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Finally, route specific outcomes were aggregated through a network model that can 
determine maximum supply flow, identify the most critical ports and routes, and efficiently 
assign specific assets to individual routes. Analysis via the network model will continue in 
subsequent thesis work by Ensign Christian Sorensen, and preliminary outcomes are 
incorporated in the conclusions and recommendation of this work. 
D. KEY RESULTS 
1. Expected Number of Deliveries 
The most concerning conclusion we came to was that almost all vessels completed 
less than one round trip and only about one delivery. Adding defensive layers in 
conjunction with convoy operations offered the most significant potential improvement. 
One subset of analysis compared the Expeditionary Logistics System (ELS) Mothership, 
ELS Marine Operations Logistics Assets (MOLA), Orca Extra Large Unmanned Undersea 
Vehicle (XLUUV), Maritime Prepositioning Ship (T-AK), and Maritime Prepositioning 
Ship roll on/roll off (T-AKR). The ELS concept was proposed by fellow students in a Naval 
Postgraduate School Total Ship Systems Engineering Capstone project. They suggested 
using a high-capacity mothership to transport bulk supply outside the contested 
environment. The mothership then distributes supplies across the contested environment to 
the warfighter via an embarked fleet of small delivery platforms, or MOLAs. The Orca 
extra-large unmanned undersea vehicle (XLUUV) is a Boeing design which can carries 
relatively small volumes of cargo underwater, snorkeling only to recharge batteries. A 
subset of the results, illustrating the expected number successfully deliveries for these 
platforms on a route from Yokosuka to Okinawa, follows in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. Expected Number of Deliveries (Yokosuka to Okinawa) 
This is a daunting outcome that alone proves the need for upgrade of the logistics 
capabilities of the U.S. Navy. It was clear that undefended vessels delivered less cargo 
tonnage than they lost and that defended convoys delivered the most tonnage per vessel. 
While most surface vessels, whether with a small observable signature like the ELS 
MOLA or a large signature such as a T-AKR, demonstrated comparable survivability rates, 
the Orca XLUUV stood out as a clearly more survivable asset. As it operated in the 
underwater domain, it almost completely avoided ASBM and ASCM threat layers, except 
for time spent snorkeling. It was also clear that some vessels stood out with less than 
average survivability, such as the JHSV and T-AOE. The dominating attribute which 
decreased their performance was their large acoustic signature. Survivability alone, 
however, was an incomplete metric because it did not translate directly into mission 




2. Cost of Losses per Ton Delivered 
To analyze the cost of losses, we divided the cost of losses values by tonnage 
delivered to create a measure of performance (MOP) that related risk to reward. The risk 
was the monetary losses likely to occur on each transit. The reward was the tonnage 
delivered. The vessels that performed the highest under this MOP were the Offshore 
Support Vessel (OSV), ELS Mothership, Expeditionary Transfer Dock (ESD), and 
Expeditionary Sea Base (ESB). A subset of the results in Figure 2 illustrate their 
performance on a route from Yokosuka to Busan. 
 
Figure 2. Best Performers in MOP: Total Cost of Losses per Ton 
Delivered (Yokuska to Busan) 
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The vessels with the lowest performance in this MOP were the Joint High-Speed 
Vessel (JHSV), Expeditionary Fast Transport (EPF), Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), 
Amphibious Transport Dock (LPD), and T-AK. This is contrary to the established notion 
that distributed logistics are the answer for distributed operations and should be examined. 
Figure 3 illustrates their performance on a route from Yokosuka to Busan, and it is critical 
that the scale on the y-axis is significantly different from Figure 2. 
 
Figure 3. Worst Performers in MOP: Total Cost of Losses per Ton 
Delivered (Yokuska to Busan) 
The OSV, ELS Mothership, ESD, and ESB performed well for this metric because 
they are relatively cheap and have a large cargo capacity relative to their size. Their low 
prices come from their lack of complexity as generic cargo carriers that are not overly 
inundated with excess systems. 
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These results do not exclusively conclude that using gross tonnage vessels in 
convoy configurations is the answer to logistics in a contested environment. Though not as 
well as the OSV, ELS Mothership, and ESD and ESB, other vessels performed fairly under 
this metric. This metric is very cost focused. If the main goal is to minimize cost and the 
fact that a certain level of loss may occur is accepted, then it is highly recommended that 
these options are explored and implemented. However, there are other factors that were not 
analyzed that should also be examined. These include speed of delivery and agility of assets. 
Large cargo vessels that can get the most delivered with the least amount of monetary 
losses are ineffective if they cannot deliver on time or in the correct manner. 
3. Sensitivity Analysis 
Sensitivity analysis was performed on the effects of reducing radar cross section 
and/or acoustic signature. The outcomes indicate that a 0.10 to 0.20 percent survivability 
increase can be harvested on a one-way transit through modest reductions to either of these 
signatures. When improvements were applied in combination, one or the other domain was 
dominant, and no synergy was observed. 
E. CONCLUSION 
The course of action that we recommend pursuing are the Offshore Support Vessel 
Concept, the ELS Concept, and Traditional Logistics Utilizing ESD and ESB. For the OSV 
Concept and the ELS Concept the high value unit can be the ESD, ESB, or ELS 
Mothership. Contrary to what was initially proposed, the performance of these large vessels 
in terms of losses per ton delivered, allows them to enter the contested environment. The 
distributed logistics asset could then occur later in the supply chain. For the ELS concept, 
the MOLA should attempt to emulate OSV and/or Orca XLUUV characteristics as much 
as possible. No matter what course of action is chosen, added defense of these vessels is 
highly beneficial and highly recommend. This could come in the form of upgrading 
onboard defenses or providing some sort of defensive escort. Lastly, RCS and noise 
reduction should be done on all vessels as practical. This is especially important to vessels 
projected to be traveling alone. In consideration of cost, it is beneficial to determine which 
reduction would have the greater impact to survivability and apply that reduction alone. 
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The senior leaders of the United States have issued the Navy’s top-level security 
and defense goals through the: 
• National Security Strategy (NSS) 
• National Defense Strategy (NDS) 
• National Military Strategy (NMS) 
• A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority, Version 2.0 
• Commandant’s Planning Guidance 
These documents describe a shift in America’s focus from nearly two decades of regional 
conflict and counterinsurgency in the Middle East to the growing global threat posed by 
peer adversaries—namely China and Russia. As these adversaries grow their economies 
and military capabilities, and cooperate to challenge America’s national power, the world 
finds itself entering an era of great-power competition (GPC; Berger 2019; DOD 2018; 
JCS 2018a; Richardson 2018; White House 2017). In this environment, the basic 
assumption from past conflicts that our “bases are sanctuaries” is no longer true (Priebe et 
al. 2019, ix). Our enemies can precisely track and target our forces from much greater 
distances than in the past with increasing ability. Additionally, where the U.S. has 
customarily operated anywhere and everywhere that international law permits, our 
adversaries are continually improving anti-access and area-denial capabilities which 
threatens that ability as well. The long-established global balance of power is beginning to 
tilt as adversaries seek to challenge the U.S. as the world’s military leader. 
With the threat of GPC looming and America’s military capability advantage 
shrinking, the Navy’s mission remains to “be ready to conduct prompt and sustained 
combat incident to operations at sea” (Richardson 2018, 1). To this end, the Navy 
recognized the need to update both the fleet and the tactics by which the fleet operates to 
remain relevant in the future threat environment. In recent years, this has meant an 
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increasing focus on developing and deploying a distributed force. This effort seeks to move 
away from traditional fleet architectures that mass combat power in few, highly capable 
capital assets. A concept of distributed operations does the opposite, distributing capability 
and risk amongst a greater number of assets employed across a much larger geographical 
area. This concept challenges enemy targeting capabilities and changes the enemy’s cost-
benefit calculus in our favor. The overall effect is a resilient combat capability that 
maintains the U.S. military advantage. 
A distributed fleet, however, comes with a larger logistics footprint—more units in 
more places with the same or greater demand as in the traditional architecture. Designed 
for post–Cold War peacetime efficiency, our current logistics force is just capable of 
meeting the logistics demand of a traditional fleet architecture. A shift to distributed 
combat fleet architecture will exceed the current logistics force capacity unless the Navy 
implements corresponding changes to its support architecture as well. Additionally, in an 
environment of global conflict, attrition of logistics assets should also be anticipated. The 
current fleet of combat logistics force (CLF) has too few ships and lacks the necessary 
survivability to endure a protracted conflict with a peer or near-peer enemy (Walton, 
Boone, and Schramm 2019). 
The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments proposed a particular logistics 
fleet architecture they felt would meet the demands of GPC. Their assessment 
recommended specific types and quantities but assumed an attrition rate over the course of 
a global conflict. One of their recommendations was that future analysis should seek to 
model attrition to yield more accurate results for force planning (Walton, Boone, and 
Schramm 2019). Our research sought to make an analysis-based recommendation for a 
logistics fleet architecture that accounts for attrition, considers the impact of self-defense 
capability and escorted convoy protection, and determines supply system capacity through 
network optimization modeling. The following report details our efforts and culminates 
with our proposed logistics system. 
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A. PROJECT BACKGROUND 
Our project was led by the 29th cohort of Systems Engineering Analysis (SEA29) 
students at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) was assigned to conduct this capstone 
project in partial fulfillment of graduation requirements. The purpose of this project was to 
demonstrate to the faculty an integrated, iterative, multidisciplinary, and analytical 
approach to problem solving that exercised the fundamental tenets of systems engineering 
and operations research. 
1. Warfare Innovation Continuum 
The NPS Warfare Innovation Continuum (WIC) is an annual campus-wide 
endeavor that aligns efforts in classrooms, capstone projects, thesis work, research, 
wargames, and workshop events towards a relevant and timely real-world defense problem. 
The complete WIC event flow and timeline is illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
 2019–2020 Warfare Innovation Continuum Event Flow. Source: 
Jeffrey Kline, unpublished brief (2019). 
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The theme of the 2019 WIC was “Logistics in Contested Environments.” The WIC 
Innovation Workshop, an event orchestrated by the Consortium for Robotics and 
Unmanned Systems Education and Research (CRUSER), brings together the innovative 
minds of naval officers from NPS, the fleet, and other Department of Defense (DOD) 
commands as well as early career engineers from the civilian sector. The workshop served 
as a primer for this integrated capstone project, another thread of the WIC, where the 
Systems Engineering Analysis cohort leads a companion research and analysis effort in 
support of the annual theme. 
2. Tasking Statement 
The official tasking statement from the Chair of Systems Engineering Analysis to 
this student group was as follows: 
Design a cost effective, deployable and resilient unmanned and manned 
system of systems employed to provide logistics in contested environments 
by near-peer competitors in the 2030–2035 timeframe Consider system 
delivery rates of dry stores, fuel, and ammunition at sea and to forward 
operating areas ashore; system vulnerability, survivability, and reliability; 
and costs. Where possible, include joint contributions in the system of 
systems. Develop alternative architectures and their operational 
employment concepts. Investigate current commercially available lift and 
technologies for rapid acquisition as one alternative. Consider both Pacific 
and Atlantic operating areas. (Jeffrey Kline, email to authors, September 1, 
2019) 
B. PROJECT TEAM COMPOSITION 
Our team was composed of 18 students representing curricula across campus and 
serving in diverse warfare disciplines within the United States, Singapore, and Israeli 
armed forces. We were able to leverage our diverse knowledge and operational experience 
to provide valuable insight when scoping the problem and completing analysis. Our team’s 
composition and background are shown in Table 1. 
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Table 1. SEA29 Project Team Composition 
Name Country Service Job Specialty 
Aldin Sim Singapore Army Combat Engineer 
Benjamin Sandridge United States Navy Surface Warfare 
Bradley Nye United States Navy Surface Warfare 
Chan Jun Liang Singapore Civilian Web Developer 
Christian Sorenson United States Navy Submarine Warfare 
Derek Tay Singapore Army Combat Engineer 
Elad Bengigi Israel Army Operations Research 
Gabriel Lim Guang Nian Singapore Air Force Engineer 
Ivan Er Singapore Army Armor Officer 
Johnathan Marks United States Navy Engineering Duty Officer 
Joseph Rego United States Navy Submarine Warfare 
Kylen Lemenager United States Navy Surface Warfare 
Matthew Lowery United States Marine Corps Artillery 
Michael Shofner United States Navy Surface Warfare 
Roberto Garcia United States Navy Surface Warfare 
Sean Dougherty United States Navy Aviation 
Sean Yang Singapore Air Force Aviation 
Vincent Chan Chi Meng Singapore Navy Surface Warfare 
 
To organize the team’s efforts, three project groups were formed: systems 
engineering (SE), technical systems, and modeling and simulation. Dividing the efforts 
among the three groups enabled the team to better leverage each members’ individual 
knowledge and interests to efficiently complete project tasks. Our SE team focused on 
defining the problem, analyzing the need, and developing the system’s operational and 
functional requirements. The technical systems team conducted an analysis of alternative 
communications architectures to gain insight on how the system could combat a 
communications-denied environment. Additionally, this team researched technical input 
values for use in the modelling and simulation efforts. These values included data such as 
platform radar cross-section, defensive capability, and armament. Lastly, the modeling and 
simulation team developed a survivability and network optimization model to analytically 
determine which architectures would be most viable in contested environments. The team 
then conducted an analysis of alternative architectures to propose a final recommended 
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architecture for the Navy to consider. Table 2 details the makeup of each of the project task 
groups: 
Table 2. SEA29 Task Organization Chart 
Advisors Fotis A. Papoulias 
Michael P. Atkinson 
Group Lead Sean Dougherty 
Chief Editor Benjamin Sandridge 




Technical Systems Analysis Team Kylen Lemenager (lead) 
Matthew Lowry 
Vincent Chan Chi Meng 
Elad Bengigi 
Derek Tay 






Chan Jun Liang 
Gabriel Lim Guang Nian 
 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Among the first tasks accomplished by our team, we conducted a review of works 
with similar subject matter and focus to better understand the problem space. The goal of 
this review was to assess current initiatives, parallel research efforts, and historical cases 
to determine how to frame the problems that the Navy faces while performing logistics in 
contested environments. We also wanted to identify areas where our research could add 
new insights and value to the existing research efforts in this subject area. 
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1. Current Initiatives 
The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral Michael Gilday, released a 
fragmentary order (FRAGO) in December 2019 to serve as an update to the Navy’s A 
Design for Maritime Superiority, Version 2.0 which was released in December 2018. The 
FRAGO shares his vision of the current and future fleet and predicted future threat 
environment. He highlights the concept of GPC as discussed in the NSS and the NDS and 
calls the fleet to focus on “warfighting, warfighters, and the future Navy” (1). In a section 
of the FRAGO titled “Future Navy,” Gilday (2019) specifically discusses the need to 
“make naval logistics more agile and resilient” (7). He lays out a vision which includes the 
ability to revive, repair, rearm, resupply, and refuel a fleet operating under the distributed 
maritime operations (DMO) concept. This vision would seek to support his desired end 
state of “a Navy fully prepared to fight and win” by “maximizing the benefits of 
expeditionary advanced base operations (EABO) and littoral operations in a contested 
environment (LOCE)” (Gilday 2019, 6). To this end, Gilday (2019) states, “We will 
develop and field affordable, lethal, numerous, and connected capabilities” (6). 
In addition, a 2020 report by the Congressional Research Service seeks to provide 
justification for operating in a distributed fleet architecture. The report states that the 
Navy’s current architecture concentrates risk in few, large, and expensive assets. This 
architecture is becoming increasingly vulnerable to China’s rapidly advancing capabilities 
in anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD). Posing a particular threat are China’s “anti-ship 
missiles and their supporting detection and targeting systems” (O’Rourke 2020, 19). 
O’Rourke (2020) offers that shifting to a distributed architecture would: 
1. Complicate the enemy’s ability to target the fleet. 
2. Distribute risk across a larger number of less expensive, more risk-worthy 
platforms. 
3. Allow for the use of unmanned surface vehicles (USV) and unmanned 
undersea vehicles (UUV) in highly contested areas where combat 
capability is required, but risk is too high for a manned vessel to operate. 
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4. Increase the ability of the fleet to rapidly adapt to a changing threat 
environment. 
The author goes on to state that Department of the Navy (DON) leaders appear more 
willing to support a distributed architecture than in the past because of an emerging belief 
that it will be operationally necessary, more affordable, and is now technically feasible. 
For similar reasons, the Commandant and the CNO cosigned the EABO concept in 
February 2019. The goal of EABO is to move away from the large, concentrated, 
vulnerable, and expensive logistics and basing infrastructure that U.S. adversaries can 
easily target. The naval force will seek to develop a smaller, more distributed infrastructure 
that can operate within the enemy’s weapon ranges without incurring disproportionate risk 
(O’Rourke 2020). 
2. Related Research 
A 2019 report titled Sustaining the Fight: Resilient Maritime Logistics for a New 
Era released by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) focused on 
the same topic of the SEA29 tasking statement: the U.S. ability to perform logistics in the 
context of GPC. In summary, the authors found the current logistics force to be inadequate 
to support major military operations against either China or Russia. Further exacerbating 
this problem, the Navy’s 30-year shipbuilding plan calls for a decreased percentage of 
spending for procurement of logistics assets. Under this plan, the already inadequate 
logistics force will be even less capable of supplying a proportionally larger fleet (Walton, 
Boone, and Schramm 2019). 
The report identifies that since the 1990s, the expeditionary logistics capabilities of 
the fleet have been largely retired, and an overreliance on vulnerable shore-based supply 
depots has followed. Adversaries of the United States are becoming increasingly 
sophisticated and are challenging the nation’s military in ways that were not planned for 
when the current fleet was being shaped in years past. 
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Five key assumptions were identified that the authors claim will better reflect the 
current and future threat environment and should be considered when shaping the future 
logistics force: 
1. Distant and contested basing 
2. Global conflict 
3. Forward deterrence and rapid response 
4. Protracted conflict 
5. High attrition planning. (Walton, Boone, and Schramm 2019, i–ii) 
CSBA’s modeling under these assumptions led them to identify “major gaps in logistics 
capacity that would hinder the fleet’s ability to employ its preferred concepts at scale 
during conflict” (Walton, Boone, Schramm 2019, ii). Their proposed solution involves: 
• employing mature technologies 
• modifications to current assets 
• chartering assets 
• providing stipends to industry 
• new construction 
These solutions would fill the capacity shortfalls and provide the Navy with a logistics fleet 
that enhances combat capability and revitalizes the decaying U.S. maritime sector of 
industry (Walton, Boone, and Schramm 2019). 
The key takeaway from the report regarding the U.S. ability to refuel the force 
involved creating a mixed fleet of assets to increase total fuel capacity and redundancy in 
the logistics system. Specifically, the authors recommended that the navy “go big, go small, 
go fast, and go different” (Walton, Boone, and Schramm 2019, iv). “Go big” refers to the 
use of U.S. flagged tankers to serve as prepositioned intermediate fuel depots. “Go small” 
refers to the use of offshore support vessels (OSV), widely used in the oil platform industry, 
as small refueling platforms. “Go fast” refers to accelerating the procurement of fleet oilers. 
“Go different” refers to development of risk-worthy unmanned or minimally manned 
systems to deliver fuel in highly contested environments. 
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For cargo and munitions distribution, the authors recommend that the Navy shift to 
a “scalable and distributed approach” (Walton, Boone, and Schramm 2019, iv). Their 
recommended approach would involve: 
• wider use of distributed aviation logistics 
• procuring higher efficiency roll-on/roll-off resupply ships that would 
transfer cargo underway to other logistics ships 
• increasing stocks of spare parts 
• increasing the fabrication ability onboard ships 
• developing abilities to reload munitions both at anchor and underway 
3. Historical Analysis 
Although U.S. leadership is concerned that we face potential great-power 
competition and future challenges in performing logistics in contested environments, it 
would not be the first time America has risen to this challenge. World War Two (WWII), 
the last truly global conflict, serves as a historical case study on how the U.S. achieved 
success in logistics in the past. While technology has vastly changed how warfare is waged 
today as compared to WWII, one significant commonality remains—logistics forces must 
operate within a contested environment to supply and maintain combat efforts. We would 
be remiss if we did not review this history to determine what still applies in today’s 
complex environment. 
In 1946, shortly after WWII ended, a report titled Antisubmarine Warfare in World 
War II was released by the Navy Department’s Operations Evaluation Group. Originally a 
confidential analysis, the report was declassified in 1959 and contains insights derived from 
operational data on defending individual logistics ships and the effects of convoy and 
escorts. The authors, Sternhell and Thorndike (1946), reported two factors which they 
found affected a submarine’s approach on a ship traveling individually: the ship’s speed 
and employment of zigzag maneuvers. 
Regarding a ship’s speed, Sternhell and Thorndike (1946) stated: 
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there are three important speed classes. 
1. High-speed ships—sufficiently fast that the submarine cannot track or 
overtake them. The sinkings are low and not greatly dependent upon 
speed, though the additional speed of the ship clearly makes the 
submarine’s problem increasingly difficult. 
2. Low-speed ships—so slow that the submarine can track and overtake 
without difficulty. Sinkings are approximately ten times as great as in 
the high-speed case and are not critically dependent on speed. 
3. Intermediate-speed ships—for which there is an abrupt transition from 
conditions of class 2 to class 1 and whose losses depend strongly on 
speed. (96–97) 
Next, the authors addressed the maneuvering characteristics of an individual ship. 
By making fairly radical turns at irregular intervals, the ships can make it 
more difficult for the submarine to approach to a good firing position and 
to secure good torpedo-firing data. The net result is that the submarine will 
tend to be forced to fire from a poorer position with poorer accuracy and 
will therefore have less chance of securing a hit. (Sternhell and Thorndike 
1946, 98) 
They conclude that both factors can be considered and applied to reduce the number of 
ships sunk by enemy submarines. However, they also noted that the effect was limited and 
“the most successful defensive measure has been the use of escorted convoys” (Sternhell 
and Thorndike 1946, 99). 
The authors then provided their insights on utilization of convoys and escorts. They 
claimed the greatest advantaged derived from convoy was the concentration of defensive 
capability it provides, since it would be infeasible to escort all ships individually. 
Secondarily, convoy reduces the number of opportunities for a submarine to encounter a 
unit “since the convoy becomes the unit instead of the individual ship” (Sternhell and 
Thorndike 1946, 100). They state: 
A convoy of 15 or more ships is apparently large enough that the number 
of ships sunk per U-boat attack does not depend on convoy size. Such would 
not be the case for smaller convoys, where we would expect increased size 
to be associated with an increase in number (though not in fraction) of ships 
sunk... it appears that large convoys are much the safest for the individual 
ships, since the fraction of convoyed ships sunk decreases markedly with 
increasing convoy size... The effect of each additional escort is to reduce 
the ships sunk by about 0.075 ship, that is, to reduce the U-boat’s chance of 
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penetrating the screen by about 6 per cent. (Sternhell and Thorndike 1946, 
106–108) 
Next the authors discuss considerations on the limitations of convoy. They note that 
convoying slows down cargo transport in two ways: 
1. Ships spend more time in port due to port congestion and convoy 
assembly time. 
2. Ships spend more time at sea due to decreased transit speeds of convoys 
over individual ships. 
If ships are instead routed independently, their transit speed will increase, but more ships 
will be sunk, and fewer ships will be available over time. The authors note that when 
comparing convoys to individual shipping by considering total cargo delivered, 
independently routed ships are more efficient for up to about six or seven months, when, 
due to losses of individual ships, the convoy would have delivered more cargo (Sternhell 
and Thorndike 1946). 
The key takeaway, then, is that convoy can be an effective means of protecting 
ships, but only when the threat is serious enough to justify cargo delays and the expected 
duration of conflict is sufficiently long for the benefits to outweigh the costs. If justification 
exists based on threat and duration, then large convoys should be used (Sternhell and 
Thorndike 1946). 
Another historical analysis on the use of convoy during WWII can be found in the 
second chapter of The Pleasures of Counting by T.W. Körner (1996). This work further 
elaborates on some of the topics of Sternhell and Thorndike’s insights and additionally 
offers counterpoints to some historical arguments against convoy. 
One such argument against convoys refuted by Körner (1996) is that a “convoy 
would provide an easier target for a submarine” (28). Instead, he offers that: 
The ocean is so large and a convoy occupies so little space in it that a convoy 
is almost as hard to find as a single ship... Attacking an escorted convoy is 
more dangerous and more difficult than attacking a single ship. Even if a U-
boat manages to get into a position to attack it will normally only sink one 
or two ships... In the worst case when the U-boat manages to make repeated 
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attacks it carries only a limited number of torpedoes and can sink only a 
limited number of ships. (28) 
Defending the use of convoys against the argument that “a convoy can only travel 
as fast as its slowest ship,” Körner (1996) made a similar point to that made in Sternhell 
and Thorndike’s work: 
The statistics of the two World Wars show that a ship is safer in a convoy 
even if the convoy’s speed is substantially lower than that achievable by the 
ship on its own. A faster ship sailing alone will, of course, deliver more 
tonnage per month, but only until it is sunk. (27) 
One final defense for convoys against the argument that they caused “delays 
involved in unloading” is offered: 
It turned out that it was the unpredictability of arrival of independently 
routed ships which disrupted the (relatively) smooth running of the ports 
and the railway systems which served them. The high probability that 
convoys would arrive and leave on schedule was a remedy for, and not a 
cause of, port congestion. (Körner 1996, 27) 
Taken together, the analyses presented by Sternhell and Thorndike (1946) and 
Körner (1996) on the use of escorted convoys offer compelling evidence for their 
effectiveness at protecting shipping against enemy attack during WWII. Additionally, 
Körner (1996) argues for convoy’s potential to improve port efficiency, which could 
improve the overall logistics system throughput. 
4. Our Contribution 
After consulting the literature, we chose to approach the problem of logistics in 
contested environments with the intent of proposing an analysis-based recommendation for 
a logistics architecture. We determined our analysis would be based on a model that 
accounts for logistics asset attrition, considers the possibility of adding self-defense 
capability to logistics assets, and revisits the concept of escorted convoy in the context of 
present-day weaponry, defenses, tracking, and targeting systems. Our analysis would also 
attempt to utilize network optimization to match specific logistics architecture components 
to arcs within the network to gain insight on where specific asset types are best utilized to 
maximize system throughput. 
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D. OUTLINE 
This report details our research, modeling, and analysis efforts and provides our 
insights and recommendations regarding logistics in contested environments. The sequence 
in which we present the information mirrors the systems engineering waterfall process 
steps to define and bound the problem, determine candidate system architectures, develop 
a representative model, and analytically compare the candidate architectures to arrive at a 
recommended system capable of meeting mission demands.  
Chapter II of the report provides a detailed description of the systems engineering 
process our team utilized in the conduct of this research. It shares stakeholder and subject 
matter expert insights, provides relevant context, and bounds the scope of effort. Finally, 
it analyzes system requirements and functions, culminating in several candidate logistics 
architectures to serve as inputs to our analytical model. 
Next, Chapter III explains our approach to modeling, lists our assumptions, and 
details each of the model components and how they interact. The theory behind each of the 
modeling components is discussed to convey the reasons for their inclusion. Equations 
utilized within the model are listed and their utility explained. 
Chapter IV provides you with the outputs of our model and initial insights derived 
from the analysis. Initial results are presented along with sensitivity analyses. The effects 
of logistics vessel type and corresponding characteristics, self-defense capability, escorted 
convoy, and port capacity are demonstrated. 
Finally, Chapter V contains our recommended solution for a logistics architecture 
and highlights key insights and findings. Amplifying information regarding specific 
modeling input values and a brief communication system analysis can be found in in the 
appendices. 
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II. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING 
A. PROCESS OVERVIEW 
Through the systems engineering analysis (SEA) curriculum, we were taught 
different definitions and models of SE which were directly applied to this research. Though 
there are many SE definitions, our team applied the following from Blanchard and 
Fabrycky (2011) to this research: 
An approach to translate operational needs and requirements into 
operationally suitable blocks of systems. The approach shall consist of a 
top-down, iterative process of requirements analysis, functional analysis 
and allocation, design synthesis and verification, and system analysis and 
control. Systems engineering shall permeate design, manufacturing, test and 
evaluation, and support of the product. Systems engineering principles shall 
influence the balance between performance, risk, cost, and schedule. (18) 
All SE definitions include the major concepts of a top-down, iterative, and 
interdisciplinary approach. In this way, systems thinking enables us to look at the 
wholeness of a system or system of systems and how it interacts with its environment to 
optimally perform its operational functions to meet the stakeholder needs. 
In addition, there are many models utilized to represent the SE processes. Blanchard 
and Fabrycky (2011) include three processes in their textbook, Systems Engineering and 
Analysis: Waterfall, Spiral, and “V” Model, which were analyzed by our SE team to choose 
the process that was best for us to follow given our nine-month time constraint. The model 
we chose mirrors that of the Waterfall model, as shown in Figure 2. 
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 Waterfall Model. Source: Blanchard and Fabrycky (2011, 36). 
We chose this model because of its ability to show traceability and our capability 
to iterate through these phases of the process model. However, we condensed and modified 
Figure 2 to tailor it for our capstone project, as shown in Figure 3. Due to the nature of our 
work, the waterfall model ended at the “Design” phase, this was because our final 
deliverable would encompass multiple concepts of operations (CONOPS) of old and new 
logistics capable platforms to employ in a contested environment. These CONOPS then 
served as inputs to an analytic model which was utilized to conduct an analysis of 
alternative solutions and recommend a final architecture based on the results. 
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 SEA29 Tailored Waterfall Model 
The three phases of our tailored waterfall model were divided into three quarterly efforts 
with multiple feedback loops which provided opportunities to adjust work completed in 
previous phases. This demonstrates the iterative nature of the SE process. 
1. Problem Definition 
Phase one included developing a process model, conducting background research 
on logistics in contested environments, and forming focus groups to foster organization of 
effort, conversation, and idea sharing. Discussions within these groups enabled us to scope 
the problem, incorporate real-life operational experiences, and start formulating questions 
and candidates for a stakeholder analysis. The stakeholder analysis was a pivotal part of 
developing a need statement. The stakeholder analysis included several interviews with 
subject matter experts on campus, industry personnel, senior military officers, and 
government contractors. This process enabled us to further scope the problem and 
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understand the capability gap the Navy faces. Phase one concluded with a defined needs 
statement where we brainstormed and, via functional decomposition, developed 
appropriate functions the system must accomplish to fulfill the Navy’s need. 
2. Requirements Analysis 
The next phase involved developing operational requirements, conducting a 
functional analysis, developing several candidate logistics architectures, and developing an 
analytical modeling process to analyze the candidate systems. During this phase, we also 
conducted our first In-Progress Review (IPR) to explain the status of this project to our 
stakeholders and receive their feedback. When the status of the project was briefed at the 
first IPR, our stakeholders had the opportunity to pose questions, provide direction, and 
deliver other relevant feedback which we were able to use in refining system requirements. 
The operational requirements would later be used to define the mission, performance and 
physical parameters, operational deployment/distribution, operational life cycle, utilization 
requirements, effectiveness factors, and environmental factors (Blanchard and Fabrycky 
2011).  
Following requirements definition is a functional analysis. A functional analysis, 
as defined by Blanchard and Fabrycky (2011), “is an iterative process of translating system 
requirements into detailed design criteria and the subsequent identification of the resources 
required for system operation and support” (86). For us, this process was accomplished by 
analyzing our previous functional decomposition and ensuring there was traceability 
between requirements and functions. These efforts further refined the scope of the project 
and helped to define the attributes of the model we developed.  
3. System Design 
Finally, the last step of our process model was designing the system. This phase 
included a finalization of the model with an analysis of the results and recommended 
architectures. In developing adequate recommendations, a trade-off analysis was 
conducted. This compared different architectures according to their performance 
parameters along with their feasibility and overall effectiveness. The sensitivity analysis 
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contained within the trade-off analysis also gave stakeholders the ability to evaluate our 
research to compare how our assumptions and decision criteria affected the results.  
The following sections will provide details on each of the SE process steps our team 
completed during this research, beginning with problem definition. 
B. PROBLEM DEFINITION 
One of the great challenges and most important stages in the systems engineering 
process is problem definition. While the tasking statement represents an initial attempt to 
define the project scope, focus, and outcomes, the voice and concerns of all concerned 
stakeholders must be considered when diagnosing the true nature of the problem. The 
temptation to hastily address the given problem should be deferred until certain that the 
right problem is being solved. Stakeholder analysis, therefore, is an integral step in that 
problem definition.  
For our project, the SEA29 tasking statement included a listing of on and off 
campus subject matter experts to serve as a starting point. We conducted research outreach 
and panel interviews (utilizing NPS Institutional Review Board approved questions) to 
gain perspective on the problem and to identify their interests as stakeholders. Based on 
those discussions, these individuals, and the organizations they represent, were divided 
further into “stakeholders” and “subject matter experts” (SMEs). In general, the 
stakeholders involved had a vested interest in the outcome and recommendations of the 
project, whereas subject matter experts served the project through the information they 
were able to provide themselves or through their professional networks. 
1. Stakeholders 
• VADM Ricky Williamson, USN, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for 
Fleet Readiness and Logistics (OPNAV N4) 
• RADM Daniel Fillion, USN, Director, Warfare Integration (OPNAV N9I) 
• Mr. Paul Lluy, Assistant Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Warfare 
Systems (OPNAV N9B) 
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• CAPT (Ret) Jeffrey Kline, OPNAV N9I Chair, Systems Engineering 
Analysis 
• CAPT Eric Morgan, USN, OPNAV N4iL – Logistics Analytics Branch 
(LAB) 
• CDR (Ret) Matthew Boensel, OPNAV N9I Chair, Systems Engineering 
Analysis 
• Dr. Michael Atkinson, Operations Research Advisor 
• Dr. Fotis Papoulias, Systems Engineering Advisor 
• SEA29 Student Cohort 
2. Subject Matter Experts 
• RADM (Ret) Winford “Jerry” Ellis, NPS Undersea Warfare Chair 
• RDML (Ret) Richard Williams, NPS Mine Warfare Chair 
• CAPT Charles “Chuck” Good, NPS Surface Warfare Chair 
• CAPT Edward McCabe, USN, NPS Air Warfare Chair 
• Dr. Wayne Porter, CAPT (Ret), USN, Director, NPS Littoral Operations 
Center 
• COL Randolph Pugh, USMC, NPS Senior Marine Representative 
• Dr. Aruna Apte, NPS Graduate School of Defense Management 
• Dr. Kenneth Doerr, NPS Graduate School of Defense Management 
• CDR Matthew Geiser, USN, Operation Research Faculty 
• CDR (Ret) Harrison Schramm, USN, Center for Strategic and Budgetary 
Assessments 
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• Lisa DeVine, Leidos 
• Frank Leban, Naval Surface Warfare Center 
• Dan Tubbs, Boeing, Echo Voyager Program Manager 
3. Needs Analysis 
The primitive needs of each stakeholder determined over the course of our 
discussions and outreach were compiled and are listed in Table 3. 
Table 3. Primitive Stakeholder Needs 





Mr. Paul Lluy 
CAPT Morgan 
• Insight, analysis, and recommendations for 
logistics systems, architectures, and concepts of 
operations 
• Recommendations to close capability gaps with 
identification of tradeoffs 
 
NPS SEA Chair(s) 
CAPT (Ret) Kline 
CDR (Ret) Boensel 
• Completion of graduation requirements 





• Completion of graduation requirements 
• Relevant recommendations to OPNAV N9I 
• Challenging and rewarding academic experience 
 
SEA29 Cohort • Completion of graduation requirements 
• Application of critical thinking and reinforcement 
of curricula skills 
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The stakeholders and SMEs collectively provided insight, concerns, and common 
themes that served as background information, shaped the problem, and enabled us to 
appropriately scope our efforts. Highlights from those discussions were broken into five 
main categories: general guidance, scoping considerations, economic considerations, threat 
environment considerations, solution centered suggestions. Following are the highlights 
captured during stakeholder analysis: 
a. General Guidance 
• Distributed Maritime Operations, as defined in A Design for Maritime 
Operations, Version 2.0 by the Chief of Naval Operations (2018) will 
serve as a guidance for the concept of operations that may be employed 
against peer competitors. 
• General Berger’s Commandant’s Planning Guidance builds upon and 
reinforces the concept of operations from the perspective of the United 
States Marine Corps (2019). 
• Work from previous related NPS capstone and thesis efforts, such as the 
Total Ship Systems Engineering (TSSE) group, should be leveraged and 
incorporated. 
b. Economic Considerations 
• The time horizon of 2030–2035 enables project recommendations to feed 
and support program objective memorandum (POM) cycles and 
technological advances. 
• Cost remains a large concern as budget constraints and national debt will 
always be considerations. 
• Industrial base capability and buildup is a legitimate concern to the 
logistics problem. 
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• Consideration should be given to alternate ownership constructs for supply 
assets. Can capability be contracted? Must assets be purchased new or can 
they be repurposed? 
c. Scoping Considerations 
• Autonomous and unmanned systems are not desired capabilities in their 
own right. The capability, speed, and risk reduction they offer are what 
may make them valuable. 
• Fuel logistics are the highest priority supply concern. 
• A focus on physical delivery systems and their protection in a contested 
environment will be the most relevant area of focus. 
• Communications and information support systems will be crucial to the 
success of logistics delivery in a contested environment but is not the best 
area of focus for this student group. 
d. Threat Environment Considerations 
• Reconnaissance, surveillance, and tracking systems advances are making 
it easier for peer competitors to follow movements, even in the ocean 
expanses. 
• Long-range missiles have changed the landscape such that nearly 
everywhere can be considered contested. 
• Underwater assets will still be threatened, even though the undersea 
domain remains the best place to hide. 
• Risk tolerance will increase as conflict escalates through the range of 
military operations (ROMO). 
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e. Solution Centered Suggestions 
• Inventory awareness and capability for the transfer of cargo from one 
carrier to another will enable lateral and backwards supply chain flows 
that can increase the resilience in the system. 
• Stockpiles, whether overt or covert may be utilized to improve supply 
system resilience. 
• Worldwide commerce may persist even during a peer competitor conflict. 
It may be possible to hide in plain sight or utilize commercial routes. 
• Predictive (“push”) versus reactive (“pull”) logistics may be used to 
improve mission readiness and will require data collection and analysis 
efforts. 
• Finding ways to reduce the demand signal could be as fruitful as finding 
ways to increase capacity and survivability. 
The insights gained through stakeholder and needs analysis were then utilized to 
assist in the next step of the SE process: bounding the problem space. 
C. BOUNDING THE PROBLEM SPACE 
Military logistics is a broad subject that includes transportation of traditional 
warfighting materiel such as food rations, fuel, and ammunition (class I, III, and V supplies, 
respectively), but also extends to categories like training, data transfer, medical, mortuary 
affairs, and many others. The complex interrelationship between logistics as an enabler to 
military operations, and military operations as an enabler for logistics transport, is 
exacerbated by great uncertainty about precisely where in the ROMO a future conflict 
might emerge. The rapidly evolving capabilities of our near-peer state competition blurs 
the image further. As such, the limitations in time and available manpower dictated a 
narrowing in scope to create a more manageable problem set. 
25 
We realized early on the need to bound, scope, and provide context to the problem 
space. The Naval Postgraduate School scenario “The Global War 2030—Two Years In” 
(summarized in a subsequent section) was developed to provide context during the WIC 
and defined the scale of war within the ROMO. We adopted that scenario in our efforts to 
serve as context when making assumptions and conducting analysis.  
To further clarify the term, “near-peer competitors” refers specifically to the pacing 
threats represented by China and Russia. While a China campaign is expected to be 
geographically limited to the Pacific Ocean operating area, a campaign against Russia is 
assumed to take place only in the Atlantic Ocean operating area and Western Europe. Thus, 
the project evaluated the relevant differences that are generated by the variations in 
operating environments and physical distances inherent in the respective geographic 
regions. 
Dry stores, fuel, and ammunition were assumed to represent the bulk of material to 
be conveyed to the front lines in support of warfighting operations. Consumption and 
delivery rates for these classes of supply were considered in the establishment of measures 
of performance (MOPs) and measures of effectiveness (MOEs) which were utilized to 
compare one architecture to another. We considered production and packaging of resources 
to be outside the scope of this research—it was assumed that resources needed by the 
warfighter were available in the logistics system. 
We expected this analysis effort to generate insight regarding the operational 
strengths and weaknesses inherent to existing logistics carriers, to include joint capabilities, 
commercially available lift technologies, and conceptual technologies. This effort 
endeavored to recommend an architecture that would likely include elements from each 
category, arranged in such a way to exploit the strengths and to mitigate the weaknesses of 
each component. 
Based on the context provided in the “Global War 2030—Two Years In” scenario 
and the assumptions we made to scope the problem space, we then revisited the tasking 
statement to ensure we focused our efforts in the appropriate places. 
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1. Focused Problem Statement 
After accounting for stakeholder concerns, input from subject matter experts, and a 
literature review including national strategic directives, we distilled the tasking statement 
into the following problem statement (emphasis added to the original): 
Design a cost effective, deployable, and resilient unmanned and manned 
system of systems to provide logistics in contested environments by near-
peer competitors in the 2030–2035 timeframe. 
• Consider system delivery rates of dry stores, fuel, and ammunition at 
sea and to forward operating areas ashore. 
• Where possible, include joint contributions in the system of systems. 
• Develop alternative architectures and their operational employment 
concepts. 
• Investigate current commercially available lift and technologies for 
rapid acquisition as one alternative. (Jeffrey Kline, personal 
communication, September 1, 2019) 
2. Scenario: “The Global War 2030—Two Years In” 
We adopted the scenario developed by Professor Jeffrey Kline for both our Joint 
Campaign Analysis coursework and the 2019 WIC held at the Naval Postgraduate School 
for the basis of our project’s context; it is called “Global War 2030—Two Years In.” It is 
a notional representation of great-power competition in the 2030–2032 timeframe. We 
coupled the given scenario with real-world, open-source capabilities data found on the 
internet to create a realistic backstory for our project efforts. Based off the details of the 
scenario and in consideration of our time constraints, we chose to focus our efforts on only 
the Pacific area of operations. We felt this region presented the greater challenge to 
logistics due to the long lines of communication. It also allowed us greater opportunity to 
leverage the expertise of our Singaporean team members, who are also concerned with the 
growing threat posed by China. The following scenario detailing Russian and Chinese 
disposition is fictional but plausible, given their history and current capabilities. 
a. China in the Year 2030 
In 2030, China has become the world’s leading economy. Although her economic 
growth began to slow in 2020, she strengthened trade infrastructure between Asia and 
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Europe under the “Belt and Road” initiative and continued her political, fiscal, economic, 
and military expansionism. Due to a strong energy trade (China’s dependence on the Trans-
Siberian pipeline on oil) and common desire to challenge the United States national power, 
relationship between Russia and China are flourishing. Further economic ties were 
generated by a series of trade agreements that began in 2023 (Jeffrey Kline, class notes, 
July 8, 2019). 
China has occupied several of the Spratly islands terra-formed through dredging in 
2015 with military installations. They have situated their military assets such as fighter 
squadrons, unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAV), surface-to-air installations (S-500), 
anti-cruise missile mobile sites, electronic surveillance and communication sites, and ship 
support facilities. This has been strongly protested by Philippines and the United States 
(Jeffrey Kline, class notes, July 8, 2019). 
Tensions between China and its neighboring East and Southeast Asia countries 
began to build in 2027, which revolved around territorial disputes and small-armed 
conflicts. These tensions eventually escalated into war in 2030. The following five 
examples list the events that occurred from 2027 and led to global war in 2030. 
• In 2027, due to defaulted Chinese loans (for various trade infrastructure) 
by several countries along the “Belt and Silk” road, China forcefully 
occupied critical facilities and placed Chinese companies to manage and 
operate them. This led to violent civil protests of Chinese workers in 
Malaysia, Pakistan, Djibouti, Vietnam, and Indonesia. 
• In 2029, China claimed that either Vietnam, Indonesia or the Philippines 
were responsible for the explosion of its deep-sea exploration ship 100 
nautical miles North of Natuna Besar. China mobilized their South 
China Seas Fleet and demanded restoration from all three countries, or 
they would “secure” their seas. They also threatened to assume 
governorship of the island of Natuna Besar, Indonesia in compensation 
for the attack on their deep-sea exploration ship. 
• A month later, the Chinese sank a patrolling Vietnamese ship using a 
land-based surface to surface missile. China announced all traffic 
through the South China Sea would henceforth be subject to inspection 
and control by Chinese forces. 
• A Philippine helicopter fired on a Peoples Liberation Army Navy 
(PLAN) Type 56 corvette conducting gunnery exercises four miles from 
Palawan Island. In response, China also threatened invasion of Palawan.  
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• During an inspection of Chinese flagships in the Indian Ocean by the 
United States, a U.S. guided missile destroyer (DDG) was torpedoed by 
an unknown submarine. War was declared by all participants. North 
Korea allied itself with China. (Jeffrey Kline, class notes, July 8, 2019) 
These events led to war in the early 2030 with China’s rapid and successful 
occupation of Natuna Besar, Indonesia and Palawan, Philippines. It quickly evolved to a 
maritime war of attrition with China’s sea control threatened by allied submarines inside 
the first island chain, and allied sea control threatened by PLAN submarines, ballistic 
missiles, and cruise missiles around and outside the first island chain. Although under 
threat of ballistic missile attack, allied expeditionary airfields are operating in the area of 
operations from Dong Tac, Vietnam; Kumejima Airport in Japan; Clark airfield in the 
Philippines; Singapore; Nangapinoh airfield, Borneo, Indonesia (Jeffrey Kline, class notes, 
July 8, 2019). Figure 4 shows the military context of the Pacific Theater. 
 
Original map obtained from Google Earth, 2020. 
 Military Context of the Pacific and Indian Oceans 
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In addition to adopting the Global War 2030 scenario, we also conducted research 
on China’s military capabilities and assets. This allowed us to assess the potential risks it 
poses to delivering logistics in a contested environment. There are a few key assumptions 
and key issues that would have to be focused on: 
• China would most likely employ indirect strategy of attacking U.S. 
logistics and avoid “force on force” confrontation. 
• China possess numerous ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance), 
and strike capabilities covering the South China Sea, and beyond, which 
affords her extensive detection ranges. 
• The survivability of individual U.S. logistics assets will depend on 
signature, exposure time, and countermeasures. 
In the following subsections, we give an overview of various Chinese threats U.S. 
forces are likely to encounter within the contested environment. 
(1) Satellites 
China’s Yaogan satellites are a series of reconnaissance satellites that are equipped 
with different sensors (electronic intelligence (ELINT), synthetic aperture radar (SAR) and 
optical) for area surveillance. A simulation conducted by the National Institute of 
Advanced Studies, Bangalore, India, presented the results of the coverage pattern for 
identifying, locating and tracking a ship from the Pacific Ocean, showed in Figure 5. The 
results demonstrated the robustness of the constellation of satellites that can be used to 
detect and track U.S. logistics ships in the area of operations (AO). It is assumed that the 
Chinese satellite surveillance capability will be leveraged to provide weapon cueing for 
anti-ship ballistic missiles and anti-ship cruise missiles launched from shore installations. 
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 Equatorial Crossing Times for Chinese SAR Satellites. Source: 
Chandrashekar and Perumal (2016, 14). 
(2) Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 
The Chinese unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) and unmanned combat aerial vehicle 
(UCAV) arsenal includes high altitude, medium-to-long endurance capabilities which can 
conduct search and disruption operations during the logistics supply mission of U.S. force. 
These assets pose a great threat, with small radar cross-section (RCS) and can also be 
capable of operating in swarms, making it difficult to detect and counter. Some of the 
examples of the UAVs are shown in Table 4. These assets will provide additional search, 
track, and targeting capability to support Chinese weapon systems. 
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Table 4. Chinese UAV and UCAV Inventory. Adapted from Jeffrey Kline, 
class notes (2019). 












ISR 470 4,700 57,000 







174 2,500 17,000 


















135 6,000 49,000 
Dark 
Sword  
30 Supersonic Strike 
Air-to-air 
Unknown Unknown Unknown 
 
(3) Aircraft 
The Chinese aircraft assets, shown in Table 5, are capable of a variety of mission 
profiles, ranging from search to destroy. The greatest threat to the U.S. Force logistics 






Table 5. Chinese Aircraft Inventory. Adapted from Jeffrey Kline, 
class notes (2019). 
Name Numbers Type Capabilities Speed  Range 
(km) 
Su-33 Flanker 200 Fighter Anti-ship, air-to-air, bombs Mach 2.2 3,000 
FC-1 Fierce 
Dragon 
100 Fighter Anti-ship, air-to-air, bombs Mach 1.8 1,352 
J-10 Vigorous 
Dragon 
300 Fighter Air-to-air, Air-to-surface, 
Bombs 
Mach 2.2 1,250 




100 Fighter Air-to-air, Bombs Mach 2+ 6,000 
Y-8FQ MMA 60 Maritime 
Patrol 
EP-3 Recon System, Sonar 
Buoy, depth charges, 
torpedoes, Submarine 
Detection 
Mach 0.5 5,615 
H-6K 20 Bomber Forward-looking Infrared 
(FLIR), Search Radar 
Missile/Bombs 
Mach 0.8 3,000 
H-20 25 Bomber Air-to-ground missiles, Bombs Mach 0.95 12,000 
TU-154 M/D 10 ISR ELINT, SAR, Infrared, 
Television, Photography 
Mach 0.75 6,598 
Y-8XZ (Y-8 
Variant) 






90-equipped troop capacity Mach 0.5 5,615 
Y-20  20 Transport 
(Cargo) 
66-ton capacity Mach 0.75 4,500 
 
(4) Anti-ship Missiles 
Within the arsenal of ballistic missiles that the Chinese possess, the DF-21 and DF-
26 pose the greatest threat to U.S. logistics as due to the capability for “conventional strikes 
against naval targets” (O’Rourke 2019, 4). If coupled with surveillance and targeting 
systems including satellites, UAVs and aircraft identified in the preceding sections, China 
might easily target not only naval logistics ship, but also combat aircraft carriers. Due to 
the missiles’ range and maneuverability, the ballistic missiles are difficult to counter and 




 Chinese Ballistic Missiles and Coverage Areas. Source: 
CSIS (2020). 
(5) Naval Submarine Force 
Submarines afford the Chinese the element of stealth and surprise and would be the 
most likely avenue of attack on U.S. logistics. Submarines also have the highest probability 
of avoiding U.S. combat forces, while potentially inflicting the greatest damage. Some of 
these include the conventionally powered submarines (SSK), the nuclear-powered 
submarines (SSN), and the nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBN). These 
submarines can launch both torpedoes and anti-ship cruise missiles. 
(6) Naval Surface Force 
The Chinese possess multiple naval surface vessels such as guided-missile cruisers 
(CG), guided-missile destroyers, guided-missile frigates (FFG) and corvettes. A study by 
the Congressional Research Service states that China has “the region’s largest navy, with 
more than 300 surface combatants, submarines, amphibious ships, patrol craft, and 
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specialized types” (O’Rourke 2019, 21). These assets will be a substantial threat to U.S. 
logistics if they are encountered at sea. 
(7) Mines 
China poses a significant threat to U.S. shipping in terms of mine warfare. They are 
most likely to utilize mines for denial. According to a Naval War College Review article 
written by Scott Truver (2012), China would also rely heavily on offensive mining in any 
scenario involving Taiwan. With a strong maritime militia consisting of fishing boats and 
other non-combatant vessels, China can deploy mines all over the Pacific Theater. 
According to Goldstein (2019), “laying 2,000 mines per day should be relatively easy for 
Chinese ships and aircraft” (par 6). The Chinese arsenal of mines consists of “over 50,000 
mines [in] over 30 varieties of contact, magnetic, acoustic, water pressure and mixed 
reaction sea mines, remote control mines, rocket-rising and mobile mines” (Freedberg 2015, 
par 15). Freedberg’s (2015) article later goes on to state that China could even possess 
80,000 to 100,000 mines in all. 
(8) Information and Electronic Warfare 
In addition to traditional military assets, China also possesses the capability to 
conduct cyber warfare and deny, spoof, or hack U.S. logistic networks. This has the 
potential to disrupt the ability to replenish U.S Forces in the AO. The use of electronic 
warfare (EW) may allow China to deny the U.S. the use of communications for 
coordinating logistics. China may also have the EW capability to track U.S. logistics, 
making supply missions more vulnerable. 
b. Russia in the Year 2030 
By 2030, Russia has achieved a larger and more stable economy supported by the 
export of oil to Europe and China. With a more stable economy, the Russian military has 
accelerated modernization efforts yielding more capable missile programs and a larger, 
more modern submarine fleet. In the Black Sea region, Russia maintains control of Crimea 
since its annexation in 2014 and maintains forces on the Ukraine-Russia border. In the 
Baltic Sea region, annual military exercises are held as a show of force along the borders 
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of their neighboring countries. In the Mediterranean Sea region, the partnership between 
Russia and Syria continues with a permanent naval group of 15 ships homeported at a naval 
facility in Tartus and continued use an airbase at Hmeymim (Jeffrey Kline, class notes, 
July 8, 2019). 
By 2032, Russia has taken advantage of the ongoing engagement of the United 
States in the Pacific and increased its efforts in political interference using cyber warfare, 
social media, and insurgency. Inspired by Russian rhetoric of reclaiming traditional lands, 
and with a promise of Russian support, Serbia invaded Montenegro. Supported by Bosnia 
and Herzegovina and Croatia, Montenegro was able to halt the advance of Serbian forces 
after a week of fighting. As shown in Figure 7, a front was established along the Moraca 
River between Podgorica and Niksic (Jeffrey Kline, class notes, July 8, 2019). 
 
 Serbian Invasion of Montenegro. Source: Jeffrey Kline, 
class notes (2019). 
36 
Committing to their promise of support, Russia sortied six ships from Tartus and 
two submarines in the Mediterranean to the Adriatic Sea to impose a quarantine on the 
flow of all military supplies. An additional 10 submarines from the fleet in the North Sea 
were also sortied to the Atlantic (Jeffrey Kline, class notes, July 8, 2019). 
In addition to their interference in the Balkans, Russia instigated unrest in the Baltic 
states by claiming persecution of ethnic Russians in Latvia and Lithuania. Russian forces 
mobilized on the borders which prompted the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
rapid reaction force to deploy five thousand troops with artillery support to Latvia and 
Lithuania in response. Capitalizing on the civil unrest, Russia invaded Lithuania by moving 
troops through the Suwalki Gap between Belarus and Kaliningrad as shown in Figure 8 
(Jeffrey Kline, class notes, July 8, 2019). 
 
 Russian Invasion of Lithuania. Source: Jeffrey Kline, 
class notes (2019). 
Within 24 hours, Russian forces had defeated the forces of the NATO rapid reaction 
force and taken control of all Lithuanian lands south of Kaunas. The invasion of Lithuania 
prompted the invocation of NATO Article 5 (Jeffrey Kline, class notes, July 8, 2019). 
Figure 9 shows the military context of the Atlantic and Mediterranean Theater. 
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Original map obtained from Google Earth, 2020. 
 Military Context of the Atlantic Ocean and Mediterranean Sea 
Like with the Chinese threats, our team also conducted open-source research on 
Russian military capabilities to assess the potential risks posed to the team’s tasking of 
delivering logistics in a contested environment. In a study assessing Russia’s armed forces, 
the RAND Corporation determined that the Russian Navy maintains effectiveness in three 
key mission areas: strategic deterrence, coastal defense, and short-term presence operations 
(Crane, Oliker, and Nichiporuk 2019). The study also determined that the Russian Navy 
lacks proficiency in other mission areas such as sea denial in the open ocean, sea control, 
and power projection and attributes this to a lack of large surface combatants capable of 
accomplishing these missions (Crane, Oliker, and Nichiporuk 2019). Among the three 
mission areas in which the Russian navy maintains effectiveness, our primary concern lies 
with their capabilities in coastal defense. These capabilities include threats such as small 
surface combatants, submarines, and aircraft which can be armed with anti-ship and anti-
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submarine missiles and torpedoes as well as shored-based coastal defense anti-ship cruise 
missiles. The following subsections provide an overview of various Russian threats U.S. 
forces are likely to encounter within the contested environment. 
(1) Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 
The Russian UAV threat present in this scenario is the Altius-M, which is a long-
range, medium-altitude UAV with a maximum speed of 950 kilometers per hour and a 
flight time of up to 48 hours. The Altius-M employs a modular design with payloads 
capable of strike, reconnaissance, and electronic warfare (Jeffrey Kline, class notes, 2019). 
These capabilities pose a threat to U.S. Forces by providing Russia with capability for 
locating, tracking, and striking logistics assets. 
(2) Aircraft 
The Russian aircraft assets, shown in Table 6, are capable of a variety of mission 
profiles, ranging from search to destroy. The greatest threat to the U.S. Force logistics 
would be aircraft capable of detection and delivering anti-ship cruise missiles. 
Table 6. Russian Aircraft Inventory. Adapted from Jeffrey Kline 
(class notes, 2019). 
Name Numbers Type Capabilities Speed Range (km) 
An-30 







Flanker-G 25 Fighter 
Air-to-air, Air-to-surface, 
Bombs Mach 2 3,000 
Su-35S 
















(3) Anti-ship Missiles 
Russia has developed a variety of ASCMs and anti-submarine missiles that are 
capable of being launched by surface combatants, submarines, aircraft, and coastal defense 
sites. Potential ASCM threats include the SS-N-22 SUNBURN (3M-80 MOSKIT), SS-N-
25 SWITCHBLADE (3M-24 URAN), SS-N-26 STROBILE (3M-55 ONIKS), and SS-N-
27 SIZZLER (3M-54 KALIBR). A potential anti-submarine missile threat is the 91R from 
the KALIBR weapons family. The basic characteristics for the export versions of these 
missiles are listed in Table 7, and it is assumed that Russian domestic variants are more 
capable (ONI 2015). 
Table 7. Russian Anti-ship Cruise Missile Inventory. Adapted from 
ONI (2015). 
Missile Type Speed Range (km) 
SS-N-22 Anti-ship Mach 2+ 120-240 
SS-N-25 Anti-ship Subsonic 130 
SS-N-26 Anti-ship Mach 2.5 300 
SS-N-27 Anti-ship Cruise: Subsonic Terminal: Supersonic 220 
91R Anti-submarine Subsonic Ship-launched: 40 Sub-launched: 50 
 
(4) Naval Submarine Force 
A lack of direct access to major ocean areas outside of the Pacific has led to 
submarines becoming the capital ships of the Russian navy (ONI 2015). Submarines afford 
Russia the element of stealth and surprise and would be the most likely avenue of attack 
on U.S. logistics. Submarines also possess the highest probability of avoiding U.S. combat 
forces, while potentially inflicting the greatest damage. The primary threats from their 
coastal defense capability include the Kilo-class and Petersburg-class diesel-electric SSKs 
and the nuclear-powered Severodvinsk-class multipurpose guided missile attack submarine 
(SSGN). Their strategic deterrence capability includes the Dolgorukiy-class SSBN. Like 
China, Russian submarines can also fire both torpedoes and anti-ship cruise missiles to 
threaten U.S. logistics assets. 
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(5) Naval Surface Force 
With a higher priority placed on coastal defense, Russia has focused on developing 
smaller surface combatants capable of guarding key areas along their coastline and littoral 
areas (Crane, Oliker, and Nichiporuk 2019). The primary threats among their smaller 
surface combatants include the Sviyazhsk-class guided-missile patrol ship (PGG) and the 
Gorshkov-class, Grigorovich-class, and Steregushchiy-class FFGs. While Russia may be 
focusing on smaller surface combatants for their coastal defense capabilities, threats are 
still posed by their larger surface combatants. The primary threats here are the Sovremenny-
class DDG and the nuclear-powered Lider-class CG. 
(6) Mines 
Russia stands to be the greatest threat with respect to mine warfare and has an 
estimated inventory of “upwards of 250,000” mines, according to Truver (2012). The 
mines could be employed offensively, defensively, or for denial operations. Russia 
possesses bottom, self-propelled, and moored mines that are sensitive to acoustic, magnetic, 
hydrodynamic (pressure), and electric signatures with operating radiuses of 50–60 meters 
(RusNavy n.d.). According to an article in The National Interest titled “Sunk Your 
Battleship: Russia is Developing Deadly Mines that Can Learn,” Russia is developing 
“[artificial intelligence]-controlled mines that are self-learning and can adapt their behavior” 
(Peck 2019, par. 2). This will provide Russia the ability to create formations of mines 
deployed from various assets which are capable of selective-targeting—a serious threat to 
U.S. logistics ships. 
(7) Information and Electronic Warfare 
In addition to the traditional threats posed by Russia’s armed forces, a RAND study 
identified other threats such as nonlinear warfare, noncontact warfare, and information 
warfare. These other threats support military operations by coordinating operations with 
the use of propaganda on social media platforms, electronic warfare, and cyber-attacks 
(Crane, Oliker, and Nichiporuk 2019). These threats have the potential to disrupt the ability 
to replenish U.S. Forces in the AO by denying the U.S. the use of communications for 
coordinating logistics and by making supply missions more vulnerable through tracking. 
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D. REQUIREMENTS DEVELOPMENT 
Once we defined the problem, scoped the problem space, and determined the 
context our system would be operating within, the next step of the SE process called for 
developing the systems operational requirements. Developing operational requirements is 
essential to the SE process and in displaying traceability between the stakeholders needs, 
system form, functions, and components. To address a capability gap, a requirements 
analysis is conducted, involving extensive interviews with personnel who have vested 
interest, experience, and subject matter expertise on the topic. The Defense Acquisitions 
University (DAU) (2001) describes requirements definition as the primary focus of the SE 
process. Systems engineers must understand the primitive needs of the stakeholder to 
develop the requirements for an appropriate and effective system (2001, 35). 
In the SE process and our work, the development of functional and performance 
requirements involves translating from the customers’ requirements (DAU 2001). A 
customer requirement, as defined by DAU (2001), is a “statement of facts and assumptions 
that define the expectation of the system in terms of mission objectives, environment, 
constraints, MOEs and MOSs” (35). These requirements are then defined by the following 
categories: mission definition, performance and physical parameters, operational 
deployment or distribution, operational life cycle (horizon), utilization requirements, 
effectiveness factors, and environmental factors (Blanchard and Fabrycky 2011). We 
transformed the critical operational issues (COIs) into system operational requirements 
(SORs) using this method to ensure the proper requirements were developed. 
1. Mission Definition 
The primary purpose of the proposed system is to provide logistics to the warfighter 
in a contested environment. The term warfighter is general in nature; however, it describes 
the marine on the beach, the sailor on a ship, the airmen controlling drones, and the pilot 
flying fighters. It also describes allies in theatre. This system needs to be scalable in a 
manner that it can be used in different theatres of war against near-peer competitors. Due 
to the scalability of the system, it could also effectively supply logistics in an uncontested 
environment. It could enable the DOD to diversify its logistics fleet to meet the warfighter 
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demand. Currently, the logistics fleet is incapable of supplying the requisite logistics to its 
warfighters in a time of a global war (Walton, Boone, and Schramm 2019). Therefore, our 
proposed system shall provide a method to transport and deliver mission essential cargo 
(such as class I, III, and V supplies) within a contested environment. 
2. Critical Operational Issues 
Another aspect of the process which involves stakeholders is the development of 
COIs. By identifying the COIs, we were able to narrow the scope of the project and 
understand what SORs a proposed logistics architecture would need to meet. Defense 
Acquisition University (n.d.) defines COIs as “key operational effectiveness or suitability 
issues that must be examined in operational test and evaluation to determine the system’s 
capability to perform its mission.” They are normally expressed in the format of a question 
and decomposed into MOEs and measures of suitability (MOSs). An MOE is a quantifiable 
metric used to evaluate a system in its intended environment (DAU n.d.).  
Once the systems MOEs are determined, each is then further decomposed into one 
or more measures of performance (MOPs). An MOP, as DAU (n.d.) defines, is a 
“quantifiable metric regarding a particular performance parameter.” After one creates 
viable MOPs, data requirements (DRs) are developed, which are the metrics used as input 
values for their respective MOP. We developed the following COIs: 
• COI 1: Is the system capable of deploying to a contested environment 
(transport from supply nodes to the contested environment)? 
• COI 2: Do the system connectors support transfer of goods from one 
carrier to another and from carrier to warfighters? 
• COI 3: How available is the system? 
• COI 4: How cost effective is the system delivering goods in a contested 
environment? 
• COI 5: How survivable is the system? 
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3. Performance and Physical Parameters 
The system of systems generated in this study will be scalable to address a wide 
range of potential conflict scenarios. As such, the amount of supply demanded and other 
parameters (such as sea state, altitude, range, and hours of operation) were represented as 
“X” values. We understood that different AOs and conflict scenarios will drive more 
specific values. This effort was consistent with the iterative SE process and a desire to 
remain solution neutral while defining the requirements. The following are the SORs we 
developed for performance and physical parameters: 
SOR. 1: The system shall have probability of survival greater than XX. 
• The probability of detection shall be less than X. The probability of 
detection influences a platform’s susceptibility which is its ability to avoid 
the effects of a threat (Ball 2013). Lower probability of detection 
contributes to a lower susceptibility, which is desired to enhance system 
survivability. 
• The noise level of the system shall be X dB. This refers to the acoustic 
noise generated by the unit when in its normal mode of operation. Higher 
noise levels lead to a greater probability of detection, which is 
unfavorable. 
• The velocity of units in the system shall be X knots. The speed at which 
a platform can operate impacts its susceptibility by means of its time spent 
in a threat environment and its ability to evade a threat, if detected. 
• The system shall survive a sea state greater than six, as defined by the 
World Meteorological Organization. In addition to man-made threats, 
the system must also withstand the effects of its operating environment. 
Sea state includes wave height and swell height. 
• The system shall have a defense mechanism. Defense may refer to the 
system’s ability to reduce its susceptibility, its vulnerability, or both. 
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SOR. 2: The system of systems shall deploy in a contested environment. 
• The system shall have a range of X nm. The range of the system is the 
distance over which it may operate. The system should be capable of all its 
demand nodes with at least one supply node. 
• The system shall remain operational in seas greater than sea-state 
four, as defined by the World Meteorological Organization. This 
varies from the sub–requirement under SOR1 in that the system must not 
only survive in sea state four, but also continue performing its primary 
mission. 
• The system shall operate at X altitude. Aerial components of the 
system, if any, must operate at some distance above the surface of the 
Earth, which may impact its susceptibility. 
• The system shall operate at X meter below the waterline. Submersible 
components of the system, if any, must operate at some distance below the 
surface of the sea, which may impact its susceptibility. 
SOR. 3: The system shall be able to store required goods. The system must be 
capable of delivering enough supply to meet the demand signal of the warfighter. Capacity 
of each unit in the system and the overall system capacity will both affect this requirement. 
• The system shall be capable of storing X tons of munitions. 
• The system shall be capable of storing X tons of dry goods. 
• The system shall be cable of storing X barrels of fuel. 
4. Operational Deployment Parameters 
For the purposes of this analysis, the system will be required to deploy in the Pacific 
and Atlantic AOs. The system will be capable of using different domains (air, surface, sub-
surface, and land) assets to deliver logistics. The system will be expected to transit from 
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high seas to territorial seas and international airspace into national airspace as shown in 
Figure 10. 
 
 Legal Boundaries of the Oceans and Airspace. Source: 
JCS (2018b, I-6). 
The system will also operate and deliver its logistics in the littorals. The Joint 
Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment defines littorals as an area that is 
made up of two segments of the operational environment: 
1. Seaward: the area from the open ocean to the shore, which must be 
controlled to support operations ashore. 
2. Landward: the area inland from the shore that can be supported and 
defended directly from the sea. (JCS 2014, GL-6) 
SOR. 4: The system shall operate in and above littoral waters. 
• The system shall operate at X altitude. This operating environment of 
the littorals may dictate an operating altitude for aerial assets that differs 
from its altitude in other environments. 
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• The system shall have a draft of X meters. The draft of a vessel is the 
distance between the waterline and the lowest part of the vessels keel 
beneath the waterline. Vessels are unable to safely navigate in waters 
shallower than their draft (plus a safety factor to account for tidal range). 
SOR. 5: The system shall offload/onload goods. 
• The system shall transfer X tons of goods per day. This is the rate at 
which the system is capable of loading or unloading dry cargo to/from the 
delivery or transfer units of the system.  
• The system shall transfer X gallons of fuel per day. This is the rate at 
which the system is capable of loading or unloading fuel to/from the 
delivery or transfer units of the system. 
Table 8 summarizes our efforts to decompose the COIs into SORs, MOEs, MOPs, 
and DRs. These metrics and data requirements helped our team to measure the 
effectiveness of our logistics system.
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Table 8. Measuring System Success 
COIs SORs MOEs MOPs DRs 
1. Survivability 
 
1.1 The system shall 








to wave heights  
1.1.1.1 Probability of 
detection 
 




1.1.1.4 Threat detection 
range 
 
1.1.1.5 Missile load-out 
 
1.1.1.6 Rate of Fire 
 
1.2.1.1 Sea State 
 
1.1.1.1.1 Radar cross-section 
 
1.1.1.2.1 Source noise level 
 
1.1.1.2.2 Transmission losses 
 
1.1.1.2.3 Background noise 
level 
 
1.1.1.2.4 Directivity index 
 
1.1.1.2.5 Detection threshold 
 
1.1.1.3.1 Start location 
 
1.1.1.3.2 End location 
 
1.1.1.4.1 Sweep width 
 
1.1.1.5.1 Missile capacity 
 
1.1.1.6.1 Time between fires 
 
1.2.1.1.1 Wave height 
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COIs SORs MOEs MOPs DRs 
2. Deployability  2.1 The system shall 
operate in contested 
littorals 
 
2.2 The system shall 






to wave heights 
 
2.2.1 Storage 
2.1.1.1 Vehicle speed 
 
2.1.1.2 Fuel efficiency 
 
2.1.1.3 Fuel capacity 
 
2.1.2.1 Operational sea 
state 
 
2.2.1.1 Storage Capacity  
2.1.1.1.1 Start location 
 
2.1.1.1.2 End location 
 
2.1.1.1.3 Start time 
 




2.1.1.3.1 Fuel consumption 
rate 
 
2.1.1.3.1 Usable fuel 
capacity 
 
2.1.2.1 Wave height 
 
2.2.1.1.1 Capacity of dry 
goods (tons) 
 
2.2.1.1.2 Capacity of 
munitions (tons) 
 
2.2.1.1.3 Capacity of fuel 
(barrels) 
3. Distribution  3.1 The system shall 















COIs SORs MOEs MOPs DRs 







3.2.1.2 Percent of 
successful transfers 
3.1.1.2.1 Start location 
 
3.1.1.2.2 End location 
 
3.1.1.2.3 Start time 
 
3.1.1.2.4 End time 
 
3.2.1.1.1 Tons of goods per 
day 
 
3.2.1.1.2 Barrels of fuel per 
day 
 
3.2.1.2.1 Number of 
successful transfers 
 
3.2.1.2.2 Number of failed 
transfers  
4. Availability  4.1 The system shall 
have an availability 
greater than XX 
 
4.2 The system shall 
have a reliability 





4.1.1.1 Mean time 
between maintenance 
 
4.1.1.2 Mean downtime 
 
4.2.1.2 Mean time 
between failure 
4.1.1.1.1 Time between 
maintenance 
 
4.1.1.2.1 Start time of 
maintenance 
 
4.1.1.2.2 End time of 
maintenance 
 
4.2.1.2.1 Hours of operation 
before critical failure  
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COIs SORs MOEs MOPs DRs 
5. Cost 
Effectiveness  
5.1 The per unit cost 
of the system shall be 
less than current 
logistics platforms. 
 
5.2 The learning and 
production rates for 
the manufacturing of 
the system shall be 






5.1.1.1 Fixed operation 
and maintenance cost 
 
5.2.1.1 Slope of learning 
curve 
5.1.1.1.1 System benefits 
 





5.2.1.1.1 Unit number 
 




5. Communications Requirements 
To create a resilient and reliable logistics architecture, two essential functions are 
demand signals and inventory awareness. Demand signals represent the need of the 
warfighter, the end user, who requires supplies to maintain mission readiness and to 
execute missions. This is commonly understood as “pull” logistics. These demands are 
currently passed from the warfighter to suppliers via information systems, relying primarily 
on satellite-based communications. Inventory awareness enables logisticians to identify the 
nearest storage location or asset carrying the demanded supplies, and route them to the 
warfighter in the most efficient manner. Inventory awareness relies on the capability to 
update stock usage and locations in real time. In a conflict, inventory awareness becomes 
even more critical because knowing that a shipment is destroyed, and its contents, will 
enable immediate initiation of subsequent delivery efforts. Inventory awareness, as much 
as demand signal transmission, also relies on real time information sharing. 
In a multi-domain war of attrition with a peer competitor, communication systems 
are likely to contested and potentially denied entirely. One method to reduce the amount 
information sharing required is through conversion to “push” logistics systems where 
possible. In a push logistics system, utilization rates are analyzed, often with the help of 
artificial intelligence, to predict the needed supplies and proactively ship them to the 
warfighter. This has a secondary benefit of reduced administrative burden on logisticians 
in the field. While push logistics should be exploited to the maximum extent possible, it is 
unreasonable to assume that the fidelity would be high enough to eliminate the demand 
signal requirement entirely. Furthermore, push logistics are no substituted for inventory 
awareness. 
For these reasons, any logistics architecture will require some form of a 
communications (COMMS) network to receive and transmit requisite demand signals 
between distant supply and demand nodes of the architecture. Though we focused most of 
its efforts on the transport and delivery functions of logistics, the COMMS component was 
determined vital and required further analysis. Our technology team developed an analysis 
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on potential COMMS architectures that could support the system. The details and results 
of this analysis are listed in Appendix A. 
E. FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS 
As described by Blanchard and Fabrycky (2011), a function is an operation that the 
system must perform to meet an objective. A functional analysis is used in the SE process 
due to its iterative nature, and how it facilitates a decomposition of system level 
requirements into functions the System of Interest (SOI) must perform to meet the 
stakeholders needs. This analysis is done during the conceptual phase to keep systems 
engineers unbiased and allow them to remain solution neutral. That is, in developing the 
system, one must identify a need, create requirements, allocate functions, and identify 
components and subcomponents that will perform specific tasks. To adequately 
accomplish and document a functional analysis, the use of diagrams and models is 
necessary. These include a functional hierarchy, Integrated Definition (IDEF), and 
Functional Flow Block Diagram (FFBD) modeling (Blanchard and Fabrycky 2011). 
1. Top-Level Functions 
The functional hierarchy prioritizes the function of the system. In scoping the 
tasking statement, we chose to analyze and model the transportation and delivery functions 
of logistics as shown in Figure 11. 
 
 Logistics Functions 
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NEED: The logistics system will be required to recognize a need and generate a 
demand signal. That is, the systems must have a method for the warfighter to recognize a 
deficiency and requisition a specific part, sustenance, fuel, or other need. For the purposes 
of our analysis, we assumed that the infrastructure was already in place to enable the 
warfighter to input their needs into the system. 
COMMUNICATION: As stated in the previous section, the system requires a 
supporting communications architecture. This architecture will need to be robust and 
enable the warfighter to communicate their needs. It must also enable the components of 
the proposed system to share information with each other, the supply depot, and warfighter. 
The ability of system components to effectively communicate with each other was 
considered vital, and an in-depth analysis can be found in Appendix A. 
PRODUCTION AND PACKAGING: We also assumed that the system would be 
required to effectively produce and package parts for delivery via transport assets. We 
understood the U.S. will require a robust supply infrastructure buildup and that there will 
always be a finite supply of parts, munitions, fuel, and dry goods. For the purpose of this 
proposed system, these limitations were considered outside the scope and the analysis 
assumes that there would be a production and packaging component in place to supply the 
requisite goods. 
TRANSPORTATION: The system will require a transportation function to store, 
transfer, and transit to the contested environment. We chose to focus on this top-level 
function and analyze several alternatives to develop a CONOPS and architecture that 
would adequately perform this function. The system will be transiting in a contested AO; 
therefore, the system will need to be robust and resilient. 
DELIVERY: The system will need to be able to deliver cargo and fuel to both 
vessels at sea, units operating within contested littorals, and units ashore. 
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2. System Interfaces (IDEF0) 
The Defense Acquisition University (2001) describes IDEF0 models to “show data 
flow, system control, and the functional flow of life cycle processes” (51). As shown in 
Figure 12, an IDEF model has inputs, controls, mechanisms, and outputs, wherein: an input 
is a form of data, object, or action that triggers the function, a control is a process, 
constraint, policy, or other method that further bounds the system, a mechanism is a method 
to facilitate the functions actions, and the output is the intended byproduct by which the 
function produced. The input, control, and output arrows could relate to other function 
showing an interconnection between top-level functions. 
 
 IDEF0 Box Format. Source: DAU (2001, 51). 
To further bound the system, we created an IDEF0, as shown in Figure 13. Though 
the focus of the proposed system was centered on the transportation and delivery function, 
the IDEF0 shows the interconnection of all the top-level functions the system will be 
required to perform, along with exchange of information and constraints.
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 Proposed System IDEF0
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3. Functional Decomposition 
Decomposing the system level functions further, we decided to use the functions 
delineated by the Universal Naval Task List (UNTL). The UNTL was developed by Navy, 
Marine, and Coast Guard leadership as an effort to standardize requirements for planning, 
executing, and planning joint missions while outlining mission essential tasks (MET) the 
services must complete (DON, 2007). For logistics, the DON defined 14 METs as shown 
in Figure 14. Each of the functions is further broken down into numerous subfunctions as 
well, giving a comprehensive description of the functions a successful logistics system 
must perform. We chose the following as critical top-level functions the system must 
accomplish in a contested environment to fulfill COIs 1–3: provide arms, provide fuel, 
provide transportation services, and supply the force. 
 
 UNTL Top-Level Logistics Functions. Adapted from 
DON (2007b). 
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The UNTL further decomposes its logistics functions as shown in Figure 15. We 
agreed that the proposed system will be required to conduct the highlighted sub-functions 
to be effective for the warfighter. 
 
 Logistics Sub-Function Hierarchy. Adapted from DON (2007b). 
Upon completion of selecting the required functions, we developed a FFBD 
utilizing a systems architecture software called CORE 9. An FFBD demonstrates 
traceability from the top-level system functions down to subfunction level, as shown in 
Figure 16. It is important that all the elements of the SOI are depicted in the FFBD. DAU 
(2001) emphasizes that an FFBD is functionally oriented and solution neutral. This enables 
decision makers to remain unbiased regarding a solution—instead, prompting them to 
focus on what the system must do to fill the gap. 
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 FFBD Traceability and Indenture. Source: DAU (2001, 49). 
The complete FFBD for the proposed system is shown in Figure 17 The three 
parallel branches depict the proposed system and its interaction between the enemy and the 
warfighter. The proposed functions for the system also have associated COIs, as described 
in the previous chapter for traceability purposes. 
1. Load Goods – (COI 2, COI 4, COI 5): The system must be able to load the 
required goods to the platform of choice. This could be through 
autonomous means, cranes, or personnel. 
2. Store Material (COI 2, COI 4, COI 5): The system must be able to store 
the required cargo requested by the warfighter. The storage capacity and 
structure are important due to the type of cargo the system is required to 
transport such as fuel, munition, and dry goods. Transporting fuel and 
munitions carry certain restrictions, policies, and specific safety 
procedures. Therefore, the system must be able to accommodate these 
constraints. 
3. Transit (COI 1, COI 2, COI 4, COI 5): The system must be able to transit 
in high seas, exclusive economic zones, and international airspaces. Due 
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to the scalability of the proposed system, it must be able to transit in 
different AOs. The purpose of this proposed system is to navigate and 
deliver goods to the warfighter in a contested environment. The interaction 
between the proposed system and the enemy is critical. As depicted in 
Figure 17, the enemy would be able track, locate, and potentially engage 
the proposed system. 
4. Provide Delivery (COI 1, COI 3, COI 4, COI 5): The system must have a 
deliver method in the littoral and national airspace. The method of 
delivery could be manned or autonomous and have different domains such 
as air platform, surface, or sub-surface delivery methods. 
5. Transfer required cargo (COI1, COI 3, COI 4, COI 5): Upon delivery, the 
system must have a method or mechanism to transfer the goods from the 
platform to the warfighter.
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 Decomposed FFBD 
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F. CANDIDATE LOGISTICS ARCHITECTURE ALTERNATIVES 
After completing functional analysis, our next step was to translate system 
functions into form—the part of the SE process where the physical architecture of the 
system takes shape. We chose several architectures with the potential to accomplish the 
required system functions based on stakeholder discussion, participation in the 2019 WIC, 
and our own operational experiences. We analyzed each of the architectures in a process 
called “Analysis of Alternatives” (AOA). According to DAU (n.d.), an AOA “is initiated 
to examine potential materiel solutions with the goal of identifying the most promising 
option.” We expected this process to yield insights into the advantages and disadvantages 
of each architecture so we could narrow our options down to the preferred solution. We 
also expected that the final solution of this process would likely be a blended solution of 
two or more potential architectures, which would allow the final architecture to leverage 
benefits and minimize drawbacks. This section serves to introduce each candidate 
architectures and our initial insights and assumptions about what they may provide to the 
solution space. The analysis conducted on the alternative architectures will be covered in 
a subsequent section of this document. 
1. Traditional Logistics 
First, as a basis for comparison, we analyzed the traditional logistics concept that 
the Navy already employs. Based on our operational experience, we know that in this 
architecture, a very few large, high-capacity, and high-value CLF ships operate inside and 
outside of contested environments (CE) to supply units in need of supplies, arms, and fuel. 
The CLF ships conduct underway replenishment (UNREP) with combatant ships and 
utilize embarked helicopter assets to deliver supplies ashore. Figure 18 illustrates the 
“Traditional Logistics” architecture—one that appears to be inherently non-distributed, and 




 Traditional Logistics Architecture 
2. SE Capstone: Expeditionary Logistics System 
The next architecture we chose to analyze was one proposed by fellow NPS systems 
engineering students on the Total Ship Systems Engineering (TSSE) track. Within the 2019 
WIC, they developed an Expeditionary Logistics System (ELS) as part of a ship design 
capstone project and proposed it as a replacement to the current CLF fleet ships. This 
architecture centers on a “mothership” that remains outside the CE and serves as an 
intermediate logistics node. The mothership receives bulk supply from large, merchant-
size ships that circulate on long-haul shipping routes in the control zone. The mothership 
then distributes those supplies to the warfighter via an embarked fleet of small delivery 
platforms. The Total Ships Systems Engineering team named these small delivery vessels 
“Marine Operations Logistics Assets” (MOLAs). The MOLAs are both surface and 
subsurface and operate in a distributed manner within the CE (Alexander et al. 2020). 
Figure 19 illustrates the “ELS” architecture; initial assumptions about this architecture are 
that it distributes risk within the CE but still has a single point of failure in the mothership. 
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 SE Capstone Architecture: Expeditionary Logistics System (ELS) 
3. Alternative Use of Current Assets 
A third architecture we chose explored the possibility of repurposing current fleet 
combat assets to serve in a logistics role, wherein repurposed warships would begin by 
rendezvousing with a CLF ship in the control zone to pick up bulk supply. Then, they 
would enter the CE in a distributed manner to supply units in need. Specific platforms we 
envisioned being employed in this architecture were: 
• Landing Helicopter Assault Ships (LHA) 
• Landing Helicopter Dock Ships (LHD) 
• Amphibious Transport Dock Ships (LPD) 
• Dock Landing Ships (LSD) 
• Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) 
• Joint High-Speed Vessels (JHSV) 
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Figure 20 illustrates the “Alternative Use of Current Assets” architecture, which 
has the potential for minimal joint contributions with use of joint aircraft and joint landing 
craft to complete “last tactical mile” deliveries ashore. This architecture appears to 
distribute risk inside the CE, delivery units have an inherent self-defense capability, and a 
single point of failure exists in the CLF ship that operates in the control zone. Other 
important points include that while the repurposed assets fill a supply role, they are less 
available in a combat capability, and a loss of one of these platforms results in losses to 
both combat and logistics capacities. 
 
 Alternative Use of Current Assets Architecture 
4. Sea Train 
A fourth architecture we considered was a “Sea Train” architecture, as illustrated 
in Figure 21, which is a novel concept discussed during the 2019 WIC (Englehorn 2019). 
A sea train consists of many small barge-like transports, each with their own propulsion 
capabilities; each that can form a line and physically couple together. During low-risk, long 
haul routes, the platforms leverage efficiency and speed by streamlining into a composite 
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ship. Then, in the higher risk contested environments, the units disaggregate and utilize 
their own propulsion capabilities to deliver supplies. Surviving components reaggregate 
and make the return trip after their deliveries are complete. This architecture appears to be 
inherently distributed and therefore, eliminates the single point of failure seen in many of 
the other architectures, as any number of surviving sea train components can reaggregate 
and return to supply nodes. However, these units have no self-defense capability. 
 
 Sea Train Architecture 
5. Offshore Support Vessels 
Finally, we analyzed an architecture that includes the use of Offshore Support 
Vessels (OSV), illustrated in Figure 22. These vessels are current-day commercial assets 
employed in the supply and maintenance of oil platforms, which are readily attainable off-
the-shelf and are relatively inexpensive given their capabilities. In this architecture, the 
OSVs would resupply with a CLF ship outside the CE, then proceed to make deliveries in 
a distributed fashion inside the CE to units in need. At first glance, this architecture, while 
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distributed, lacks self-defense capabilities, and the CLF ship serves as a single point of 
failure. 
 
 Offshore Support Vessel Architecture 
After our initial analysis of the candidate architectures, they were included in our 
modeling efforts to gain further insights about their respective strengths and weaknesses. 
The modeling efforts took into consideration aspects of each architecture such as: 
vulnerability, susceptibility, speed, and capacity. The “Modeling” chapter of this report 
provides an in-depth discussion of the aforementioned analysis. 
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III. MODELING APPROACH 
A. OVERVIEW 
Logistics in a contested environment incorporates many factors, but the key issue 
is the ability for Blue Force (U.S. and her allies) to deliver supplies to the warfighter, end-
users that are inherently located inside a hostile AO. Thus, to assess a delivery assets’ 
ability to penetrate Red Force (China and Russia) threat-layers, a simple campaign model 
was selected: the circulation model. We developed a circulation model to analyze this 
problem because its purpose is to demonstrate statistical uncertainty in determining force 
effectiveness throughout a campaign (ORD 1999, 1a.1). As a result, the output provides a 
survivability assessment for Blue Force logistics assets engaged in a series of attacks by 
Red Forces.  
In terms of survivability, for a Blue Force asset to be successful or survive a transit, 
it must avoid detection and/or defend itself from a Red Force attack; to simulate this, the 
model was broken down into two main parts. The first part is the probability of detection 
from the Red Force; the second part, is the probability that a Red Force engagement is 
successful, given a Blue Force is detected. The detection and engagement probabilities 
ultimately lead to the survivability of Blue Force logistics. The model incorporates many 
different threat-layers and sub-models, which will be discussed in detail in later chapters, 
seen in Figure 23. Each threat-layer within the circulation model yields its own probability 
of survival. We examine threat each layer separately and estimate the survival probability 
through various sub-models and analysis. This analysis was broken down into two separate 
efforts, probability of detection and engagement analysis, as shown in Figure 23. 
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 Overview of the Survivability Analysis with Generalized Inputs 
Both the efforts behind the probability of detection and engagement analysis, 
previously described and shown in Figure 23, incorporate several other sub-models for the 
threat-layer analysis within the circulation model. These separate threat analyses and sub-
models provide additional fidelity to quantitative and qualitative assumptions. To enhance 
the analysis of probability of detection, the additional sub-models employed were: 
• random search 
• Johnson’s criteria 
• Young’s model 
• barrier search 
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To further enhance the engagement analysis, the following additional sub-models were 
employed: 
• Monte Carlo simulation 
• simple initial threat (for mine warfare analysis) 
• raid annihilation 
These engagement analyses and probabilities of detection tools were applied to each of the 
threat categories and layers shown on the right side of Figure 23. Each category shown 
depends on a specific context and input sub-model and is further explained throughout this 




• submarine (torpedoes and ASCMs) 
• surface ships 
• satellites 
• minefields 
Our modeling efforts then analyzed each respective threat to determine both the 
results of the probability of detection analysis and the engagement analysis. The results of 
both efforts were then aggregated to yield an overall probability of survival against each of 
the threat-layer categories. These threat-layer probabilities of survival then served as input 
values in the circulation model, as shown in Figure 24. 
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 Overview of the Modelling and Simulation Approach Utilized 
Together, each layer feeds into the overall loss rate of the specific Blue Force 
logistics asset being analyzed. The model results also enabled us to address our MOEs and 
MOPs which provide significant insight into the logistics system architecture and helped 
determine the susceptibility and vulnerabilities of each modeled asset. This not only 
provided insight into asset development, but also allowed for risk analysis of a logistics 
network along specified nodes and arcs. 
To allow for risk analysis and mitigation through a contested AO, the outputs of 
the circulation model fed into a network flow model. The goal of the network flow model 
was to incorporate the demand signal of the warfighter, the capacity and processing ability 
of all the key ports within and between an AO, the capability of logistics carriers, and the 
cumulative suspected threats along a route into a single narrative. These three factors 
coupled together generated an optimal routing of logistics through a static network and 
helped in determining the resiliency and robustness of the logistics network by identifying 
critical hubs in the network arrangement. The results generated an optimized route that 
looked to mitigate risk and account for the supply and demand signal at each port within a 
specified network. An example of the static network is shown in Figure 25. 
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Original map obtained from Google Earth, 2020. 
 Network of Nodes and Arcs Optimized in the 
Network Flow Model 
The black dots represent the various supply and demand nodes that the logistics 
assets will be traveling to and from. The white lines are the arcs, or the paths that the assets 
will travel between the nodes. Together, these nodes and arcs make the static network that 
was analyzed for results in the form of MOEs and MOPs. The survivability along these 
routes will inform the specific sensitivity analyses performed to support insights and 
recommendations to address the challenges of logistics in a contested environment. 
Combined, the MOEs, MOPs, sensitivity analysis generated from the circulation model, 
and the results of the network flow model provided tangible results. A list of system 
requirements and recommendations was then generated for future conflicts to solve 
logistics in a contested environment. 
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B. ASSUMPTIONS 
All assumptions for the analyses previously discussed were purposely conservative 
in nature, to reflect the worst-case scenario, and are broken down into two categories: route 
design assumptions and threat assumptions. They are all general assumptions of the model 
based on People’s Republic of China (PRC) and PLAN order of battle (OOB) (detailed in 
Appendix E) and technology, as well as Blue Force capability and technology: 
1. Route Design Assumptions 
• Pacific Theater is divided into discrete threat regions. 
• Each threat region has an expected number of enemy combatants, 
organized by platform and operational availability.  
• Arc length is based upon the most direct sea lane. 
• Routes are determined based on allied nations, current logistics stores, and 
highly trafficked sea routes.  
• Logistics assets will maintain a constant speed of advance along entire 
route. 
• Threat rings are allocated to incorporate the air threat from ASCM, ASBM 
and aircraft. 
The route design assumptions are additionally illustrated in Figure 26. Details on the 
development of Figure 26 are presented in Appendix D. Shown in this figure, are the 
assumptions used for the Pacific AO. Some of the nodes and arcs are depicted, as well as 
the specific breakdown of the various threat regions. Additionally, threat rings for the 
ASCM (orange half circles) and ASBM (red half-circles) threats are shown and identified 
on the map. 
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Original map obtained from Google Earth, 2020. 
 Visual Representation of the Route Design Assumptions 
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2. Threat Assumptions 
• Threats are separated by class: ASCM (fired from surface ships, 
submarines, and aircraft), ASBM, mines, and submarines (torpedoes). 
• If a Blue Force asset is detected by a Red Force platform, then the hostile 
asset will engage. 
• Each engagement has a distinct range of salvo sizes. 
• Minefields are assigned a set probability of occurring on a given route. 
• Escorted convoys will counter incoming threats, with some probability of 
leakage still occurring. 
• Logistics carriers have a staying power of one, meaning that if a weapon 
penetrates defenses this results in a kill. 
• Red assets are not pre-alerted and have no information on the logistics 
route chosen by the Blue Force. 
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C. INPUT DATA 
Specific modeling inputs are shown in Appendix B. The general types of inputs and 
their components utilized in our modeling efforts are summarized in Table 9. 
Table 9. General Overview of Modeling Inputs 
Category Considerations 
Threat Region • Area 
• Enemy Distribution 
Route Information • Distance 
• Threat Exposure 
Background Noise 
• Sea State 
• Frequency of Concern 
• Civilian Activity (such as merchant and fishing 
vessels) 
• Contact Density 




• Physical Size 
• Noise Level 
• Cargo Capacity 
• Salvo Size 
• Self-defense Capability 
• Countermeasures (electronic and acoustic) 
• Aegis (used with RAM, NSSM, SM-2) 
• Aircraft Defensive Layer 
• Deception Effectiveness 




• Salvo Size 
• Capability 
• Quantity 
• Type (submerged, surface, aircraft) 
• Over-the-Horizon Radar (OTHR) 
• Search Type (random, barrier) 
Mines • Mine Presence 
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D. SURVIVABILITY ANALYSIS 
As previously mentioned, the survivability analysis was broken down into two 
parts: the probability of Blue Force detection and the probability of surviving an 
engagement given a Blue Force detection by a Red threat. The results ascertained from 
these analyses combine to estimate the one-way survivability. Since we expect that each 
logistics carrier will perform multiple deliveries, the one-way survivability feeds the 
circulation model that determines Blue Force survivability. Both the probability of 
detection and probability of engagement are broken down into separate analyses. In the 
following section, each category is explained in detail. 
1. Probability of Detection 
Using unclassified and open-source data, this section analyzes methods that 
estimated the probability of detection of the Red threat searching for the Blue Force. The 
following sections demonstrate the adaptations of random search theory that were applied 
for aircraft, submarine, and surface ship search. To bolster the random search theory and 
to tailor the equation for each Blue Force asset analyzed, the RCS and sound level were 
also incorporated into the analysis. 
a. Random Search, Barrier Search, and Johnson’s Criteria  
Random search was selected as the basis for all search theory used in the probability 
of detection analysis for this model because it established a theoretical search where little 
information about a target is known in terms of its tactical employment and search plan 
(Wagner, Mylander, and Sanders 1999). As a result, with the little information that was 
available to us at the unclassified level, these inherent assumptions enabled us to generate 
tangible results. Thus, we generated a conservative estimate of the success probability of 
one asset being able to detect another within a specific coverage factor. The coverage 
factor, a facet of random search, is the ratio of the area within a sensor sweep width to that 
of a total search area (Wagner, Mylander, and Sanders 1999). To explain this further, the 
random search equation is shown in Equation 1, 
77 





= − , (1) 
where Fd(t) is the cumulative detection probability given search time, t is the time the Blue 
asset is in the search area, w, v, and A are the Red asset sweep width, search speed, and 
search area respectively (Wagner, Mylander, and Sanders 1999, 192). While there are 
multiple definitions for sweep width, w, this analysis treats this as the total distance 
perpendicular to the course of the searcher where a target can be detected. This concept is 
demonstrated by Figure 27, which shows a Red Force submarine searching for a Blue Force 
logistics asset. 
 
This figure demonstrates sweep width as used in our model. Shown, a Red Force SSK searches for a 
Blue Force logistics ship. The orange and yellow regions represent the search area, with the yellow 
circular area representing the sweep width of the searcher moving along the track indicated by the red 
arrow. 
 Sweep Width Demonstration 






An understanding of the specific parameters within this relationship can yield better 
analysis with information. As stated in Naval Operations Analysis, “in the case where more 
is known about a target and a systemic means of searching is used, an equal amount of 
search effort should yield a higher probability of detection” (Wagner, Mylander, and 
Sanders 1999, 174). As a result, the specific signatures of the platform being analyzed were 
incorporated through RCS and sound level, to increase the effectiveness of the analysis 
against Blue Force logistics assets. In the following subsections, we describe how we apply 
random search models to enemy aircraft, submarines, and surface ships. 
(1) Airborne Search (Radar and Electro-optical) 
Aircraft-mounted sensor systems can be used to detect, track, and identify possible 
targets (Harney 2013). Harney goes on to state that in terms of an aircraft’s radar system, 
pulses of radio signals are emitted and scattered off ships when they are in the path of the 
emitted energy. The reflected energy is then amplified and processed in the radar system 
to filter out the required echoes as part of its search and detection process. Likewise, 
Koretsky, Nicoll and Taylor (2013) note that these electro-optical sensors operate over a 
range of spectral bands, such as the visible and infrared regions, and provide imaging 
abilities in day, night, and low light conditions. This probability of detection determination, 
through random search, was demonstrated through the analysis of using these electro-
optical sensors. 
Utilizing the information gleaned from the aforementioned sources, it was possible 
to derive the probability of detecting Blue Force logistics assets using aircraft random 
search. This discussion is based on the Y-8, a PRC Maritime Patrol Aircraft with a range 
of 2970 nautical miles (5,500 km) and a maximum velocity of 346 knots (640 km/hr) (Pike 
1999). It was assumed to perform a random search at a fixed speed within the area the U.S. 
logistics platform was transiting. The probability of successful detection was influenced by 
the size of the search area, the sensor capability of the Chinese Y-8 aircraft, the speed of 
the Chinese Y-8 aircraft, and the time spent within the search area (Harney 2013). The 
cumulative probability of detection as a function of time was found using the random 
search equation (Equation 1). 
79 
An example of this application is the scenario analyzed within the first island chain. 
The search area was bounded by the first island chain and the Chinese landmass with an 
estimated size of 3,644,000 square nautical miles. The Chinese OOB has a fleet of 60 Y-8 
aircraft at an estimated 17% fleet availability given any point in time, equating to ten 
aircraft per search cycle. The search area of each aircraft was determined by dividing the 
search area with the number of aircraft, so in this case 3,644,000 nautical miles divided by 
ten aircraft. The velocity of the U.S. ships was negligible compared to the velocity of the 
Y-8 aircraft; therefore, the U.S. ships can be considered static and not require the 
application of relative velocity (Washburn 2014). The velocity of a Y-8 aircraft was 
estimated to be 295 knots (152 m/s). The time allocated to perform search and detect 
missions was limited to eight hours, given the risk involved in the open sea and the 
endurance of the Y-8 aircraft. As such, multiple Y-8 aircraft must be deployed around the 
clock for surveillance. This was then extended to determine the cumulative probability of 
detection over the duration of transit by the U.S. logistics platform. However, to determine 
the sweep width to apply to the random search by Red Force air asset, the RCS was 
analyzed and converted to a detection range. 
(i) Search Sweep Width of Radar Based on RCS 
The maximum detection range of aircraft is limited by the horizon and the 
maximum range of its sensors. The earth’s curvature creates a blind zone beyond the 
“horizon,” as illustrated in Figure 28. 
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 Illustration of Radar Horizon and Other Obscurants. Source: 
NAWC (1999). 
A sensor can only detect a target if the target is above the horizon and if it is within 
the maximum range of the sensor (Ball 2003). Using Equation 2, 
 ( )( ) 3.57 ( ) ( )h searcher t ar g etR km h m h m= + , (2) 
it is possible to calculate the visual horizon, where 3.57 is a constant to determine the 
geometric distance to the horizon in kilometers, hsearcher and htarget are the respective heights 
of the searcher and target above the surface of the earth in meters (Ball 2003, 479). This is 
purely for the visual horizon; a different but similar process is used for the electro-magnetic 
energy of a radar. 
Like the visual horizon, there also exists a radar horizon. Due to their wavelengths, 
search radar waves bend more around the curvature of the earth due to atmospheric 
refraction and travel further than electromagnetic rays in the electro-optical (EO) spectrum 
(Payne 2010). Like the visual horizon, the radar horizon is governed by the height of the 
search aircraft and the height of the targets, which are U.S. logistics platforms in the context 
of this study. The radar equation used to estimate the radar horizon is like that used to 
calculate the visual horizon and can be seen in Equation 3, 
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 ( )( ) 4.12 ( ) ( )h searcher t ar g etR km h m h m= + , (3) 
where 4.12 is a constant that accounts for the curvature of the earth and incorporates a 
conversion factor for meters to kilometers (Ball 2003). This equation is based on the 
geometry of the earth’s curvature and approximations to account for the bending of radar 
waves. The higher the target or the searcher, the longer the radar horizon. 
In considering altitude parameters, maritime patrol aircraft and UAVs typically 
operate at heights from 5,000 to 30,000 feet based on optimal endurance, sensor 
capabilities, and weather conditions. Modern sensors and digital processing have improved 
sensor capabilities, leading to higher-altitude operations that maximize detection horizons 
and sweep width. For the modelling process, an average search height of 10,000 feet (3,000 
m) was used. This altitude is typical of turbofan and turboprop maritime patrol aircraft and 
unmanned aerial vehicles, balancing best endurance with the range and resolution of radar 
and electro-optic payloads. As an example, for a target height of 16.4 feet (5 m), this 
translates to a radar horizon of 126 nautical miles (234 km) and a visual horizon of 109 
nautical miles (203 km). The mast heights of the navy ships studied in this project range 
from 3 to 46 meters in height. 
Aside from the radar horizon, the radar cross section (RCS) of the target also affects 
the detection range. RCS is defined as the area of a platform that intercepts the incoming 
power from the electromagnetic waves of radar, and when scattered off this area, produces 
an echo or radar return. RCS relates to the physical size, shape, and construction material 
of the target. The larger the RCS, the more radar energy is reflected to the search radar. If 
the radar energy received by the radar is too low, the radar cannot distinguish the target 
signature from random noise (Payne 2010). We assumed that a modern airborne search 
radar can positively detect a large RCS target, such as a CLF fleet oiler (T-AO class) at a 
full radar horizon range. While detailed specifications of maritime radars were not 
available on open source, several sources support the statement that such large surface 
vessels can be detected at ranges of up to 400 km (IAI 2017; Kopp 2007). Referencing 
Figure 29, which shows estimated RCS for various ships, an approximate RCS can be 
determined for each Blue Force logistics asset. For example, the T-AO oilers are equivalent 
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in size to a medium tanker which range from an RCS of 5,000 to 80,000 square meters. 
Consequently, we assumed an approximate average RCS size of 30,000 square meters to 
characterize a CLF oiler. Therefore, if a target has an RCS of 30,000 square meters, the 
probability of detection is 100% if it comes within the radar horizon of the search aircraft. 
 
Note: The medium tanker was assumed to be representative of a CLF oiler. 
 RCS of Various Ships. Source: Williams, Cramp, and Curtis 
(1978). 
If the RCS of the target is smaller than the datum 30,000 m2 RCS, we assumed that the 















where PR is the power transmitted by the radar, GR is the gain of the radar receiver antenna, 
σ is the RCS of the target, λ is the wavelength of the radar waves S is the minimum signal 
strength to distinguish a positive radar target from background noise (Ball 2003, 482). 
On January 28, 2020 at NPS, Monterey, CA, Christopher Adams, Director of the 
Center for Survivability and Lethality at the Naval Postgraduate School, gave a lecture 
titled “Radar Fundamentals.” Using notes from his lecture and Equation 4, RCS size and 
radar detection range are recognized to have a relationship that is based on the fourth power 
and a new radar detection range can be calculated from the datum radar performance as 










where RCSdatum is 30,000 m2, RCS is the target RCS if less than 30,000 m2, and Radar 
Horizon is the value calculated by Equation 2. Critically, this correction would only be 
made for targets with smaller RCS and not larger RCS targets. As an example, against a 
smaller vessel with an estimated RCS of 1,000 m2, the airborne radar detection range drops 
from 234 km to 100 km for the assumed height values used earlier. However, radar 
detection is not the only means of aircraft search, there is also electro-optical search. 
(ii) Search Sweep Width of electro-optical (EO) Sensor Based on 
Johnson’s Criteria 
Johnson’s criteria were the governing concept used to determine the detection range 
of aircraft using electro-optical sensors. In the mid-1950s, John Johnson performed a series 
of imaging experiments and found a strong correlation between how much details could be 
observed about the target and the minimum number of line pairs across the target (Harney 
2013). Statistically, if two lines (also known as one line pair) across the target could be 
perceived, then the observer had a 50% probability of detecting the target. His results 
became known as Johnson’s criteria, which stipulate the minimum required resolution, in 
terms of line pairs (also known as cycles) of image resolution across a target, for specific 
tasks of object detection, recognition or identification. 
84 
Furthermore, Johnson’s criteria relate sensor resolution to probability of detection 
when the sensor sweeps a target. For a sensor with a fixed number of pixels, resolution can 
be improved by adjusting an aperture to focus on a smaller area. This comes with the 
negative effect of a smaller sweep with. Therefore, when searching for a large target, an 
imaging sensor can employ a larger sweep width when compared to a search for a smaller 
target. For this section of the model, we assumed that EO sensors on search aircraft are 
staring sensors looking directly below the aircraft. The sensor field of view can expand or 
contract to adjust the resolution achieved, and is the angular equivalent to sweep with as 
illustrated in Figure 30. 
  
 Field of View Directly Corresponds to Sweep Width. 
Adapted from Payne (2010). 
To achieve a 90% probability of detection with an imaging sensor, the resolution 
must be high enough that the critical dimension is covered by at least two cycles (Harney 
2013). The logistic vessel’s critical dimension is defined as “the geometric mean of the 
target’s vertical and horizontal dimensions” (Harney 2013, vol 1, 456). This relationship is 
shown in Equation 6, 
 ( )1/2C X YL L L= , (6) 
85 
where Lc is the logistics vessel’s critical target dimension, LX is the horizontal dimension, 
and LY is the vertical dimension (Harney 2013, vol 1, 456). If the logistics carrier is an oiler 
that is 41.75 meters long and 9.25 meters wide, its critical dimension is 19.65 meters. We 
then define the instantaneous field of view (IFOV) as field of view per pixel in the sensor 











Under Johnson’s criteria, two cycles are required for a 90% detection probability as shown 
in Table 10. When we assume a search altitude of 5,000 meters, substitute the previously 
derived critical dimension, and substitute two for the number of cycles, the IFOV becomes 
0.98 milliradians.  
Table 10. Johnson’s Criteria. Adapted from Harney (2013, vol. 1, 451–56). 
 50% probability 90% probability 
Detection 1 cycle 2 cycles 
Recognition 3 cycle 6 cycles 
Identification 6 cycle 12 cycles 
A multiplier of 2.0 is used to derive the number of cycles for 90% 
probability based on the original values from Johnson’s experiments, 
which was for 50% probability. 
 
If we assume the EO sensors are on a search aircraft looking directly below the 
aircraft, then the range is equivalent to the search aircraft’s altitude. Hence, the IFOV of 
the sensor can be derived from Johnson’s criteria, by determining the number of pixels 
(number of cycles x2). We assumed that the EO imager will utilize a modern camera with 
4,000 pixels in each dimension. Field of view (FOV) is dependent on the IFOV and the 
resolution of the EO sensor, in pixels. With the values of IFOV and sensor resolution, we 


















, was used to calculate the FOV in radians (FLIR 
2018). We then substituted our example values for IFOV and pixels to yield a FOV equal 
to 0.23 radians. This result served as an input for Equation 9, 
 2 tan
2
FOVSweep Width altitude = × 
 
, (9) 
to generate a sweep width, as shown in Figure 30, for the Red aerial searchers. Thus, at a 
search altitude of 5,000 meters, this FOV corresponds to a sweep width of 1132 meters. In 
this manner, sweep width for searching EO sensors was derived, then applied to random 
search theory as previously described in other sections to estimate the probability that a 
logistic asset is detected. 
(2) Ship Random Search (ASuW) 
Random and barrier searches were both applied to the searching efforts of Red 
surface assets. A random search was applied for large areas in the AO, whereas a barrier 
search is applied for chokepoints along a sea-line-of-communication. This following 
section covers surface ship random search. 
For the modelling efforts, Red Force surface assets were assumed to perform 
random search at a fixed speed within the Blue Force logistic platform transit AO. The 
probability of successful detection is influenced by the size of the search area, the sensor 
capability of the Chinese ship, the speed of the U.S. ships, and the time spent within the 
search area (Harney 2013). Since the relative speed of the searching and evading platforms 
are similar, the target cannot be assumed to be stationary as it was with the search aircraft. 
The cumulative probability of detection as a function of time using random and dynamic 
search theory was found using Equation 10, 
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where all variables are defined as in Equation 1. However, v  in this equation is now the 
relative velocity between the Red and Blue surface assets (Washburn 2014). The relative 
velocity was calculated from Equation 11, 
 
( )( )2 21 max ,2v u v u v≈ + + , (11) 
where u is the speed of the searcher and v is the speed of the target (Washburn 2014). 
The maximum detection range of the sensors depends on multiple factors. The first 
factor was the detection horizon that is governed by the height of the sensor mounted on 
the Chinese ships and the height of the U.S. ships. 
As such, we reapplied Equation 3 to determine the radar horizon and Equation 2 to 
determine the visual horizon. The nominal radar antenna of naval ships is typically 49 feet 
(15 m). For a target height of 16 feet (5 m), as an example, this translates to a radar horizon 
of 13.6 nautical miles (25.2 km) versus a visual horizon of 11.8 nautical miles (21.8 km). 
In this regard, it can be observed that a radar sensor, under nominal conditions, can be 
expected to offer a longer detection range than an EO sensor. As such, taking a conservative 
approach towards subsequent analysis, only the detection capability of radar was 
considered. 
As a datum for surface ship search, we assumed that a modern radar would be able 
to exploit the full radar horizon range and positively detect a large RCS target, such as a 
CLF fleet oiler (T-AO class) with an approximate average RCS of 30,000 square meters. 
Referencing Figure 29, these oilers are equivalent in size to a medium tanker which have 
an RCS range from 5,000 to 80,000 square meters. Therefore, if a target has an RCS of 
30,000 square meters, we assumed that the probability of detect would be 100% if it came 
within the radar horizon of the Chinese ship. In other words, we assume the radar on a 
PLAN ship is a generic sensor with a range of 22.2 km. 
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With different U.S. logistics platforms employed, there were variations to the RCS 
that would affect the detection capability of the Chinese ship. In general, as RCS decreases, 
the shorter the range at which detection would occur. Equation 5 was again used to 
determine the radar detection range. 
Finally, once the maximum detection range was established, sweep width was 
defined as the full left and right lateral limits of the search, equivalent to twice the 
maximum detection range. 
(3) Derivation of Detection Range for Acoustic Search 
Like radar search conducted by aircraft and surface ships, acoustic searches exploit 
energy that is transmitted from waves, however, these waves were derived from sound. 
This model accounts for passive search, as the use of passive sonar systems is typical for 
detecting undersea targets and for attack submarines to detect and track threats. For the 
modelling efforts, the key concern was the detection of Blue logistics platforms by Red 
submarines. Once detected, Red submarines will close and engage the platforms with 
torpedoes and cruise missiles. For a logistics ship with no escorts, the probability of kill 
was high. The role of acoustic detection in the survivability modelling of a Blue logistics 
ship is illustrated in Figure 31. 
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 Survivability Modeling against Red Submarines 
Passive sonar detection performance can be determined by first determining the 
carrier-to-noise ratio (CNR). The CNR performance of a passive sonar was used via 
Equation 12, 
 ( )CNR SL TL NL DI= − − − , (12) 
where SL is the source level, TL is the transmission loss, NL is the background noise level 
and DI is the directivity index (Harney 2013, vol 2, 581). This is a logarithmic equation 
with the terms in decibels. The SL depends on the platform of interest. Equation 12 helped 
in determining the performance of a platform’s passive sonar. However, it does not 
incorporate the detection threshold (DT). According to LCDR Craig M. Payne, USN (Ret.) 
(2010), the DT is defined as “the signal minus the noise level required inboard of the of the 
hydrophone array such that an operator can detect a target” (179). In other words, it is the 
minimum CNR required for detection (Wagner, Mylander, and Sanders 1999). Thus, the 
CNR equation becomes Equation 13, 
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 ( )CNR SL TL NL DI DT= − − − ≥ , (13) 
which can be found on page 584 of volume two of Harney’s (2013) work. This passive 
sonar equation was used and rearranged to determine a platform’s respective detection 
range, which was then applied to the sweep width for the random search equation. 
The first step in determining an equation for the detection range was finding the 
sound level for each Blue Force asset modeled. Figure 32, Figure 33, and Figure 34 
illustrate how the SL varies for different submerged and surface platforms.
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 Estimated Broadband Acoustic Source Levels of Submarines. Source: Harney (2013, vol. 2, 585). 
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 Trends of U.S. and Soviet Submarines Source Levels 1958–1987. Source: Harney (2013, vol. 2, 586).
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 Typical Source Levels Spectra for Various Surface Ships. Source: 
Harney (2013, vol. 2, 591). 
Using Figure 32 and Figure 33, it was determined that the state-of-the-art, ultra-
quiet submarines, generate an SL of approximately 100 dB (based on SSN-21 class), while 
legacy merchant ships can have an SL as high as 180 dB. The detection range of the former 
is as low as 0.1 nautical miles for current passive sonar technology. For the latter, detection 
is as far as 500 nautical miles. However, these are just example values for the dB sound 
levels used. Each Blue Force logistics platform had an estimated source level determined 
from Figure 32, Figure 33, and Figure 34. The next factor determined was the transmission 
loss. 
Transmission loss was a necessary value to account for, given that as sound waves 
travel through the ocean, a signal gets delayed, distorted, and weakened (Payne 2010). To 
find the transmission loss from a modeled Blue Force logistics asset, we used Equation 14, 
 020lo 01g ( .0 )TL R Rα= + , (14) 
where R is the detection range (in meters), and α is the attenuation coefficient (Harney 
2013, vol 2, 595). Taking this, Equation 13 was manipulated to find a detection range, 
which in turn was applied for a sensor’s sweep width. Part of this process also required 
finding the attenuation coefficient of the sound waves through seawater. Figure 35 
illustrates how α varies for different environments and sound frequencies. A nominal value 
of 0.03 was determined based off the 50–60 hertz assumption. However, because this factor 
is so low, for simplicity, we assumed a value of zero. This range was selected because it is 
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the commonly used alternating current electrical bus frequency, including on civilian 
merchant vessels. This logic also applies to our determination of noise level.  
 
 Acoustic Attenuation of Sea Water. Source: Harney 
(2013, vol. 1, 229). 
The next part of Equation 13 determined was the background noise level, which is 
the total contribution of noise from both ambient and vessel traffic in an area (Payne 2010). 
By estimating or assuming information regarding the different threat regions from Figure 
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26, different background noises were determined based on sea-state, depth, and civilian 
traffic density, allowing for the development of an expected NL for each. 
To account for the level of civilian traffic density (such as fishing vessels, 
merchants, passenger vessels, and tugs; see Figure 37 for full list of vessels) in the Pacific 
AO, we utilized data collected from the Automated Identification System (AIS) at 1530 
Pacific Daylight Time on April 26, 2020 to serve as a point estimator for traffic density in 
the region. AIS is utilized on civilian craft to aid in vessel tracking and safety of navigation. 
It displays a wealth of information about each vessel including name, current location, 
heading, course, speed, origin, destination, and other data. Figure 36, with its associated 
legend in Figure 37, demonstrates the high level of traffic that was accounted for in 
determining the background noise from traffic. 
 




 Legend for Figure 36. Source: MarineTraffic (n.d.). 
In addition to vessel traffic, we also estimated the average depth of water for the various 
routes in the AO. We assumed shallow water and coastal depths within the first and second 
island chain and then deeper water for routes between the second island chain and Hawaii. 
These water depth assumptions were made after consulting the depth chart provided by 
Encyclopædia Britannica’s (2017) online encyclopedia, shown in Figure 38. 
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 Depth Contours of the South China Sea, East China Sea, and 
Western Pacific Ocean. Source: Encyclopædia Britannica (2017). 
Combining these factors and our understanding that most of the world’s merchant and 
fishing traffic emits a general broadband noise level between 50 and 60 hertz, Wenz’ 
acoustic curve, Figure 39, was used to determine an estimated background NL. 
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 Wenz Curves for Acoustic Ambient Noise in the Ocean. 
Source: Wenz (1962). 
To simplify the modelling efforts for routes across multiple threat regions with differing 
depths and traffic densities, an average sound level of 81 dB was used for all Western 
Pacific routes. 
The DI was the other factor that was directly subtracted from this NL determination. 
For simplicity of calculating the range from source level, the DI was assumed to be zero, 
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as the sound propagating away from the source was omnidirectional, and the characteristics 
of the enemy sonar array are unknown (Payne 2010). 
 The detection threshold was the last value included in the CNR equation, where the 
CNR that is required for detection of a target platform. This value is largely affected by the 
technical ability of the sonar suite employed. Thus, a value can be as low as -6 dB or as 
high as -15 dB depending on the type of signal processing (Wagner, Mylander, and Sanders, 
1999). Because unclassified data on Red Force equipment capability is not available, the 
average of the two values was used and calculated as -10.5 dB. This was then substituted 
into the CNR equation along with the rest of the determined variables. 
 Taking these variables into consideration, Equation 13, 
( )CNR SL TL NL DI DT= − − − ≥ , 
becomes 
( )SL TL NL DI DT− − − ≥ . 
We then substituted all the variables described to yield 
( )20log 81 10.5SL R dB dB− − = − . 
This was then rearranged to yield 
10.5 8110
20
dB dB SLR + + =  
 
, 
which determined the maximum range that a Blue asset can be acoustically detected, given 
its sound level. This calculated detection range was then used to calculate the sweep width 
of the searching Red Force assets, where sweep width was defined as the full left and right 
lateral limits of the search, equivalent to twice the maximum detection range. This was a 
conservative assumption applied for each Blue Force asset. 
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(4) Derivation of Probability of Detection by Hostile Submarines 
The probability of detection for submerged threats was derived from the random 
search equation, using the ranges for sweep width from the CNR equation previously 
discussed. For this model, Red Force submarines, including both SSNs, SSBN (converted 
to guided missiles) and SSKs were assumed to perform a random search at a fixed speed 
within a pre-defined threat region (where U.S. supply platforms are expected to transit). 
This assumed that Red assets were not pre-alerted and had no information on the chosen 
logistics route. The probability of successful detection was influenced by the size of the 
search area, the sensor capability of the Chinese submarines, the speed of the Chinese 
submarines, and the time spent within the search area (Harney, 2013). The cumulative 
probability of detection as a function of time using a random search was derived from 
Equations 10 and 11. 
These equations gave the probability that one enemy searcher will detect a 
transiting friendly asset. To calculate the total probability of detection of many different 







DDF tot F= − −∏
. (15) 
Equation 15 was selected because it was assumed that the glimpses performed by each 
searching Red Force asset were statistically independent of one another. To further 
understand this equation, each of the individual parts are broken down in the following 
paragraphs. 
The first part of Equation 15 shows the probability of detecting on a single glimpse 
D or 
nD
F . Therefore, to get the probability of not detecting on any number (n) glimpses, 
we subtract 
nD
F from one,  
( )1 nDF− . 








where each layer is multiplied against the other. Thus, Equation 15, came from taking this 
probability of not detecting during n independent glimpses D and subtracting that from 





 −  
 = − . (16) 
Equation 15 and Equation 16 are equivalent and demonstrate the process used for the 
cumulative probability of detection for the independent assets of Red Forces searching for 
Blue Force logistics assets. The results from these equations were then taken and placed 
into the analysis of the differing threat regions.  
The Pacific AO was divided into different threat regions, each serving as its own 
respective threat area as shown in Figure 26. Inside each threat area, was an assumed 
allocation of differing PLAN or Red Force distribution of platforms (air, subsurface, and 
surface) searching this area for Blue Force assets, as detailed in Appendix D and Appendix 
E. This area was then used as a factor to estimate the number of enemy submarines within 
a set distance from the Blue Force’s transit. This was done to avoid using an inflated 
number of searchers in the vicinity of the logistics vessel’s track. Accounting for A as the 
total area of the threat region and At as the track area, we determined the total probability 





= . (17) 
Generalizing enemy tactics, we also assumed a chance of barriers placed at strategic 
chokepoints within operating distances from hostile homeports. Using the equation of 
independent layered barriers, which was the strategy assumed for hostile forces, we arrived 
at Equation 18 for probability of detection by independent layered hostile barriers (Wagner, 







 = +  
  , (18) 
where W acts as the sweep-width of a hostile searcher, D is the length of the barrier, v is 
the search speed of the hostile searcher, and u is the speed of the friendly logistics asset 
(Wagner, Mylander, and Sanders 1999, 223). This concept is also shown in Figure 40.  
 
This shows the general approach to a linear barrier, with multiple layers. There is a total length that needs 
to be covered, and thus there should be more than one asset covering this layer. 
 Independent Layered Barriers 
Figure 40 demonstrates the multiple layers that different searching assets perform as a 
general surveillance of an area. The large blue arrow demonstrates the area that needs to 
be covered, with the smaller orange arrows showing the independent layers. Figure 41 
demonstrates the movement of the assets relative to one another, with the geographic track 




 Generic View of Both the Target (u) and Searcher (v) Moving 
Relative to the Earth. Source: Jeffrey Kline, class notes (2019). 
From this perspective, the linear patroller is moving left and right along its line, or fixed 
search length, reversing course once it reaches the end. Additionally, this Figure 41 shows 
the target, or Blue Force, moving from the top to the bottom of the area, trying to cross the 
barrier. The cone around the Red Force asset is the searching platform’s sweep width. 
These two figures provide the basis for Equation 18, which gives the barrier patrol formula 
for each layer.  
Assuming each layer is probabilistically independent, if every layer fails to detect 
the incoming asset, the Blue Force remains undetected. Thus, the overall detection of the 
asset is FD,tot which is equivalent to one minus the probability of every layer failing to 
detect, which can be shown as,  
 ( )( ) ( )1 2, 1 1 1 ... 1D D D DnF tot F F F= − − − −   .  
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This is equivalent to Equation 15 for the probability of detecting during several 
independent glimpses. However, because each layer is assumed to be equivalent for the 
case of barrier search, this overall equation was simplified to Equation 19,  
 
 ( ), 1 1
n
D tot DF F= − − . (19) 
Lastly, it is unreasonable to assume that in either the random search or barrier case, 
that an enemy force will allocate all their resources to finding either a Blue Force logistics 
asset or convoy. Additionally, it is unreasonable to assume that there will be no deployed 
Blue Force combatants sanitizing the area beforehand. To account for this problem and 
make the probability of detection more effective, Henry Young’s model was applied to 
help estimate the number of active searchers in each search area. 
b. Young’s Model 
Henry Young’s model was applied for the submarine campaign of this model both 
to provide fidelity on the force size of each asset, and because one of the goals of this 
submarine campaign is to reduce the enemy submarine force to a desired low level. The 
U.S. maritime strategy is one of early and heavy attrition of a large fraction of the enemy 
submarine force. Young’s model is an application of the Lanchester attrition model, as it 
applies the concepts of linear law (Young 1985). 
The Lanchester Model was developed by Fredrick William Lanchester in 1914 to 
estimate the attrition rate based on relative force strengths and combat capabilities (Harney 
2013). This model is a time-stepped analysis that incorporates a force-on-force interaction 
with losses on both sides due to an engagement rate (ORD 1999). This engagement rate is 
proportional to the product of enemy and Blue Force submarines. The output suggests a 
realistic number of adversary submarines that could be encountered along a route. In this 
case study, an estimate was needed of the force size of Red Force submarines available to 
attrite Blue Force logistics assets. 
To derive the submarine attrition rates of both sides, a random search of the area, 
or a general sweep, was applied as shown in Figure 42. 
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 General Sweep Model Applied for Young’s Model. Source: 
ORD (1999, 3a.5). 
In this defined area, all submarines had an equal probability of encountering one 
another. The smaller the number of submarines in an ocean theatre, the smaller the number 
of engagements that could occur. As the campaign unfolded and submarines were 
destroyed on both sides, the numbers continued to fall. The exchange ratio, which is the 
expected number of enemy submarines destroyed per Blue SSN lost in a single engagement, 
was set to five to account for the superiority of U.S. submarines. The theory behind this 
concept is explained in the following Lanchester description. 
For the change in Blue logistics platforms over time (time rate of change, or the 
derivative) given several Red Force assets we adapted material from a class taught by NPS 




α= = − , (20) 
where R is the number of Red Force assets, B is the number of Blue Force platforms, and 
αR is the rate constant describing the average combat power potential of a Red Force asset 
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(Harney 2013, vol 6, 340). A similar process was completed for Red Force attrition, as 




α= = − , (21) 
where αB was the average combat power potential of a Blue Force asset (Jeffrey Kline, 
class notes, 2019). These are the equations for the Lanchester Linear Law used, where 
random search applies, and little can be known about the specific location of an opposing 
force’s whereabouts. Regardless, according to Professor Kline (lecture, 2019), by 
multiplying Red Force’s equation by αB and the Blue Force’s equation by αR, the two sides 
become equal as shown in Equation 22, 
 R BdR dBα α= . (22) 
Integration of both sides of the equation yields the Linear Law, shown in Equation 23, 










This is equivalent to the exchange ratio used in Young’s Model (Equation 24) and was how 
the linear law was applied to a submarine on submarine campaign. Equation 23 then 
becomes Equation 24, 






where the difference is that Y accounts for Red Force platforms, X accounts for Blue Force 
platforms, and lowercase and upper case Y and X are the starting number of submarines for 
each side compared to the ending number on each-side, respectively (Young 1985). In other 
words, these equations are one in the same when applied to a submarine campaign, but 
Young’s model (Equation 24) is expressed in simpler terms. 
Using this concept allowed us to factor in the technology difference between Blue 
and Red Force submarines, where the assumption was that Blue Force submarines have an 
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inherently higher exchange ratio due to technological superiority. Additionally, even 
though the Blue Force submarines were assumed technologically superior, the Red Force 
was assumed to have more submarines. Thus, the Linear Law enabled us to understand 
how both factors affected the remaining number of submarines for a submarine-on-
submarine campaign, lasting the duration of the Blue Force logistics transit. This transit 
went directly through the search area of an allocated Red Force, as previously discussed. 
The search area was bounded by the first island chain and the Chinese landmass with an 
estimated size of 3,088,247 square miles. The search rate of each submarine was estimated 
at 150 square miles per hour (ORD 1999). 
In addition, two parameters, engagement probability and search time, were 
introduced to the model to simplify the calculations. Engagement probability was the 
probability that an engagement occurred given that two vessels encounter each other; 
however, to remain undetected, a submarine may not engage a submerged threat. Taken 
together, the daily engagement rate (γ) was calculated by Equation 25, 
 
X Y R E H
A
γ × × × ×=
, (25) 
where X is the number of friendly SSNs, Y is the number of enemy submarines, R is the 
search rate in square miles per hour, E is the probability of engagement, H is the number 
search hours per day and A is the search area. To link back to the Lanchester equations 





α × ×= , (26) 
and Equation 27, 
 RX Yγ α= × × . (27) 
Thus, Equation 25 and Equation 27 are equivalent and continue to demonstrate the utility 
of Lanchester’s equations for modeling a submarine campaign’s attrition values. Using this 
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concept, a simulation was run from day one with X1 number of friendly SSNs and Y1 
number of enemy submarines. On the nth day, the remaining number of friendly SSNs Xn 
was calculated by Equation 28, 
 1
1
1n n Exchange Ratio
X X γ− × +
= − . (28) 
The corresponding remaining number of enemy submarines Yn was calculated by Equation 
29, 
 ( )1 1n n nY Y X X Exchange Ratio− −= − − × . (29) 
Thus, Equation 28 and Equation 29 were a rearrangement of the Linear Law and were used 
as a determination for the value of Blue and Red Force submarine assets given an nth day 
transit. 
To obtain the approximate number of submarines in the region for any given time 
during a transit, n was set to a large number and a simulation was run over the number of 
days of a given Blue Force transit. The initial days of the transit account for the greatest 
possible rate of engagement because this was when it was assumed that the number of 
submarines present in the contested region was the largest. As the number of Blue and Red 
submarines decreased over time, the rate of engagement slowed because the time required 
to seek out a shrinking number of Red submarines with a smaller force of submarines 
became disproportionately longer. Thus, when n was sufficiently large, a lower, more 
accurate number of submarines was estimated. Given that each side allocates some (but 
not all) to this submarine interaction, Young’s model gave us a reasonable estimate for the 
final number of actively searching Red and Blue Force submarines. These approximate 
numbers were then used as input in calculating probability of attack by enemy submarines 
in the region. 
Ultimately, the goal of using Young’s case study in the model was to ensure that 
the game theory aspect of the anti-submarine warfare (ASW) problem was managed, 
meaning that it was unrealistic to assume that the Red Force would allocate all their assets 
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in one area. Thus, using the Young’s Model, attrition was accounted for to produce a 
realistic density of submarines around the transit route of the asset or convoy. Essentially, 
this accounted for any area sanitization completed by deployed Blue assets (such as SSNs, 
DDGs, LCS), as a separate action and prior to any logistics movements. As a result, a 
quantitative assumption was generated based off a qualitative assessment of Red Force 
allocation within the assigned threat regions. 
2. Engagement Analysis 
The previous section focused on detection models; but now, given a detection has 
occurred, we move to the engagement analysis phase. Engagement analysis between the 
Red and Blue Force assets creates a level of attrition. To attrite forces, salvos are launched 
against one another, with defensive countermeasures employed to prevent the attrition. To 
incorporate this into useful survivability analysis, Monte Carlo simulations, Raid 
Annihilation and Simple Initial Threat were used. 
a. Monte Carlo Simulation 
Given the amount of randomness and uncertainty in the complex problem of 
logistics in a contested environment, a Monte Carlo simulation was chosen as the method 
to quantify probabilities that would ultimately be inputs into the circulation model. A 
Monte Carlo simulation provided a statistical model that utilizes random variables and a 
probability distribution associated with those variables to quantify a result (Wagner, 
Mylander, and Sanders 1999). Thus, our adaptation of this simulation utilized many 
iterations for a specified threat scenario and logistics asset moving through the threat-layers 
to provide an expected survivability rate of that asset. The previously described models 
provided detection probabilities from Red submarines, aircraft, and surface vessels that fed 
the engagement analysis. This was how randomness and uncertainty of the assumptions 
were captured. 
The Monte Carlo simulation also involved a complex system of Red and Blue Force 
assets to determine the survivability of Blue Force logistics. It was important to include 
many random variables in the simulation to account for the uncertain nature of warfare and 
the many different assets available to those countries involved in great-power competition. 
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The input variables in the Monte Carlo scenario’s include: the probability of Blue logistics 
detection by Red Forces, the number of weapons fired in a Red Force salvo, the defensive 
capabilities of Blue Forces (if any), and the effectiveness of Blue and Red weapons. 
However, the probability of Blue assets being detected is the primary concern and main 
driver in this simulation. The outputs ascertained from the Monte Carlo scenarios were the 
average survivability rates from all Red Forces. 
The first uncertainty incorporated into the simulation was the affect Red Force 
submarines would have on Blue survivability. This included the random search and barrier 
search theories prescribed to Red submarines and the number of Red submarines in the 
area found using Young’s model previously described. The resultant probability of 
detection using these three methods fed the Monte Carlo simulation. Each iteration of the 
scenario independently calculated a different probability of engagement that feds into each 
engagement phase once a Blue asset was detected. An overarching detection probability 
was assigned based off the cumulative efforts of all Red submarines in a threat region, 
based on discrete glimpses from each submarine. Where each glimpse was assumed to be 
statistically independent, along with the probability, a detection would occur at least once 
during the Blue logistics vessel transit. The overall probability of detection was found using 











where Fdn was the probability there was at least one detection by at least one Red Force 
asset and Pi was the instantaneous detection probability on glimpse i (Wagner, Mylander, 
and Sanders 1999, 134). 
Another uncertainty in the model was the impact level Red Force missiles would 
play in the equations. These missiles include both anti-ship cruise missiles and anti-ship 
ballistic missiles. The ASCM threat incorporated random search theory for Red aircraft 
with detection capabilities of EO and radar, as well as random search theory for surface 
ships with line of sight detection capability. Once the probabilities of detection were 
determined for EO and radar of Red aircraft based on assumed input values, an overall 
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probability of detection was prescribed for the air domain. Assuming Red assets were not 
continuously transmitting to avoid detection themselves, an “on/off” factor for Red sensors 
was used which reduced the likelihood that Blue assets were detected by either a Red air 
or surface threat. This factor was implemented using an assumed ratio of time Red Force 
sensors will be actively transmitting to the time those sensors would be passive. Using 
Equation 30, a complete probability of detection was determined which encompassed both 
the air and surface domains by combining their individual detection probabilities. 
Similarly, the ASBM threat incorporated the same process in determining the detection of 
Blue Forces by Red assets, with the exclusion of surface ships, since surface vessels were 
not assumed to carry ballistic missiles. 
The Monte Carlo simulation incorporated ten-thousand iterations for each scenario; 
this number was chosen to increase the confidence in the results given the randomness and 
uncertainty of the inputs to the model. In determining if an attack occurs from either a Red 
Force mine, submarine, ASCM, or ASBM weighed heavily on the probability of Blue 
Forces being detected. However, the assumption in play was that if the Blue Force asset 
was detected, then it would be attacked. Probability of detection was the initial input to the 
simulation, and a random generator was used to determine if a detection occurred; then a 
subsequent attack followed, given a detection.  
If there was a detection in the simulation, then the process proceeded through 
multiple potential engagement scenarios. For example, Red Force submarines can launch 
both torpedoes and ASCMs. If an attack occurred, the submarine would launch its 
torpedoes. If it hit and killed all Blue assets, then the simulation would show all Blue assets 
destroyed. However, if the torpedoes missed, or there were any Blue assets remaining, the 
simulation would run through a subsequent ASCM launch scenario. The simulation then 
determined the number of Blue Forces, if any, that remained. 
The number of Red weapons launched at any one time and from any platform was 
a user input that would vary based on the best intelligence at hand and at the time of use. 
In determining the number of weapon/weapons launched from Red Forces that make a Blue 
Force kill was a binomial random variable. This distribution treated each weapon as an 
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independent trial and a probability of success was assigned to each or all weapons in the 
salvo (CFI n.d.). 
The simulation accounted for scenarios where there were: 
• undefended Blue logistics assets 
• defended Blue logistics assets 
• undefended Blue logistics assets with escort defenses 
• defended Blue logistics assets with escort defenses 
The major difference between these scenarios were whether the Red Force weapon(s) 
penetrated the Blue defense layers. When a Blue asset was undefended, there was a 
probability assigned to the weapon that it would either kill or not kill the asset. It was solely 
the effectiveness of the Red weapons that determined a kill or no kill. When the asset was 
defended, there was a probability assigned that the Blue asset would survive the 
engagement given the defense layers onboard or surrounding them. When defended, the 
binomial distribution was still utilized, but this time the probability of success was affected 
by the defensive measures of Blue Forces and the capability of Red Force weapons. 
After the ten-thousand iterations were run, the simulation calculated an average 
survivability rate for the given scenario. This probability of surviving a one-way transit 
was the q value which served as the primary input to the circulation model. 
b. Raid Annihilation  
A facet of the Monte Carlo simulation depended on the logistics asset defensive 
layers. Self-protection systems and escorts reduced the probability of kill (PK) of Red 
threats. For instance, incoming ballistic missiles and cruise missiles could be shot down by 
Aegis air defense systems. The PK was thus dependent on the effectiveness of the 
countermeasures in killing the incoming threats. This was modelled using counter-kill 












where q is the defender’s survival probability against one type of Red threat, L is the 
number of defensive or countermeasure layers against Red threats, PCK is the probability 
of the attacker destroying the defender and PKi is the probability of destroying the attacker 
of a specific defensive layer i (Wagner, Mylander, and Sanders 1999, 291). 
Furthermore, countermeasures were studied for effectiveness against cruise 
missiles, ballistic missiles, and torpedoes from submarines. Figure 43 illustrates how the 
counter kill model fits into the overall survivability model. Given detection and 
engagement by the Red threats, the counter kill model was used to factor in the role of 
escorts and countermeasures in enhancing survivability. Three layers were studied for 
ASCM model: the first layer was Blue airpower (such as combat air patrols) destroying 
launch platforms (air, land or sea-based) before they can launch an attack; the second layer 
was Aegis-equipped ships which can use the standard missile to shoot down incoming 
threats (while the Aegis ships could also shoot down Red aircraft, the standoff range of 
Red ASCM generally allowed them to launch without coming within range of Blue air 
defenses); and the last layer of defense was close-in-weapon systems (CIWS) such as the 
Phalanx which has the ability to shoot down incoming cruise missiles. 
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 Survivability Modelling against Anti-ship Cruise Missiles 
Coupling this with example engagements, if a Red aircraft attempted to launch an 
ASCM at a Blue ship, a 90% weapons effectiveness rate made a kill likely. When factoring 
in a 70% chance that the aircraft was killed before it could launch any missiles, a 90% 
chance that Aegis destroyed the incoming missile, and a 70% chance that CIWS destroyed 
the incoming missile, the resulting probability of survival was 99.29%. For Anti-Ship 
Ballistic Missiles (ASBM) with a PK of 90%, the only relevant layer of defense was the 
Aegis systems which had a PK of 70% and resulted in a survivability rate of 73%. Lastly, 
against Red submarines, the defenses were maritime patrol aircraft, anti-submarine escort 
ships and Blue submarines. These defenses decreased the PK of the Red submarines from 
90% to 49%. 
c. Simple Initial Threat 
The potential mine threat was also accounted for in the model, as mines pose a 
serious threat to the mobility and movement of an asset or convoy by restricting access. 
“Naval mines are weapons that are not required to do anything to achieve their purpose 
except to pose a threat, real or imagined” (Payne 2010, 294). Former Chief of Naval 
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Operations, Admiral Forrest Sherman, said it best, “When you can’t go where you want to, 
when you want to, then you haven’t gotten command of the sea” (Wagner, Mylander, and 
Sanders 1999, 234). It is because of this concept, that the Red mine layer was included. 
This model can be adapted for mines or can simply prohibit a region of access due to a 
specific story line (number of Red assets patrolling, fishing density, depth, etc.). 
Regardless, it provided a level of sensitivity for the nodal network analysis by providing a 
level of risk to a specific route to avoid all together. Additionally, it is an important factor 
because a Blue Force asset may plan to enter a mined area or enter accidentally. Regardless, 
most ships have some probability of entering a minefield and the majority can transit 
through without being damaged (Wagner, Mylander, and Sanders 1999). 
Even though ships can enter a mined area and get damaged with some probability, 
this probability was hard to determine. It is hard to have an outcome for a model when the 
actual locations of the mines are unknown. Ideally, a Red threat would arrange mines in a 
clean, evenly spaced out line perpendicular to transit routes as to avoid any gaps in 
coverage (Wagner, Mylander, and Sanders 1999). Additionally, lines of mines would also 
be tactically convenient for the mine layer. Even with these assumptions, the reality 
assumed was that these mines will not be spaced out as described for two reasons. First, 
they are not spaced out evenly because some mines were possibly duds, some were 
configured differently than their neighbors, and other differences occurred because of 
navigation or timing errors in the actual minelaying (Wagner, Mylander, and Sanders 
1999). The second reason is how could the Red minelayer know exactly the angle which a 
target would approach the mines? For these reasons, mines were assumed to be 
independent and randomly distributed throughout a channel. Thus, the danger of 
overstating the effectiveness of minefields is a possibility and to avoid this, the Simple 
Initial Threat (SIT) model was utilized. 
SIT estimated the probability that the first ship to enter a minefield was damaged. 
This model assumed that the mines within the minefield are located independently and at 
random, as shown in Figure 44 (Wagner, Mylander, and Sanders 1999). 
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 Simple Initial Threat for Modeling Minefields. Source: 
Michael Atkinson (class notes, 2020).  
Figure 44 shows SIT, a subset of Enhanced Naval Wargaming System for modeling 
minefields, where N mines were placed randomly, uniformly, and independently in a 
channel of length L and area A. A Blue Force ship that was transiting through the field, on 
the dotted line of the ship’s incremental track, was destroyed by any mine that it passed 





 = − − 
  , (32) 
from Wagner, Mylander, and Sanders (1999) demonstrates the mathematical formulation 
for SIT, where m is the number of mines in the area, w is the mine sweep width, l is the 
incremental length of track of the ship and A is the minefield area (240). Again, SIT 
demonstrated the probability that the first ship in a minefield is damaged by a mine. In 
theory, the second ship has a lower probability than the first to hit a mine because the route 
has either been proven clear, or the first ship detonated one of the mines in the chosen path. 
SIT was not a perfect fit for our modeling effort because it does not account for the 
countermeasure effectiveness of the second ship, following the first ship via 
channelization—a basic mining countermeasure (Wagner, Mylander, and Sanders 1999). 
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However, using SIT enabled us to model the effects of a minefield against each asset 
individually, even if convoy tactics are employed. This is another conservative assumption 
of the worst-case scenario: that each asset had an equal probability of hitting a mine. 
Implementing SIT accounted for the presence of minefields without it being excessively 
complicated, hence the simple part of its name.  
E. CIRCULATION MODEL 
The circulation model was the overall model used, as it illustrated the statistical 
effectiveness of a force as it progressed through a campaign (ORD 1999). This was chosen 
as the basis for the modelling and simulation efforts because of its tangible results; the 
model allowed for the combination of a multitude of factors yielding a single output. Figure 
45 shows a basic circulation model. Typically, some asset started at a base in an AO, went 
through a hostile layer with a probability of survival q as it traveled to some destination. In 
the case illustrated in Figure 45, the destination was a sea-line-of-communication (SLOC). 
The first half of a circulation model, from the Base to the SLOC in the case of the example, 
can provide some significant insights into a problem, such as the survivability of an asset 
from a source to a target. From this probability alone, many other MOEs and MOPs can be 
determined for analysis. The other half of the circulation is a return trip (back to the Base 
from the SLOC in the example). Notionally, the asset returns through the same hostile 
threat layers, which greatly diminishes the overall survivability. While alternate return 
routes could be used and the adversary may choose not to attack an empty logistics carrier, 
this analysis assumes equal risk on the delivery and return transit. Again, we have made a 
conservative assumption to bracket the worst-case scenario. As a result, the circulation 
model was used to generate the expected number of deliveries, and the expected number 
of round trips that a given Blue Force logistics platform would execute. Through Monte 
Carlo analysis, we used the model to evaluate the permutations of many different logistics 
carriers, various routes, and dynamically changing threat environments. 
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 Generic Circulation Model. Source: ORD (1999, 1a.1). 
The model described to this point was adapted to this project in the form shown in 
Figure 46 which demonstrates the different threat-layers that were considered for this 
project. The threat-layers shown, are generic in nature and do not demonstrate the specific 
values for each category. The overall threats that threaten a logistics asset, whether it be 
single or in a convoy, were air threats (such as aircraft, ASCM, ASBM), surface threats, 
submerged threats (such as submarines and torpedoes), and mine threats. Each individual 
layer produced a probability of kill, and when combined yielded the total probability of 
survival. The circulation model connected each of the previously discussed sub-models and 
simulations and enabled us to generate data for our MOEs.
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 Illustration of Circulation Model Utilized
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The following are specific circulation model outputs that were used for MOE analysis: 
1. Probability of surviving a single round trip 
2. Expected number of round trips (E[X]) and standard deviation 
3. Expected number of deliveries (E[X]) 
• 1/2 model from source to target node 
4. Average tonnage delivered before an asset is lost 
5. Average tonnage lost 
6. Average Red Force ammunition expended per Blue trip 
As a result, the outputs of the circulation model were very forthright in identifying 
the vulnerabilities of a specific asset throughout a campaign. As shown in Figure 45, there 
were various q values. These represented the probability of survival against an individual 
threat-layer. The equation from page 1a.1 of ORD’s (1999) text demonstrated the 
relationship between the probability of kill, or PK, and the probability of survival, q, for 
each threat-layer as shown in Equation 33, 
 1i K iq P= − . (33) 
Each one of these layers and their respective survivability were independent of each 
preceding barrier. Thus, the aggregate survivability for a half-length used is shown in 
Equation 34, 
 1 2 3 4 ...HALF iq q q q qq × ×= × × . (34) 
To determine the probability of survival for a whole round trip, the qHALF equation was 
multiplied together, or squared in this case, to get qTOT, as shown in Equation 35, 
 
2
TOT HALFq q= . (35) 
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This equation provided the overall campaign round-trip survivability for a given route. 
Going forward, the survivability will only be referred to as q.  
The goal of using the circulation model was to determine the number of deliveries 
(half-trips) and roundtrips made. This geometric random variable allowed us to generate 
tangible results in the form of MOEs and MOPs. The process applied for the follow-on 
formulas were representative of a geometric distribution, in that the goal was to ascertain 
data around the successful round trips until the transiting vessel was killed. In comparison 
to flipping coins, the goal was to find the number of tails flipped (successful trips) until the 
first head was flipped (killed during transit), which in turn was a geometric variable 
(Montgomery and Runger 2013). Even further, the form of the geometric distribution for 
this problem was relevant to where the number of successful trips could start at zero and 
then proceeded to one, two and so forth. The probability mass function for this assumption 
was given by Law (2007) in Equation 36, 
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 , (36) 
where p is the probability of getting killed during the transit (305). Thus, these sequences 
of independent Bernoulli trials with probability p of failure, yielded the mean or expected 
value, shown by Equation 37, 
 




(Law 2007, 305). When considering round trips in the circulation model, p was equivalent 
to 21 HALFq− . Substituting for p, this provided us with the expected number of round trips, 
shown in Equation 38, 









(ORD 1999, 1a.2). Thus, this geometric sequence allowed for the derivation of expected 
number of round trips for a particular asset. 
The same assumptions for the expected value of round trips holds true for the 
standard deviation of round trips. The logical progression commenced with the derivation 







from Law (2007, 306). Taking this basic form and substituting 21 HALFq−  for p yielded the 









from ORD (1999, 1a.2). This accounts primarily for round trip numbers. However, there 
was significant value in also obtaining the expected number and standard deviation for the 
number of successful deliveries, even if the asset is killed on its final return trip. 
Like the previous equations, the determination for half-length was an involved 
process that also included the assumptions behind a geometric random variable. However, 
the number of deliveries here was similar, but not geometric in nature. Thus, to get the 
number of deliveries, in which only the q half-length was accounted for, the expected 
number was also calculated. The formulation for the expected number of half deliveries 
was derived from a geometric sequence shown in Equation 41, 
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from ORD (1999, 1a.2). These are the formulas for the generic circulation model that were 
applied to this project. 
F. IMPLEMENTATION 
The tool that we chose to implement each model element was spreadsheet analysis 
in Microsoft Excel. Excel was the only tool used, as it allowed us to implement simple yet 
insightful analysis for results in a dynamic problem. This simple and user-friendly platform 
enabled all members of the team to participate in the modeling experience. Additionally, 
combining model elements was straightforward, which was important as each member 
contributed to building a certain facet. Ideally, this format will enable others to easily use 
our model for future, complex campaign models that require circulation model analysis. 
Lastly, this feature allowed us to easily implement and analyze various Blue Force assets 
as either an individual unit or a convoy with multiples units. By having it in an easy-to-
use, excel spreadsheet, sensitivity analysis on these assets through various defensive layers, 
signature reductions, susceptibility and vulnerability features was quickly and adequately 
determined. 
G. NETWORK ANALYSIS AND MAXIMUM FLOW OPTIMIZATION 
The output from the circulation model assisted in network analysis, by assigning 
risk to the arcs within a static network. The assigned risk is equivalent to the probabilities 
of survival, or q, calculated for the circulation model shown in Figure 46. This section is a 
summary of the network analysis and flow optimization performed with those results. This 
network analysis is a different but complementary modeling effort for the problem of 
Logistics in a Contested Environment. For more information, refer to ENS Christian 
Sorenson’s 2020 Naval Postgraduate School thesis, “Logistics in a Contested 
Environment: Network Analysis and Flow Optimization” (publication forthcoming). 
1. Network Science Fundamentals 
Network science has become a mainstay of analyzing complex systems in today’s 
world, representing complex real-world networks as graphs, which are easier to examine 
and draw patterns from. A network of logistics hubs has been created as a part of the 
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modeling and simulation effort, with the goal of examining the structure of the network 
based upon characteristics of both edges and nodes within the network. Figure 47 depicts 
a sample logistics network, where the nodes represent logistics hubs and the edges 
represent connections between the hubs. 
 
 Sample Logistics Network of Five Ports with Undirected Edges 
Connecting the Nodes 
A network graph is composed of two finite disjoint sets: edges and vertices, where 
edges are connections between vertices (Bollobás 1998). For this analysis, edges are 
connections between distinct vertices. In other words, a vertex cannot be connected to itself 
by an edge. Edges can be represented by binary values, where a value of one indicated the 
presence of an edge and a value of zero indicates that no edge is present. Additionally, both 
vertices and edges can be associated with non-binary values, called weights, that can 
represent the importance of a given vertex or edge in comparison to others in the network. 
In Figure 47, the edges are binary weighted, solely indicating the presence of the edge. The 
degree of a vertex can be taken as the number of vertices it is connected to; degree can also 
consider the weight of edges connected to a vertex. In Figure 47, for example, Port2 has 
degree four. A network is defined as: a simplified representation that reduces a system to 
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an abstract structure capturing only the basics of connection patterns and little else. 
(Newman 2010). 
A seminal graph theory problem is the Seven Bridges of Konigsberg, solved by 
Euler. The problem states that there are four islands in Konigsberg, and seven bridges 
connecting the islands, as shown in Figure 48. In this graph, the vertices are islands and 
the edges are bridges. The edges in this graph are binary valued. By representing the map 
of Konigsberg in graph form, it is possible to analyze the problem using network science. 
 
 The Seven Bridges of Konigsberg. Source: Kadesch (1997). 
In addition, metrics have been developed to analyze networks based upon the 
characteristics of vertices and edges. Some categories of these metrics that are used in 
analyzing the logistics network are centralities, network diameters, and clustering 
coefficients. From Sabidussi (1996), among the most popular centralities include: 
Eigenvector, Closeness, and Betweenness Centrality. For the purposes of this analysis, 
those centrality metrics suffice. The purpose of centralities is to quantitatively measure the 
importance of each node in the network. For example, the betweenness centrality, which is 
often used in logistics network analysis, provides a measure of how collocated each node 
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is to the shortest paths in the network. Some networks have portions that are more 
interconnected than the average across the total network. Those subgraphs are referred to 
as communities, and defined by Radicchi et al. (2004) as: a subset of vertices within the 
graph such that connections between vertices within a community are denser than 
connection with the other communities in the rest of the network. 
In addition to identifying communities, it is important to parametrize the strength 
of individual communities. Network modularity is used to generate communities and their 
relative strengths. Newman and Girvan (2004) use modularity to separate the total network 
into discrete communities and assign them a measure of strength. 
2. Logistics Network Analysis 
To apply the principles of network science to an analysis of a logistics network, we 
correlated the graph theoretic terms to characteristics of the real-world network. Vertices 
of the graph represented logistics hubs in the network, henceforth the vertices were referred 
to as nodes. The nodes had multiple different types, representing different capabilities of 
the ports. The important capabilities considered were as follows: dry cargo storage, 
ordnance storage, fuel storage, light crane lift capability, heavy crane lift capability, 
shallow draft pier accessibility, medium draft pier accessibility, and deep draft pier 
accessibility. These types were treated as binary values, indicating the capability, or lack 
thereof, of a given node. Different layers of the network were created by type, where all 
present nodes of a given type were connected by edges. Edges also had layers, where each 
layer represented a non-binary weight based on type. The edge types were as follows: 
distance and platform risk. The distance weight was the length of a sea lane connecting 
nodes, in nautical miles. The platform risk weight was generated from the circulation model 
risk assessment described earlier in the chapter. Each platform and its associated risk were 
analyzed as a separate layer. Using the Gephi open-source network analysis and 
visualization software package, we generated values for network diameter, network 
modularity, eigenvector centrality, closeness centrality, and betweenness centrality. We 
then analyzed these results and determined characteristics of our logistics network. 
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3. Maximum Flow Optimization 
In addition to static network analysis, we applied a maximum flow algorithm to the 
logistics network model. This section presents an optimization model that determined the 
maximum amount of demand satisfied by logistics assets over a set period. The main goal 
of this model was to optimally allocate logistics vessels to routes, and configurations of 
supplies or tonnage allocation to vessels. This model fit the mold of a classic network flow 
model, as it did not include a time component (Ahujah, Magnanti, and Orlin 1993). Our 
network flow model used the same network of vertices and edges as the static network 
analysis but focused on optimizing flow from source nodes to demand nodes within the 
logistics network.  
Drawing a parallel to the Seven Bridges of Konigsberg, shown in Figure 48, to 
formulate a maximum flow problem, vertices were partitioned into source nodes and 
demand nodes. Each edge had a weighted value indicating the penalty for crossing a bridge. 
A maximum flow optimization solved for optimal routing based upon the prescribed edge 
weights and source/sink nodes. 
For the purposes of our model, we examined three subsets of demand: fuel, dry 
cargo, and ordnance. In the network flow model, each node was parametrized by its 
demand, the Blue Force logistics asset or assets prepositioned at the node, vessel or vessels 
loading time, and unloading time. Every edge was parametrized by the time it took a certain 
vessel to traverse the edge and the probability of survival of a certain vessel traversing the 
edge. The optimization assigned a cargo configuration to each vessel, where configurations 
allowed the optimization algorithm to prescribe an even distribution of fuel, cargo, and 
ordnance or prescribe a distribution that favored one of the supply subsets. Our model 
accounted for the risk that each vessel experienced traversing an edge, and for a parameter 
that assigned the penalty for losing a certain vessel. For a set demand signal and maximum 
time, the algorithm optimized a vessel selection and routing to achieve as much demand as 
possible within set constraints (Ahujah, Magnanti, and Orlin 1993). 
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IV. RESULTS 
A. RESULTS GENERATION 
To generate the results, we created a survivability analysis simulation in Excel that 
implemented the previously discussed modeling methodologies and assumptions. The 
model was run to analyze the performance of 20 vessels, in four configurations, along 91 
different routes in the operating area. The 20 vessel types we analyzed are listed in 
Table 11. 
Table 11. Vessels Analyzed in Model 
LCS (Littoral Combat Ship) 
JHSV (Joint High-Speed Vessel) 
T-AOE (Fast Combat Support Ship) 
T-AO (Fleet Replenishment Oiler) 
T-AKE (Dry Cargo/Ammunition Ship) 
LHA (America-Class Landing Helicopter Assault 
Ship) 
LSD (Dock Landing Ship) 
LPD (Amphibious Transport Dock 
OSV (Offshore Service Vessel) 
Sea Train 
ELS (Expeditionary Logistics System) Mothership 
ELS MOLA (Marine Operations Logistics Asset) 
Orca XLUUV 
T-AK (Maritime Prepositioning Ship) 
T-AKR (Maritime Prepositioning Ship) 
T-AKR (Roll-on/Roll-off Ship) 
Expeditionary Fast Transport (EPF) 
LCU (Landing Craft Utility) 
ESD (Expeditionary Transfer Dock) 
ESB (Expeditionary Sea Base) 
 
The four configurations used to analyze vessel performance were entitled: 
• Solo Undefended: Transiting alone with present-day defensive 
capabilities. 
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• Solo Defended: Transiting alone with defensive layers defined below. 
• Convoy Undefended: Five vessels transiting together with present-day 
capabilities. 
• Convoy Defended: Five vessels transiting together with defensive layers 
which are defined in the following paragraph. 
Defended vessels were given extra layers of defense within the model to analyze 
the level of effectiveness that these upgrades have on the survivability of the Blue Force 
logistics assets within the threat environment. These extra defensive layers simulated the 
addition of typical defensive layers seen on current U.S. warships as shown in Figure 49. 
 
 Example of Layered Defense against ASCM by U.S. Warship. 
Source: Harney (2013, vol. 6, 320). 
The purpose was to analyze these effects as either permanent or modular additions 
to the Blue Force logistics platforms already in use or for future design considerations. The 
different defenses specifically used for this model are shown in Figure 50. 
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This figure demonstrates the defensive layers that “defended” Blue Force platforms had for each of the 
following major threats: ASCM, ASBM, submarine, and minefield. The Red Force surface ship and Air 
threat was coupled into the ASCM defensive layers, as it was assumed this would be the weapon of 
engagement against the Blue Force. Values depicted were either qualitatively determined from 
warfighter personal expertise or extracted from Harney (2013, vol. 6, 320–323). 
 Sample of Model Input Interface for Defensive Layers 
For ships not in a convoy, the additional defensive measures included SeaRAM, 
CIWS, electronic countermeasures, acoustic countermeasures, and Maritime Patrol 
Aircraft as shown in Figure 49 and Figure 50. These measures were also included for the 
convoys, along with the addition of a missile defense system like Aegis or SSDS, combat 
air patrol support, and anti-submarine escort support. 
1. Inputs Selection and Output Metrics 
To run the model, the user selects the platform, and the origin (source node) and 
destination (target node) of the route. Choosing the route activated specific threat regions 
within the simulation. These threat regions determined the threat layers, threat densities, 
and regional characteristics applied to the simulation. There was also the option to select 
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whether the vessel was modified to have additional reduction in RCS and self-noise. 
Specifically, for those vessels that did not already have signature reduction implemented 
into their designs. Thus, these reductions were used in sensitivity analysis to determine 
whether the additional reduction would be beneficial. Given the need for the Orca XLUUV 
to snorkel to recharge its battery, there was a selection for whether the Orca was transiting 
either at snorkeling depth or submerged. 
This factor is significant, because the Orca will transit at a shallower depth when 
snorkeling to raise an exhaust mast out of the water. This exhaust mast, or snorkel, allows 
the exhaust from the diesel generator to leave the vessel as the battery recharges. Because 
of this, the results for the Orca needed to be proportioned, to adequately account for the 
time the XLUUV spends snorkeling. According to Dan Tubbs (email to author, March 13, 
2020), Boeing’s program manager for the Orca XLUUV, the Orca will snorkel for 
approximately six hours. A nominal battery charge allows the Orca to travel at the optimal 
speed from both of the Orca’s operating modes and were combined using an operating 
mode ratio, to simulate a transit longer than one single operating cycle (Dan Tubbs, 
telephone call, February 6, 2020). Thus, the survivability and sensitivity analysis for the 
Orca accounts for 56 total hours, with six of those snorkeling and the other 50, transiting 
submerged. The actual time spent doing each varied with each route, due to the difference 
in distance travelled.  
Figure 51 shows the user interface created within the Excel model to choose input 
options for the Blue Force asset being analyzed. Figure 52 shows an example of the threat 




 Input Variables User Interface 
 
 Threat Region Selection Interface 
Once the input criteria were selected, the model iterated 10,000 Monte Carlo trials 
and populated the results table. Table 12 shows an example results table. 
Table 12. Example Results Table 







q1 - Survivability Against 
ASBM 0.6541 0.6588 0.4917 0.7503 
q2 - Survivability Against 
Submarines 0.9948 0.9956 0.9941 0.9983 
q3 - Survivability Against 
ASCM 0.6624 0.9932 0.4993 0.9693 
q4 - Survivability Against 
Mines 0.9777 0.9838 0.9823 0.9836 
q - Survivability 0.4214 0.6409 0.2398 0.7141 
Probability of Completing One 
Round Trip 0.1776 0.4107 0.0575 0.5099 
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Expected Number of Round 
Trips 0.2159 0.6970 0.0610 1.0406 
Standard Deviation of Number 
of Round Trips 0.5124 1.0876 0.2544 1.4572 
Expected Number of 
Deliveries 0.5124 1.0876 0.2544 1.4572 
Standard Deviation of Number 
of Deliveries 0.6864 1.1920 0.4698 1.5383 
Enemy ASBM Used 3.12 3.07 4.57 4.64 
Enemy ASCM Used 0.86 0.86 6.20 6.08 
Enemy Torpedo Used 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.03 
Enemy Mines Used 0.02 0.02 0.09 0.08 
Tons Destroyed by ASBM 155.42 155.41 778.36 376.63 
Tons Destroyed by ASCM 550.29 11.06 564.81 35.36 
Tons Destroyed by Torpedoes 898.77 517.65 1341.10 383.44 
Tons Destroyed by Mines 1400.00 1400.00 1400.00 1400.00 
Average Cargo Ship Losses 
Per Inbound Transit 0.58 0.36 3.80 1.43 
Average Tonnage Lost 
Inbound 810.02 502.76 5321.63 2001.28 
Average Tonnage Delivered 589.98 897.24 1678.37 4998.72 
 
The major data points that were extracted from the results data for analysis include: 
• survivability of the vessel on the given route 
• expected number of roundtrips completed by the vessel 
• expected number of deliveries conducted by the vessel 
• attrition cost per ton delivered 
• total tonnage capacity of the system 
From these data points three MOPs were calculated: 
• number of ships lost per delivery 
• average tonnage lost per system 
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• average tonnage delivered by system 
Assuming a confidence level of 99%, the margin of error on the aggregate q value 
was on the order of 0.01. We determined that the magnitude of this margin of error was 
insignificant, and further error analysis did not alter our results or provide further insight. 
Therefore, we did not carry forward the margin of error in calculating the MOPs from our 
raw data. From these MOPs, we calculated the cost of losses per inbound transit by 
multiplying the estimated platform costs and supply costs outlined in Appendix C by the 
average number of vessels lost and average tonnage lost, respectively. This allowed us to 
analyze the cost of losses on a direct, inbound transit, or half-length of a round trip. By 
dividing this cost by the average tonnage delivered, we were able to calculate the attrition 
cost per ton delivered, as well. 
2. Focusing Results 
The results of our analysis determined that three major factors had a large impact: 
differences in route length, number of threat regions through which the route passed, and 
portion of the route within the weapons engagement zones of ASBM and ASCM threats. 
To focus our efforts, we chose to compare and analyze the results of 20 specific routes. 
3. Choosing Routes to Analyze 
We assumed that the routes used most frequently are those that transit to and from 
ports with current U.S. bases and major ports of current allies. However, the routes we 
chose were also meant to be a diverse selection that best encompassed the characteristics 
of the 91 routes within the network; to that end, they vary in length from 530 nm to 4,000 
nm, have different route percentages within weapons engagement zones (WEZ), and are 
either contained within a single threat region or span multiple threat regions. The WEZs in 
this model were created by the ASCM and ASBM rings that emanate away from the PRC. 
Table 13 lists the 20 specific routes used in the focused analysis. Throughout this report, 
the figures shown use data taken from the routes that best exemplify the trend being 
discussed. However, the insights being discussed throughout were present on all the routes 
analyzed. 
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Route Length Within 
ASBM/ASCM Range 
(nm) 
Hawaii Okinawa 4035 1 870/1305 
Singapore Darwin 1826 2 1106/0 
Cam Ranh Bay Singapore 730 2 730/482 
Manila Okinawa 935 2 935/935 
Cebu Singapore 1341 3 1341/1341 
Yokosuka Guam 1347 1 1347/1347 
Yokosuka Okinawa 824 1 824/824 
Yokosuka Busan 630 3 630/630 
Okinawa Busan 537 2 537/537 
Okinawa Guam 1226 1 1226/1226 
Zuoying Guam 1514 1 1514/1514 
Zuoying Yokosuka 1326 2 1326/1326 
Pattaya Singapore 759 1 759/500 
Pattaya Darwin 2476 2 2100/800 
Palau Manila 976 2 976/976 
Palau Singapore 1945 4 1945/1745 
Guam Darwin 1891 2 1661/270 
Guam Sasebo 1459 2 1459/1459 
Guam Manila 1490 2 1490/1490 
Guam Singapore 2566 3 2566/2400 
 
B. BASELINE RESULTS 
To understand the major trends within the results generated by the model, we first 
examined the survivability of the vessels in their baseline configuration. The first major 
trend that arose was that vessels in undefended convoys tended to have lower survivability 
than undefended vessels transiting by themselves. The takeaway from this trend is that the 
increase in detectability and targetability inherent to a convoy is detrimental to 
survivability. Larger convoys tend to demand a larger salvo from the enemy, increasing the 
probability of hit from a missile attack. Figure 53 and Figure 54 exemplify this for a smaller 
sample of vessels transiting the route from Guam to Darwin. 
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 Sample Baseline Solo Survivability from Guam to Darwin 
 
 Sample Baseline Convoy Survivability from Guam to Darwin 
Conversely, we found that vessels in defended convoys have a higher survivability 
than defended solo vessels. In this case, the whole was greater than the sum of its parts. 
Similarly, adding defenses to a convoy increased the survivability of its vessels much more 
than adding defenses to a solo vessel increased its survivability. The defenses overcame 
the inherent lack of survivability previously stated. In general, most of the vessels that were 
modeled and analyzed had very similar survivability. Outliers on the low end of the 
spectrum were the JHSV and the T-AOE. This can most likely be attributed to the high 
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self-noise values for these two vessels. The outlier on the high end of the spectrum was the 
Orca XLUUV. This can also be seen in Figure 53 and Figure 54. 
From the baseline survivability, other MOPs were developed and observed for the 
vessels. Figure 55 and Figure 56 show the number of expected deliveries and round trips 
conducted by each vessel on the route from Yokosuka to Okinawa. 
 
 Sample (Reduced Size) Baseline Expected Number of Deliveries 
from Yokosuka to Okinawa 
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 Sample (Reduced Size) Baseline Expected Number of Round Trips 
from Yokosuka to Okinawa 
For almost all vessels, the expected number of deliveries were close to one for both 
the solo defended and convoy defended configurations. For the undefended configurations, 
the expected values were much lower. This was consistent across all routes. The exception 
to this trend was the Orca XLUUV. The XLUUV conducted between eight and ten 
deliveries in the defended configurations and between 3.5 and 5 deliveries in the 
undefended configuration. Our model generated this output for all assets, but providing a 
small, unmanned, subsurface vehicle an escort is an impractical CONOPS. This is because 
the escort would likely be more costly than the asset it is escorting and would likely negate 
the stealth benefits inherent to the Orca. Similarly, the expected number of round trips for 
the vessels, excluding the Orca, were always less than one. Thus, adding defensive layers 
did not significantly improve the expected number of round trips. The Orca round trip 
values were like its delivery values. Round trips in the defended configurations varied from 
eight to ten. Round trips in the undefended configurations varied from three to five. 
The model also produced results regarding the average tonnage delivered and the 
average tonnage lost on an inbound transit for delivery. The results were expressed as 
tonnage per group of ships. Because of this, the data for convoys had to be normalized by 
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dividing by the convoy size of five. This converted the data to be expressed as tonnage per 
ship per transit. Figure 57 and Figure 58 show the tonnage lost and the tonnage delivered 
for vessels transiting from Pattaya, Thailand to Singapore. 
 




 Sample Tonnage Delivered per Ship per One-Way Transit from 
Pattaya to Singapore 
The major takeaway from this tonnage data is that undefended vessels tend to lose 
more tonnage of supply than they deliver. This is because the survivability values of all the 
undefended vessel configurations are less than 50%. Critically, these values alone do not 
indicate a preferable logistics asset. These values are very much dependent upon the cargo 
capacities of the vessels and must be further scrutinized. The ESD provided a good example 
of this. As, by far, the vessel with the largest cargo capacity, its tonnage delivered values 
dwarfed those of the other ships. However, its tonnage lost values did the same. As 
previously discussed, from the initial (before normalizing) tonnage lost data, we were able 
to calculate one-way costs of losses. This was accomplished by multiplying the average 
supply tonnage cost and estimated vessel cost found in Appendix C by the tonnage lost and 
vessels lost, respectively. Figure 59 and Figure 60 show the vessels with the lowest and 
highest costs calculated for the route from Manila to Okinawa. 
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 Vessels with Lowest Cost of Losses ($M) per One-Way Transit 
from Manila to Okinawa 
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 Vessels with Highest Cost of Losses ($M) per One-Way Transit 
from Manila to Okinawa 
The data in the cost plots was beneficial in highlighting which vessels will have, 
potentially, more costly transits than others. The vessels with the lowest cost of losses were 
the OSV, ELS MOLA, Orca, and LCU. The vessels with the highest cost of losses were 
the T-AK, T-AKR, LPD, LHA, ESD, and ESB. Again, these values alone do not indicate 
a preferable asset. A vessel may have had a low cost simply due to its size, lack of capacity, 
or low unit cost. The Orca XLUUV was an example of this. It had the lowest values for 
cost of losses but also had the lowest tonnage delivered values. To apply the cost data more 
effectively, we divided the cost of losses by the tonnage delivered to create the metric “cost 
per ton delivered.” This metric served as an MOE for each vessel that compared risk to 
reward. It was not all-encompassing in that it did not include all possible costs incorporated 
with conducting the transit, such as fuel, ordinance, and crewing costs, but included the 
cost of risk. That risk was losing vessels and the cargo that they were carrying. Figure 61 
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and Figure 62 show the vessels with the lowest and highest cost per ton delivered for the 
transit from Yokosuka to Busan. 
 
 Vessels with Lowest Cost of Losses per Ton Delivered ($K) from 
Yokosuka to Busan 
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 Vessels with Lowest Cost of Losses per Ton Delivered ($K) from 
Yokosuka to Busan 
From these risk-to-reward comparisons, it was evident that some vessels with low 
cost losses were not as cost effective in terms of delivered tonnage as were some vessels 
which had very high cost losses. The OSV, ELS Mothership, ESD, and ESB were the most 
cost-effective in terms of delivered tonnage. The least cost-effective vessels were the JHSV, 
EPF, LCS, LPD, and T-AK. 
C. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
Sensitivity analysis was conducted by comparing the baseline configuration results 
to the results after applying upgrades to the vessels. This was done to determine the effect 
that these upgrades may have on the vessels. These upgrades, as seen in the inputs interface, 
were an RCS reduction and a noise reduction. When selected, these reductions were applied 
within the model as described in Appendix F and Appendix G. The RCS reduction upgrade 
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was applied to all vessels. The noise reduction upgrade was only applied to vessels that did 
not have the mitigations mention in Appendix G installed organically. The sensitivity 
analysis was conducted to analyze the effects of each reduction applied separately and 
applied in conjunction with each other. 
1. RCS Reduction Results 
To analyze the effect of applying an upgrade to these vessels that would not require 
the installation of a new combat system element, we first applied the RCS reduction as 
described in Appendix F. The reduction was applied as an option in the inputs interface of 
the model. Figure 63 and Figure 64 show RCS reduction data for a sample of vessels 
transiting from Yokosuka to Okinawa. 
 
 Sample Reduced-RCS Survivability from Yokosuka to Okinawa 
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 Sample Reduced-RCS Survivability from Yokosuka to Okinawa 
(Continued) 
From the data, we were able to conclude that added reductions in RCS created a 
noticeable change in vessels with already small RCS. This included LCS, OSV, JHSV, Sea 
Train, ELS MOLA, and LCU. The added survivability ranged from 0.03 to 0.12 and RCS 
reduction was more effective for solo configurations than it was for convoy configurations. 
It should be noted that the route form Yokosuka to Okinawa is fairly low risk. It only 
crosses one threat region. When RCS reduction was applied to vessels crossing higher 
numbers of threat regions, the increase in survivability was present, but generated much 
less of an increase. 
2. Noise Reduction Results 
Like the RCS reduction, a noise reduction was applied to vessels that did not 
possess sound level reduction in their original design. The reduction applied was as 
described in Appendix G. The effect on overall survivability was analyzed. Figure 65 




 Sample Reduced-Noise Survivability from Hawaii to Okinawa 
When we examined the effect of noise reduction, we found that there was an 
apparent limit to its effect. All vessel survivability values increased to approximately the 
same value for each configuration. This occurred across all routes. The reduction applied 
was large enough that it drove the subsurface survivability value to (or very close to) one, 
essentially removing the effect of the subsurface threat on overall survivability. Because 
all the vessels started at different noise levels, this shows that there may be a threshold 
noise value that could be achieved to gain the maximum advantage for noise reduction. 
3. Combined Noise and RCS Reduction Results 
The final analysis of upgrades analyzed the effect of adding an RCS reduction to 
the vessels that the noise reduction was applied to. Given the convergence of survivability 
values for the application of a noise reduction alone, the values for the application for both 
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reductions were not surprising. For vessels whose RCS reduction survivability values were 
below the noise reduction survivability values, the values after applying both reductions 
were similar to, if not exactly the same as, the values after applying the noise reduction. 
For vessels whose RCS reduction survivability values were above the noise reduction 
survivability values, the values after applying both reductions were similar to, if not exactly 
the same as, the values after applying the RCS reduction. There were no synergies between 
the two reductions. The reduction that gave the vessel better survivability values dominated. 
D. NETWORK ANALYSIS RESULTS 
From the data compiled by the modeling and simulation team, we created a Pacific 
theater logistics network. The first level of analysis considered edge weighting based upon 
the distance between logistics hubs and described overall parameters of the network based 
on the connections between the nodes. The network’s characteristics are presented in 
Table 14. 
Table 14. Network Characteristics 
Characteristic Value 
Number of Nodes 21 
Number of Edges 91 
Average Degree 8.66 
Network Diameter 3 
Average Shortest Path Length 1.69 
Network Modularity 0.263 
Number of Communities 2 
 
The modularity value was on the lower side of the spectrum, indicating the presence 
of communities, but with a high level of cross-community connection. In the case of 
distance-based-weighting, the two communities were associated with the South East Asian 
and East Asian/Pacific Island node clusters. The network diameter value was equivalent to 
the greatest number of voyages necessary to travel from one node to any other node. Next, 
we used the threat level calculations to assign an edge weight for each class of assets. 
Threat level was not an adequate measure, so we formulated an alternative edge weighting 
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scheme. To distinguish between assets, we had to account for the tonnage capacity of each 
vessel class, and the cost of the losses for each vessel class traversing a specific route. 
Betweenness centrality, by definition, prioritizes nodes that are endpoints of low-weight 
edges (Hagberg, Schult, and Swart 2008). We used the following metrics: cost of losses 
and average tonnage delivered per day by vessel class along an edge. To prioritize edges 
with low weights, we applied the following edge weighting metric: 
i j
Cost of LossesW
Tonnage Delivered per Day
= . 
This metric ensured that edges that had low losses and high tonnage deliveries were 
prioritized. This prioritization accounted for the traversal risk, the monetary value of the 
vessel and its supply load, the vessel’s speed of advance, and the route distance. Table 15 
presents the betweenness centrality values of the top ten nodes for four different network 
layers. Our network analysis only examined the current capabilities of each logistics 
platform. It did not examine changes to the network that resulted from using convoys or 
adding defensive layers to vessels. For example, LHA edges were calculated with 
defensive measures accounted for while T-AOE edges were calculated without defensive 
measures accounted for. The uncontested network assumed that there was no threat to 
logistics assets. The LCS layer highlighted the top centralities for a vessel that has 
defensive capabilities. The T-AKR layer represented large tonnage, slow vessels that do 
not have defensive capabilities. The T-AKR is most like the modern fleet of MSC vessels 
used to resupply forward deployed assets. The Orca layer represented a slow, small tonnage, 
hard to detect asset. 
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Table 15. Comparison of the Highest Centrality Nodes across Four Vessels 
Uncontested LCS 
Node Value Node Value 
Singapore 0.192 Singapore 0.189 
Manila 0.179 Guam 0.158 
Guam 0.089 Manila 0.158 
Palau 0.079 Okinawa 0.105 
Cebu 0.047 Darwin 0.079 
Zuoying 0.047 Diego Garcia 0.068 
Puerto Princesa 0.047 Cebu 0.063 
Okinawa 0.042 Palau 0.058 
Yokosuka 0.026 Yokosuka 0.053 
Darwin 0.021 Puerto Princesa 0.053 
T-AKR Orca 
Node Value Node Value 




Diego Garcia 0.216 Cebu 0.126 
Palau 0.179 Manila 0.100 
Darwin 0.174 Phuket 0.100 
Kwajalein 0.158 Puerto Princesa 0.089 
Bandar Seri 
Begawan 0.132 Okinawa 0.079 
Yokosuka 0.126 Singapore 0.068 
Puerto Princesa 0.111 Zuoying 0.047 
Manila 0.089 Sasebo 0.037 
 
The uncontested network favored centrally located nodes, with special emphasis on 
the importance of geographic hubs. The following three layers accounted for the presence 
of an enemy threat. The LCS layer continued to place an emphasis on Singapore and Manila, 
but also noted the increased importance of the out-of-threat-region hubs Diego Garcia and 
Darwin. The LCS has defensive countermeasures to enemy threats, so it was more 
survivable within the threat region than a large undefended asset. The T-AKR layer showed 
a massive shift in importance to hubs that lay on the fringe of the threat region, or 
completely outside it. This was an indication of the high losses that conventional logistics 
assets will suffer while operating in a contested environment. The Orca layer’s most 
important hubs were characterized by short distances to other nodes and central geographic 
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location. The Orca layer was notable, because its high probability of survival combined 
with its low cost focused its nodes within the threat region. Figure 66 is a network 
visualization of the four aforementioned layers (Bastian, Heymann, and Jacomy 2009). The 
color of the nodes represents their modularity class. The size of the nodes corresponds to 
their betweenness centrality value. The thickness of the edge represents the weight of the 
edge, with thicker edges being costlier. The community grouping is notable, because it was 
not always the best idea to take a direct, shortest-path route. The visualizations show that 
it was advantageous to route along less-costly edges on a total path from one node to 
another. 
 
Clockwise from the top left: Uncontested, LCS, T-AKR, Orca. 
 Comparison of Network Visualization of Four Vessel Classes. 
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By analyzing the centrality values of the current nodes, shown in the uncontested 
network, we observed that a small subset of logistics hubs dominated. The high centrality 
values of nodes like Singapore and Guam implied the vulnerability of the network to single 
points of failure. If any circumstances denied access to high centrality nodes, the current 
logistics system would suffer drastically. The trend held when we examined logistics in a 
contested environment. Assets with similar attributes relied heavily on a small number of 
important nodes. Increased diversity of the composition of the logistics inventory would 
improve the resilience of the system. Adding nodes to the network would also help alleviate 
the high centrality values of a small selection of the nodes. Using additional ports or 
creating sea bases in the vicinity of high value nodes would serve to decrease the 
importance of each single node within the network. In addition to showing the need for 
increased resilience of the network in case of a nodal failure, our network analysis indicated 
that certain asset classes are more useful in different threat-level environments. In a highly 
contested environment, small, cheap, fast vessels delivered tonnage at a greater rate and 
lower cost. In low-threat environments, slow, large capacity assets are more efficient. 
Combining these insights, our network analysis supported the courses of action 
recommended by this capstone project. In particular, our network analysis indicated the 
need to diversify the logistics inventory in order to succeed in a contested environment. 
Table 50 lists the top 10 nodes by betweenness centrality in Appendix H. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
After analyzing the data produced by the model, we developed some key takeaways 
and trends. First, most vessels shared very similar survivability values transiting routes 
within the network. The exceptions to this trend were the Orca XLUUV, the JHSV, and 
the T-AOE. The XLUUV had high survivability due to almost completely eliminated 
ASBM and ASCM threats. The Orca was only vulnerable to these threats during the time 
it was snorkeling. During this time, the RCS of its mast was the target for missile threats. 
Due to the short amount of time spent snorkeling and the small target that was its mast, the 
ASBM and ASCM threats to the Orca were almost negligible. The JHSV and T-AOE had 
lower survivability values that were most likely attributable to their very high noise levels. 
The second set of takeaways came with the delivery and loss data. We concluded 
that almost all vessels completed less than one round trip and only about one delivery. This 
is a daunting outcome that alone proves the need for upgrade of the logistics capabilities 
of the U.S. Navy. It was clear that undefended vessels delivered less cargo tonnage than 
they lost and that defended convoys delivered the most tonnage per vessel. When we 
examined cost of losses alone, it seemed that smaller, more survivable assets were preferred. 
The vessels with the lowest cost of losses per delivery were OSV, Sea Train, ELS MOLA, 
Orca, and LCU. The vessels with the highest cost of losses were the T-AK, T-AKR, LPD, 
LHA, ESD, and ESB. This metric, however, was not a final indicator of preferred assets 
because it was affected by scale. 
To better analyze the cost of losses, we divided the cost of losses values by tonnage 
delivered to create a measure of performance that related risk to reward. The risk was the 
monetary losses likely to occur on each transit. The reward was the tonnage delivered. The 
vessels that performed the highest under this MOP were the OSV, ELS Mothership, ESD, 
and ESB. The vessels with the lowest performance were the JHSV, EPF, LCS, LPD, and 
T-AK. This is contrary to the established notion that distributed logistics are the answer for 
distributed operations and should be examined. The OSV, ELS Mothership, ESD, and ESB 
perform well for this metric because they are relatively cheap and have a large cargo 
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capacity relative to their size. Their low prices come from their lack of complexity as 
generic cargo carriers that are not overly inundated with excess systems.  
These results do not exclusively conclude that using gross tonnage vessels in 
convoy configurations is the answer to logistics in a contested environment. Though not as 
well as the OSV, ELS Mothership, and ESD and ESB, other vessels performed fairly under 
this metric. This metric is very cost focused. If the main goal is to minimize cost and the 
fact that a certain level of loss may occur is accepted, then it is highly recommended that 
these options are explored and implemented. However, there are other factors that were not 
analyzed that should also be examined. These include speed of delivery and agility of assets. 
Large cargo vessels that can get the most delivered with the least amount of monetary 
losses are ineffective if they cannot deliver on time or in the correct manner. 
Lastly, we analyzed the effect of reducing RCS and noise level on vessel 
survivability. Reductions in RCS were effective for vessels that already had a low RCS. 
These reductions were less effective as the threat level of a route increased and were more 
beneficial for undefended configurations. Reductions in noise seemed to be beneficial to 
only a certain point. The reduction used was large enough that it drove the survivability 
against submarines to nearly or exactly one for most vessels. This removed the effect of 
submarines on the overall survivability. The vessels in this configuration all had very 
similar survivability values. This not only showed that noise level reduction could play a 
crucial role in decreasing the submarine threat to almost nothing but also that it was 
variation in survivability against submarines that was the main cause for variation in the 
survivability values of most of the vessels. We examined the effects of adding both noise 
and RCS reductions to some vessels. We found that the reduction that created the best 
survivability values dominated. 
Given the performance of the vessels analyzed with regards to losses per ton 
delivered, the course of action that we recommend pursuing are the Offshore Support 
Vessel Concept, the ELS Concept, and Traditional Logistics Utilizing ESD and ESB. For 
the OSV Concept and the ELS Concept the CLF HVU can be the ESD, ESB, or ELS 
Mothership. Contrary to what was initially proposed, the performance of these large vessels 
in terms of losses per ton delivered, allows them to enter the contested environment. The 
157 
distributed logistics asset could then occur later in the supply chain. For the ELS concept, 
the MOLA should attempt to emulate OSV and/or Orca XLUUV characteristics as much 
as possible. No matter what course of action is chosen, added defense of these vessels is 
highly beneficial and highly recommend. This could come in the form of upgrading 
onboard defenses or providing some sort of defensive escort. Lastly, RCS and noise 
reduction should be done on all vessels as practical. This is especially important to vessels 
projected to be traveling alone. In consideration of cost, it is beneficial to determine which 
reduction would have the greater impact to survivability and apply that reduction alone. 
A. RECOMMENDED FUTURE WORK 
Over the course of this work, many concepts, variations, technologies, and 
questions arose that there simply was not enough time to fully evaluate. As such, our team 
has identified several related areas that warrant future analysis. 
In some respects, we are fortunate to know that the efforts in this project have 
already inspired additional thesis work by one of our team members. As we have leveraged 
some portions of Ensign Sorenson’s network model in this effort, an additional academic 
quarter will enable him to advance his findings. Some areas where his thesis, titled 
Logistics in a Contested Environment: Network Analysis and Flow Optimization, will 
further our efforts are: 
• Evaluate our network to pinpoint critical nodes and expose vulnerabilities. 
• Evaluate a maximum flow algorithm to determine optimal routing and 
upper bound for sustainable combat operations intensity in the Pacific 
theater. 
• Evaluate the tradeoffs to consider whether it is preferred to operate using 
infrequent mass deliveries or frequent smaller deliveries. 
Additionally, some members of our group will participate in the OPNAV N4 
Logistics Wargame, tentatively scheduled in July 2020. Members of our team will directly 
contribute their subject matter expertise in addition to insights and recommendations 
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contained within this work. This will enable evaluation of recommended concepts via a 
second analytic method, wargaming. 
Other specific areas of interest for future work include: 
• Application of our methods to a logistic network focused in the Atlantic 
Ocean. While we suspect that most of our insight and analysis will remain 
valid, understanding the impact of shorter overwater routes, the potential 
for more overland routes, and other variations in the operational 
environment may generate valuable information for decision makers. 
• Exploring the effects of reducing the demand signal. What if, for example, 
the same units that define our demand signal could operate with the same 
effectiveness with 20% less supply? Will corresponding reductions in 
logistic asset attrition hold a proportional ratio? Understanding this 
question might highlight the value in concepts like additive 
manufacturing, locally sourced supply, and alternative fuels. 
• Adding network layers that effectively estimate contributions of airborne 
logistics assets. Emerging technologies in hybrid airship vehicles and 
amphibious aircraft offer interesting alternatives that may accelerate 
delivery timelines and reduce threat exposure. 
• Exploring solutions to reload missiles into vertical launch systems and 
torpedoes into submarine magazine in the AO and at sea. With a limited 
number of shore facilities currently capable of reloading our combatants, 
and no capability to reload at sea, combatants will spend considerable time 
off station to replenish their inventory. In a high-end fight, the rate of 
weapon expenditure is likely to be extraordinary and sustaining the 
conflict will require new and better ways to reload. 
• Analyzing the enemy cost to sink and destroy assets. The modeling and 
simulation conducted made assumptions regarding the propensity of the 
enemy to attack. Further analysis regarding the cost and risk of attack for 
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the enemy, versus the reward of sinking or destroying a particular asset, 
would lead to more accurate enemy attack doctrine. The information 
acquired could be applied to game theory processes to further determine 
both enemy and allied doctrine. 
• Conducting cost-benefit analysis of modifying current vessels. We made 
recommendations regarding upgrading defense systems, reducing RCS, 
and reducing noise level. Determining the cost of these upgrades would 
further affect the decision to utilize them in the future. 
• Analyzing vulnerability to specific threats. In our analysis of noise level 
reduction, we identified the submarine threat as the most variable across 
platforms. However, when this threat was practically eliminated, 
survivability remained low. Analysis regarding the most detrimental threat 
to the assets and ways to reduce the threats could lead to further course of 
action development. 
• Conducting follow-on analysis inclusive of platform capability. This 
analysis focused on the ability to deliver tonnage and compared it to cost 
of said delivery. Though vessel characteristics and capabilities were 
factored into survivability analysis, time and manner of delivery were not 
constraining in determining performance of specific vessels and bounding 
recommendations. Exploring different operational constraints such as 
speed, manner of delivery, and nodal access constraints would be 
beneficial to continue analysis of the suitability of these platforms for use 
in future logistics architectures. 
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APPENDIX A.  COMMUNICATIONS ANALYSIS 
Although we deemed communications (COMMS) beyond the scope of our analysis 
due to time and resource constraints, we recognized the vulnerability to U.S. logistics 
systems that COMMS present when operating in a contested environment (CE). Therefore, 
we analyzed threats to communication, researched current, planned, and conceptualized 
technologies, formulated scoring criteria, and proposed several potential COMMS 
solutions based on our findings. 
Currently the United States armed forces operate logistics on a need-driven basis, 
known as “pull” logistics—supplies are not shipped based on estimates, but rather on 
reported need. This method requires a COMMS network that allows warfighters reliable 
connectivity to signal their demand and pull supply from the logistics system. Network 
speed/bandwidth requirements vary between assets. Currently the U.S. force operates 
primarily on vulnerable lines of communications, leaving the logistics communication 
network susceptible to disruption. 
The types of supplies that are required range anywhere from basic human 
necessities such as food and water to fuel to armament consisting of bullets, mortars, 
missiles, rockets, and torpedoes to medical supplies. The wide range and disparity between 
types of supplies is coupled with a diverse fighting force. The U.S. forces illustrated in the 
“Global War 2030—Two Years In” scenario span across all branches and every available 
asset in the U.S. armed forces arsenal. This makes for a complex and complicated logistics 
network that dependent upon the communications network. The ability to maintain “pull” 
logistics is crucial to maintain efficiency with respect to logistics and the U.S. has not 
operated on a “push” logistics network to a large magnitude since World War II. 
A. THREATS TO COMMUNICATIONS 
In the context of the “Global War 2030,” it is anticipated that the U.S. forces will 
be operating in a communication degraded or communication denied environment due to 
the presence of formidable adversaries. Peer competitors can disrupt communication 
networks through the hostile actions of jamming, denial, spoofing, hacking, and physical 
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destruction. The resulting effects range from minimal to catastrophic. At the low end of the 
spectrum, communications are disrupted or delayed but can be rerouted successfully. At 
the high end of the spectrum, entire communication networks are disabled, and individual 
units will operate in complete isolation from one another. Attacks on information sharing 
will manifest in the logistics system by interfering with the ability to transmit demand 
signals from the warfighter in need to relevant sources of supply. Furthermore, maintaining 
inventory awareness will prove untenable without routine information sharing. This makes 
the entire logistics system vulnerable through communications, since failing to know which 
units are in need or where demanded supplies are within the system at any given time 
renders the system inoperable. 
B. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS 
While developing a supporting communications system was deemed outside the 
scope of our efforts, we did evaluate several external threads of effort for potential 
COMMS architectures that could support the system. The candidate systems were drawn 
initially from ideas introduced at the 2019 WIC Workshop, relevant theses, and capstone 
efforts at NPS, and from commercial efforts referenced by stakeholders and subject matter 
experts. 
1. Attritable Communications/Logistics System 
Team Demeter was the nickname for one of the working groups at the 2019 WIC 
Workshop. Their presentation of the Attritable Communications/Logistics System 
described a system of autonomous, solar-powered UAV’s, soaring in the upper 
atmosphere. The solar chargers on the UAV enable each unit to maintain indefinite, 
persistent presence in its area of operations. Furthermore, the maneuverability of the 
platform would enable it to exploit favorable positions in the environment to make 
jamming efforts less effective. By increasing and decreasing altitude quickly, the UAV can 
get close enough to burn through adversary jamming and interference. Each UAV would 
carry a communications payload to transmit and receive logistics data in a communication 
degraded or communication denied “Global War 2030” conflict. This system would utilize 
EHF point-to-point upload/download communications with naval assets, shore 
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installations, and other UAVs to create a robust and resilient network. This would enable 
fast, reliable, and resilient communications to transmit logistics needs. Since this system is 
purely conceptual, attributes of the Airbus Zephyr, a commercially developed solar-
powered glider, were utilized for comparison against other systems. The payload capacity 
of the Zephyr is 500 pounds (Airbus n.d.), which is enough to support an encrypted 
communications transmitter/receiver system as well as a camera to provide the capability 
to conduct ISR operations. As a tertiary mission and potential application of this asset is 
the capability of providing third-party targeting. We assess the Technology Readiness 
Level (TRL) to be a 6 for this system. For a price comparison, we utilized the ARC-210 
cost estimate from the U.S. General Services Administration (GSA) and added a buffer 
bringing to a total estimate of $50,000 per transmitter/receiver. 
2. Starry Night System 
Another WIC Workshop group, Team Hermes, introduced the Starry Night System. 
In place of the gliders in Team Demeter’s Attritable Communications/Logistics System, 
Starry Night utilized maneuverable stratospheric balloons. This resulted in a significant 
decrease in cost, as the estimated price tag for a weather balloon is between $200 and $300 
(Stratostar n.d.), so we will assume the stratospheric balloon to cost $1,000. Stratospheric 
balloons modify their altitude in search of air currents that best support their desired ground 
track. As such, they cannot maintain station, but may be able to achieve favorable 
environmental conditions to mitigate enemy jamming efforts. Many balloons in series 
would be necessary to maintain continuous communication coverage over a desired area 
of operations. The network would also create a secure upload/download communications 
network linking ground-based units, naval assets, and balloons to transmit logistics 
information. A real-world application of this technology is already in existence. Loon is a 
project designed to connect people everywhere by extending connectivity to billions of 
people around the world. Loon partners with mobile network operators to provide LTE 
service to areas around the globe that lack the current capability (Loon n.d.). This type of 
technology would provide the same secondary and tertiary mission capabilities proposed 
for the Zephyr-style UAV. The benefit to this asset over the Zephyr-style UAV is the 
extremely low cost of an estimated $17,870 per balloon (comm suite and camera excluded) 
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according to a report by James Burr (2016) this type of asset could also alter its altitude to 
achieve burn through, but it would take considerably more time to do so in comparison to 
the Zephyr style UAV. A stratospheric balloon can be manufactured in days and the launch 
process is about 30 minutes (Loon n.d.). For this reason, building a large inventory of these 
is not necessary until conflict seems imminent. The report by Burr also identifies the 
payload capacity is approximately 67 pounds, which is adequate for the communications 
equipment anticipated. As this system has already been fielded, we assess a TRL of 8. We 
utilized the ARC-210 cost estimate from the U.S. General Services Administration and 
added a buffer bringing to a total estimate of $50,000 per transmitter/receiver again for 
price comparison purposes.  
3. Underwater LED-Based Communications Links 
A current NPS thesis effort by Capt. Nowak (2020), proposes the use of underwater, 
LED-based Communications Links into tactical, military scenarios. This technology offers 
high bandwidth, low cost, and power efficient underwater communications. While the 
thesis aimed to improve short range underwater wireless communications between assets 
at ranges of 5 to 15 meters, it also references the capability for significantly longer-range 
underwater data transmission using traditional acoustic transmission. Potential benefits to 
using optical transmissions over acoustic and RF wireless communications include a 
narrow beam-width for directional links, increased data rates, faster transmission speeds, 
and low probability for intercept and detection (LPI/LPD). This system would utilize 
secure buoys as communications relays throughout an AO, preventing the need for 
underwater assets to snorkel as frequently and serve as a relay to satellite communications. 
4. Starlink Satellite Program 
SpaceX’s Starlink Satellite program is a current commercial endeavor to surround 
the Earth with 12,000 low-orbit satellites to provide high-speed, low-latency, and 
affordable internet to all corners of the globe by the year 2027 (Mosher 2019). These 
satellites will orbit at 273 miles above the surface. Geosynchronous orbit is orders of 
magnitude higher at roughly 22,000 miles above the surface. The reduction in distance 
between satellites and ground stations will greatly reduce the latency inherent in current 
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satellite communications. Each satellite will act as a router, relaying information to four 
other satellites via lasers. The worldwide network created enables long range, resilient, and 
secure information sharing without going through traditional fiber optics (of which some 
networks may have been compromised by the adversary). Such a system will allow each 
user or platform to connect directly to the network from anywhere in the world, provide 
speeds equivalent to traditional terrestrial wire-based internet, improve security by 
reducing the ability of the adversary to tap the network, and improve resiliency by the sheer 
number of satellites used. 
5. Current Army and Marine Corps Logistics Network 
The logistics network currently utilized by the U.S. Army and USMC is the 
Logistics Communications Network, Global Combat Support System (GCSS). This system 
acted as our baseline for comparison against the other concepts and represented the way 
we currently utilize communications in a logistics capacity. This Oracle-based software 
and internet-based network rides on the existing tactical data network and can be accessed 
anywhere with network access, whether stateside or deployed. While deployed, various 
satellite assets can be utilized to provide the network connection, and operators of the 
system attend a few days of training and learn much of the system nuances on the job. The 
system provides enterprise wide visibility and accountability with a single point of entry 
for all logistics requirements (USMC n.d.) 
6. Line-of-Sight Surface Vessel Network 
The Line-of-sight (LOS) Surface Vessel Network operates in the same fashion as 
the Team Demeter and Team Hermes proposed networks. It was a concept proposed during 
the WIC but not included in the workshop’s final report. The difference here is that this 
system utilized surface vessels, manned or unmanned, to transmit via LOS as a giant mesh 
network on the waters of the world. The range of communications at sea level will be 
significantly less than you can achieve in the upper atmospheres and the expected number 
of vessels required would be substantially greater than in the Team Demeter and Team 
Hermes systems. 
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7. Wireless Mesh Network 
Another NPS Thesis effort by Edward Crapino (2019), advocates for a wireless 
mesh network (WMN) concept. He suggests that data flow can be maintained via 
directional antennas, ultrawideband sensor networks, and range augmentation using 
tactical airborne networks and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency’s Towed 
Airborne Life of Naval Systems. This network can be realized with manned or unmanned 
vessels and suggests that unmanned vessels could be weaponized to add defense layers to 
the network. 
C. ANALYSIS 
The candidate communications systems were ranked using the Analytic Hierarchy 
Process (AHP). AHP is a weighted scoring method that combines system performance 
attributes with the relative value of each category to rank overall performance. The scoring 
matrix, shown in Table 16, breaks down attributes deemed to be defining characteristics of 
a communications system. 
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Table 16. Communications System Scoring Matrix 
 1 (Worst) 2 3 4 5 (Best) Notes 
Network 
Susceptibility 
>50% 25-50% 10-25%  1-10% <1% 
Probability that enemy will 
compromise the system and/





Adaptable for at least 2 
branches and a minimum 
of 5 assets 
- 
Universally adaptable 
across all assets and 
branches 
Branches are USN, USA, 
USMC, USAF, USCG. 
Assets refers to ships, 
installations, aircraft, etc. 
Robustness Single point of failure exists 
At least 1 element of 
redundancy per node 
At least 2 elements of 
redundancy per node 
At least 3 elements of 
redundancy per node 
>3 elements of 
redundancy per node - 
Resiliency >25% 25-49% 50-74% 75-99% >99% Attacks can be physical and/or cyber 
Time to 
Implement 
>20 years 17-20 years 14-16 years 13-10 years <10 years 
Timeframe to implement at 
full operational capabilities 
(Acquisition estimate is 5 
years) 
Coverage <25% 25-50% 50-75% 75-99% >99% % of global coverage 
Speed & 
Bandwidth 
<100 MB/sec 100-500 MB/sec 500MB-1GB/sec 1-10GB/sec >10GB/sec Average data exchange rate  
Foreign 
Interoperability 
U.S. Only - Interoperable with NATO - 
Interoperable with all 
major allies and coalition 
forces 
Major allies are U.K., 
Canada, Israel, Japan, South 
Korea, France, and 
Australia. 
Cost >$10B $1B-$10B $500M-$1B $1M-$500M <$1M Rough estimate of initial investment 
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Category weights were also established using input from stakeholders, subject 
matter experts, and the operational experience of the team. Attributes with a weight of three 
were deemed mission critical whereas a weight of one signified an attribute deemed not 
mission critical. 
Table 17. Attribute Weights 
Candidate Systems Weights 
Network Security 3 
Adaptability & Interoperability 3 
Robustness 2 
Resiliency 3 
Network Requirements 1 
Coverage 2 
Network Speed & Bandwidth 2 
Foreign Interoperability 1 
Cost 2 
 
Raw scores for each candidate system were assigned individually using the matrix 
(higher scores are better). The scores were then averaged, and the resultant raw scores are 
annotated in Table 18. Table 19 lists the results after application of the weights to the raw 
scores. Finally, the systems were ranked based on their weighted scores where the number 
one ranking is the most favorable system. The system rankings are listed in Table 20.
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Attritable Comms/Logs System 4.0 5.0 4.0 5.0 3.7 3.7 3.3 5.0 1.3 35.0 
Starry Night System 4.0 5.0 4.3 4.7 4.7 3.7 3.3 5.0 4.0 38.7 
Underwater LED-Based Comms Links 4.0 1.7 1.7 3.0 3.0 2.0 4.0 2.3 2.7 24.3 
Underwater Wi-Fi Acoustic Networks 3.0 1.0 2.7 3.7 4.0 2.0 1.0 3.0 3.3 23.7 
Current Logistics Comms Network 2.0 2.3 2.3 2.0 5.0 4.7 3.7 1.0 5.0 28.0 
Starlink Satellites 4.7 5.0 4.0 4.7 2.3 5.0 3.3 5.0 1.7 35.7 
LOS Surface Vessel Network 3.3 3.0 4.0 3.7 4.7 2.3 3.0 5.0 1.3 30.3 
WMN Concept 3.3 3.0 3.7 3.7 4.3 2.3 3.0 5.0 2.0 30.3 
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Attritable Comms/Logs System 12.0 15.0 8.0 15.0 3.7 7.3 6.7 5.0 2.7 75.3 
Starry Night System 12.0 15.0 8.7 14.0 4.7 7.3 6.7 5.0 8.0 81.3 
Underwater LED-Based Comms Links 12.0 5.0 3.3 9.0 3.0 4.0 8.0 2.3 5.3 52.0 
Underwater Wi-Fi Acoustic Networks 9.0 3.0 5.3 11.0 4.0 4.0 2.0 3.0 6.7 48.0 
Current Logistics Comms Network 6.0 7.0 4.7 6.0 5.0 9.3 7.3 1.0 10.0 56.3 
Starlink Satellites 14.0 15.0 8.0 14.0 2.3 10.0 6.7 5.0 3.3 78.3 
LOS Surface Vessel Network 10.0 9.0 8.0 11.0 4.7 4.7 6.0 5.0 2.7 61.0 
WMN Concept 10.0 9.0 7.3 11.0 4.3 4.7 6.0 5.0 4.0 61.3 
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Table 20. Communication System Rankings 
Candidate Systems Raw Weighted 
Attritable Comms/Logs System 3 3 
Starry Night System 1 1 
Underwater LED-Based Comms Links 7 7 
Underwater Wi-Fi Acoustic Networks 8 8 
Current Logistics Comms Network 6 6 
Starlink Satellites 2 2 
LOS Surface Vessel Network 4 5 
WMN Concept 4 4 
 
D. RECOMMENDATIONS 
To make our logistics communication network more survivable we recommend that 
we utilize a robust, resilient, and mixed network consisting of our current satellites, solar-
powered UAVs and maneuverable stratospheric balloons. Our recommendation is a mix of 
the two, which could provide global coverage with as few as 153 stratospheric balloons 
and 100 solar-powered UAVs for approximately $515.4M, working in concert with the 
existing satellites. This should result in efficient and effective communication coverage for 
the Pacific and Atlantic AOs combined. These systems would communicate with one 
another via designated frequencies. Solar powered UAVs would be dedicated to major 
assets and installations to provide faster burn through, if necessary. The maneuverable 
stratospheric balloons would then be dispersed as required to ensure effective and efficient 
relay of communications is achieved at the lower orbits across the AO. The current 
satellites would maintain communications with these assets as well to serve as a form of 
redundancy and fortification to the system. Figure 67 is a conceptual illustration of what 
this system could look like operating in the Pacific AO. 
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 Recommended Communication System in Pacific 
Of note, the reasoning for choosing Team Demeter’s concept over the Starlink 
Satellite system is due to the uncertainty of the Starlink system being dedicated solely for 
military use. In the event it would be unreasonable or infeasible for the government to 
procure and have sole possession of the Starlink system, utilizing this system would add 
increased levels of susceptibility and vulnerability to a logistics communications network. 
Therefore, despite being outperformed by the Starlink System, we determined the solar 
powered UAVs was the better option IOT achieve a secure, reliable, robust, and redundant 
communications network. 
Leverage cost asymmetry where possible.  
A cost asymmetry advantaged is realized when the adversary must pay more to 
destroy an asset than it costs friendly forces to replace. This creates a win-win scenario 
where the asset either performs its mission freely or generates a net positive resource 
advantage if the enemy chooses to destroy it. The solar UAVs in the Attritable 
Communications/Logistics System is estimated to cost around $5M. Most, if not all, 
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missiles capable of destroying the asset by the adversary will cost more. This imbalance 
generates a virtual defense for the asset. The maneuverable stratospheric balloons, costing 
less, would be an even greater imbalance. 
We recommend employing one solar UAV for each major asset, and base, and EAB 
within the operating areas of conflict. Another asset that would comprise this fortified 
logistics communications network is a maneuverable stratospheric balloon. 
Utilize flexible frequency bandwidth and encryption.  
The communication transmitters and receivers must support encryption as well as 
possess the capability of spanning frequencies from HF to EHF. This provides a redundant 
means to overcome heavy interference due to atmospheric conditions and/or adversarial 
jamming. It also allows for smaller assets not capable of utilizing a wide range of 
frequencies to communicate with airborne relays. Our calculated RF ranges for this system 
is shown in more detail in the attached spreadsheet and assumes a conservative 50% 
attenuation factor. We estimated that the UAVs and balloons could transmit distances out 
to approximately 530 miles at an altitude of 70-thousand feet. This provides for over 
roughly 281-thousand square miles per asset. Taking in to account our cost estimate of 
solar-powered UAVs plus the transmitter/receivers it would cost approximately $1.3B to 
cover the Pacific Ocean, Indian Ocean, and Mediterranean Sea, and only approximately 
$35.5M to have global coverage with the stratospheric balloons. 
Create links between underwater and airborne communication networks.  
If UUVs and submarines are utilized in a logistics role, we recommend utilizing the 
encrypted underwater Wi-Fi acoustic networks between the assets and secure buoys. 
Though our scoring showed the underwater LED-based communications link performed 
better than the acoustic networks, its limited range of 5–15 meters made it very undesirable 
for application to covering millions of square miles. In the subsurface realm, our 
recommendation is to equip secure buoys throughout the conflict AOs that can act as 
communication relays between submarines and UUVs. These buoys could then transmit to 
and receive from the UAVs and stratospheric balloons. This would be a relatively 
inexpensive application as it would merely be an install of the acoustics communication 
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systems, if necessary. The assumption in this case that UUVs are already being utilized, 
submarines already operating in need of logistics, and buoys that are already in the water 
therefore they are not cost considerations for this analysis. It is also known that submarines 
utilize encrypted underwater acoustic communications, so it is understood that the system 
is already technologically matured making for a quick application. 
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APPENDIX B.  BLUE FORCE MODEL INPUTS 
Table 21 contains data pertaining to the logistics assets utilized in our model and 
simulation. The data, unless otherwise annotated, was obtained online utilizing the Navy 
Fact File. For LCS, parameters were averaged between the Independence and Freedom 
Class variants. Regarding T-AO, the displacement is an average between the single and 
double hull designs. The TSSE Mothership’s parameters were based on the motor vessel 
Blue Marlin. For T-AK, the parameters were averaged amongst the Sgt. Matej Kocak, 2nd 
Lt. John P. Bobo, 1st Lt. Harry L. Martin, Gunnery Sgt. Fred W. Stockham, and Lance Cpl. 
Roy M. Wheat classes. The T-AKR parameters were averaged amongst the Gordon, 
Shughart, Bob Hope, and Watson classes. The LCU parameters were averaged between the 
1610 and 1700 classes. Finally, regarding the ESD and ESB, cargo capacity was based on 
General Dynamics NASSCO’s Alaska-class crude oil carrier. These averaged parameters 
were used consistently in Table 22 and Table 23. 
Table 21. Model Inputs: Logistics Assets (Non-Rendered Data) 

















LCS 3500 16 1400 3666 123.3 24.6 38.5 
JHSV 1200 35 600 2461 103.0 28.5 20.0 
T-AOE 6000 25 29291 48800 229.8 32.6 46.0 
T-AO 6000 15 26838 41063 206.5 29.7 46.0 
T-AKE 14000 20 11075 41000 210.0 32.3 46.0 
LHA (America-
Class) 9500 16 16460 43745 260.7 32.3 46.0 
LSD 14800 15 6440 16708 185.6 25.6 46.0 
LPD 5000 16 5691 24900 208.5 32.0 63.4 
OSV 5500 13 2000 1450 60.0 11.2 25.0 
Sea Train 9000 15 1000 1786 103.0 28.5 20.0 
TSSE 
Mothership (1) 14000 15 30000 55000 153.6 41.5 46.0 
TSSE MOLA (1) 4500 8 48 188 20.4 7.9 2.0 
Orca (2) 6500 3 8 50 15.5 2.6 2.6 
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T-AK  6000 15 9578 46110 231.9 32.0 46.0 
T-AKR  6000 15 13000 62583 288.0 32.3 46.0 




1200 25 600 2461 103.0 28.5 20.0 




9500 15 193830 78000 239.3 50.0 46.0 
Exped. Sea Base 
(ESB)  (3) 9500 15 193830 90000 239.3 50.0 46.0 
Sentry USV (4) 1070 15 2.5 9 - - - 
Sea Hunter 
(MDUSV) 10000 12 60 
(5) 129 40.0 15.0 25.0 
Adapted from DON (n.d.) unless otherwise annotated. (1): Alexander et al. (2020); (2): Boeing (2017); 
(3) General Dynamics (n.d.); (4): Vavasseur (2016); (5): NIWSC (2017). 
 
Table 22 consists of those same logistics assets but contains analytical data 
pertaining to RCS, unadjusted and adjusted, angle reduction measures, radar absorbent 
material (RAM)/radar absorbent structures (RAS) reduction factors, and noise level. RCS 
was calculated utilized Harney’s (2013) Equation 8.2, 1/2 3/252 f Dσ ≅ , where f is frequency 
in MHz and D is displacement in thousands of long tons (vol 6, 373). Noise level was 
estimated with Harney’s (2013) Equation 11.24, 60 log 9log 20log 35SL v D f= + − + , 
where ν is the forward speed of the ship, D is displacement in metric tons, and f is frequency 
in kHz (vol. 2, 591). Regarding angle reduction to RCS, it is assumption based comparing 
the utilization of RAM to retrodirectivity. According to Harney (2013), “[m]any materials 
will only provide reductions to 10% of the original retrodirectivity” (vol 6, 384). Therefore, 
we concluded that up to 90% reduction in RCS can be achieved utilizing angles as well as 
an additional 90% RCS reduction utilizing RAM and/or RAS.  
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RCS (m2) Adjusted RCS 
Noise level 
(dB) 
LCS 90% 0% 3.46E+04 3.46E+03 125.3 
JHSV 90% 0% 1.90E+04 1.90E+03 144.2 
T-AOE 0% 0% 1.68E+06 1.68E+06 147.1 
T-AO 0% 0% 1.30E+06 1.30E+06 133.1 




0% 0% 1.43E+06 1.43E+06 135.0 
LSD 50% 0% 3.37E+05 1.68E+05 129.6 
LPD 90% 0% 6.13E+05 6.13E+04 132.8 
OSV 0% 0% 8.61E+03 8.61E+03 116.3 
Sea Train 0% 0% 1.18E+04 1.18E+04 120.9 
TSSE 
Mothership  0% 0% 2.01E+06 2.01E+06 134.2 
TSSE MOLA 0% 0% 4.02E+02 4.02E+02 95.7 
Orca 0% 0% 1.00E+00 1.00E+00 90 (110 snorkel) 
T-AK 0% 0% 1.54E+06 1.54E+06 133.6 
T-AKR  0% 0% 2.44E+06 2.44E+06 134.8 




0% 0% 1.90E+04 1.90E+04 135.4 








0% 0% 4.21E+06 4.21E+06 136.2 
Sentry USV 90% 90% 4.16E+00 4.16E-02 100.1 
Sea Hunter 
(MDUSV) 90% 0% 2.30E+02 2.30E+01 104.8 
Values in table were calculated utilizing equations found in Harney (2013). Adapted from DON 
(n.d.) unless otherwise annotated. 
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Table 23 lists the total number of assets, an assumption of availability, and 
assumptions pertaining to cruise and ballistic missile salvos per asset. We utilized the Navy 
Fact File to determine the total number of assets, except for OSVs, Sea Trains, TSSE 
Motherships, TSSE MOLAs, Orcas, Sentry USVs, and Sea Hunters. For commercial or 
concept platforms a reasonable estimate was utilized for an assumed quantity. We could 
not reasonably determine the number of Sentry USVs or Sea Hunters as those projects are 
still infant in their development. The availability numbers are assumptions based on the 
type of asset, combatant, logistics dedicated, or autonomous. A combatant is assumed to 
have an availability of 80%, logistics asset 90%, and autonomous asset of 95% for this 
project. 
Table 23. Model Inputs: Logistics Assets (Availability and Salvo Sizes) 
Ship Total Available 
Cruise/Ballistic Missile Salvo (per Asset) 
Land Surface Air Subsurface 
LCS 25 20 4 4 2 4 
JHSV 14 11 2 2 2 2 
T-AOE 4 4 10 10 2 8 
T-AO 15 14 10 10 2 8 
T-AKE 14 13 10 10 2 8 
LHA (America-
Class) 8 6 10 10 2 8 
LSD 8 6 4 4 2 4 
LPD 11 9 6 6 2 6 
OSV 40 36 1 1 1 1 
Sea Train 4 4 1 1 1 1 
TSSE 
Mothership  4 4 10 10 2 8 
TSSE MOLA 88 79 1 1 1 1 
Orca 11 10 - - - - 
T-AK 11 10 10 10 2 8 
T-AKR 8 7 10 10 2 8 




14 11 2 2 2 2 
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Ship Total Available 
Cruise/Ballistic Missile Salvo (per Asset) 
Land Surface Air Subsurface 




2 2 10 10 2 8 
Expeditionary 
Sea Base (ESB) 3 3 10 10 2 8 
Sentry USV - - 2 2 2 2 
Sea Hunter 
(MDUSV) - - 2 2 2 2 
Cruise/ballistic missile salvo sizes were estimated or assumed based on asset self-defense capability and size. 
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APPENDIX C.  DEMAND SIGNAL AND COST FORMULATION 
The demand signal formulation considered force logistics, consumptions rate, 
location, and cost. The types of supply we deemed to be most important to the warfighter 
in a contested environment were fuel, stores, and ordnance. A planning factor for each 
force domain such as ground, maritime, and air was determined while implementing a 
distribution and considered variation in the consumption rate. To integrate with our 
network model, we would need to place each asset in a specific location (defined latitude/
longitude). Lastly, the cost per ton of supplies and the cost of units themselves were 
instrumental in providing valuable insight on the cost benefit analysis for the proposed 
logistics system architecture. 
A. GROUND DEMAND SIGNAL 
1. Forces 
For this research, the ground units consist of an Army and Marine component. The 
army component is divided into the following divisions: armored, infantry, light infantry, 
airborne, and air assault (DoA 1997). The Marine components are made up of the 
following: Marine expeditionary force (MEF), Marine expeditionary brigade (MEB) and 
Marine expeditionary unit (MEU). 
We chose to associate a uniform distribution with each ground unit. Probability 
Methods for Cost Uncertainty Analysis describes a random variable to have a uniform 
distribution when the probability density function (PDF) and cumulative density function 
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In a uniform distribution, it is equally likely that any value between the minimum 
(a) and maximum (b) will be selected. Each unit was bounded and simulated using @Risk 
in Excel. This platform enabled the user to capture variation in the unit size after conducting 
10,000 iterations of the Monte Carlo simulation. Of note, for both ground and maritime 
forces, @Risk was used to determine all static values used for each unit and its various 
supply consumption rate. Following is a description of each force and the distribution 
utilized to determine the number of personnel assigned to the unit. 
a. Armored  
Armored divisions are heavily armed units originally designed for large scale 
attacks, equipped with M1 Abram series tanks, M2/M3 Bradley series infantry vehicles, 
M109 howitzers and other heavy vehicles and munitions (CBO 2016). The distribution 
allocated to this unit was:  
( )10000,15000X Unif , 
where at least 10,000 and not more than 15,000 personnel are assigned to the unit. 
b. Infantry 
Infantry divisions are designed to be deployable in a short period of time; they are 
largely based on foot, with some transportation capability. Due to this division’s lack of 
heavily armored vehicles, infantry divisions are largely a supported unit, meaning they can 
call in for fire support and artillery strikes when required (CBO 2016). The distribution 
allocated to this unit was: 
( )10000,15000X Unif . 
c. Light Infantry 
A light infantry division has similar capabilities to a conventional infantry division 
explained above, except it is smaller in size (Mohr 1984). The distribution allocated to this 
unit was: 
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( )6000,12000X Unif . 
d. Airborne 
Airborne units are traditionally smaller and composed of personnel with specialized 
training. They are trained in parachuting from aircrafts to conduct missions such as forcible 
entry operations which involve gaining access to an enemy’s terrain that cannot be reached 
via other transportation methods (CBO 2016). The distribution allocated to this unit was 
(Thompson 2010): 
( )4000,8000X Unif . 
e. Air Assault 
An air assault unit has similar capabilities to an airborne unit. The distribution 
allocated to this unit was (Global Security n.d.-a): 
( )4000,6600X Unif . 
f. Marine Expeditionary Force 
A MEF is the largest of the Marine task forces. It includes a Marine Division 
(MARDIV), Marine air wing (MAW, and Marine logistics group (MLG) and is composed 
of approximately 50,000 personnel, 4,000 vehicles, and 168 fixed-wing aircraft. A MEF 
carries enough supply to be self-sustained for approximately 60 days (Dayne Nix, class 
notes, 2019). The distribution allocated to this unit was (CBO 2016): 
( )35000,50000X Unif . 
g. Marine Expeditionary Brigade 
A MEB is a crises response force that is composed of an infantry regiment, a Marine 
aircraft group (MAG), and a combat logistics regiment (CLR). They include approximately 
17,000 personnel, 700 vehicles, and are self-sustained for up to 30 days (Dayne Nix, class 
notes, 2019). The distribution allocated to this unit was: 
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( )14000,17000X Unif . 
h. Marine Expeditionary Units 
A MEU is the forward deployed Marine expeditionary task force that is made up of 
a ground combat element, air squadron, and combat logistic battalion (Dayne Nix, class 
notes, 2019). It consists of approximately 2,200 personnel, 100 vehicles, and are self-
sustained for up to 15 days. The distribution allocated to this unit was: 
( )1980,2420X Unif . 
i. Anti-Ship Mobile Missile Batteries 
 According to the “Global War 2030” scenario, there are 40 anti-ship mobile 
missile batteries located throughout the Pacific AO (Jeffrey Kline, class notes, 2019). 
These batteries can be manned by various ground forces throughout the AO, and are 
assumed to be outfitted with the Naval Strike Missile (NSM), which weighs approximately 
900 lbs. 
j. Mobile Air Defense Sites 
According to the “Global War 2030” scenario, there are 15 mobile air defense sites 
located throughout the Pacific AO (Jeffrey Kline, class notes, 2019). These sites can be 
manned by various ground forces throughout the AO and are comprised of Terminal High 
Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) and Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) sites. These 
sites have individual warheads with a yield of approximately 2,000 lbs. 
k. C4ISR Mobile Sites 
According to the “Global War 2030” scenario, there are 30 C4ISR mobile sites 
located throughout the Pacific AO (Jeffrey Kline, class notes, 2019). These sites can be 
manned by various ground forces throughout the AO and are assumed to not draw an 




The planning factors for logistics consumption for ground units per person were 
estimated based on FM 55-15 (DoA 1997). Each class of logistics is described in Table 24. 
Table 24. Class of Supply Definitions. Adapted from DoA (1997). 
Class of supplies Definition 
Class I Subsistence 
A-Ration Air (in-flight rations) 
B-Ration Ground support material 
T-Ration Industrial supplies 
MRE Meal, ready-to-eat 
LRP Long range Patrol 
R/CW Ration, cold weather 
HCP Health and comfort pack 
Class II Clothing, individual equipment, tents, tools, and other supplies 
Class III Petroleum, oil, lubricants, and fuel products. 
Class IV Construction/barrier material. 
Class V Ammunition. 
Class VI Personal demand (exchange) items. 
Class VII Major end items (tanks, vehicles, generators, radios, etc.) 
Class VIII Medical supplies 
Class IX Repair parts 
Class X Material for nonmilitary programs 
 
For this research, we classified Classes I, II, IV, VI and water as stores; Class III as 
fuel; and Class V as ordnance. We also categorized the type of operational tempo as an 
assault and sustainment. The assault planning factor per person accounts for mobility; that 
is, if warfighters are fatigued due to the heavy strain their gear, they cannot effectively 
engage the enemy for a long period of time. The sustainment factor enables warfighters to 
carry more logistics, as they have planned for a longer period of conflict without direct 
action.  
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The planning factors outlined by the FM 55-15 by class of supplies is shown in 
Table 25, Table 26, and Table 27. 
Table 25. Class I–IV, and VI Planning Factors. Adapted from DoA (1997). 








HCP 1 0.77 
HCP 2 0.055 
Class II - 3.17 
Class III - 0.51 






Table 26. Water Planning Factor. Adapted from DoA (1997).  
Water (gal/
man/day) Temperate Arctic Tropic Arid 
Company 3.9 4.4 5.7 5.9 
Battalion 6.6 7.2 8.5 8.7 
Brigade 7 7.6 8.9 11.1 
Division 7 7.6 8.9 11.9 
Above 




Table 27. Class V Planning Factor. Adapted from DoA (1997). 
Type of Division Class V (Ston/day) 
Planning Factor 
Ston/man/day 
Armored 1452 0.097 
Infantry 1442 0.096 
Light 651 0.065 
Airborne 677 0.085 
Air Assault 842 0.140 
   
For the following calculations, we associated a triangular distribution with each 
logistics element. Probability Methods for Cost Uncertainty Analysis describes a random 
variable as having a triangular distribution when the probability density function (PDF) 
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The triangular distribution is a bounded approach, where one inputs specific range 
values for the specified random variables: minimum (a), most likely (m), and maximum 
(b). Each logistics element planning factor (per person) was simulated using this method. 
3. Modeling and Simulation for Ground Logistics  
To develop a planning factor to capture variation, we first associated each element 
with a triangular distribution. The range for the distribution was set at +/- 25% of the values 
shown in the planning factor tables. The data input process is depicted in Figure 68.
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 Inputting Distributions to Elements
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Upon associating each element with a triangular distribution, we then summed all 
of the “stores,” which include class I,II,III,V, and water variables as shown in Table 28. 
These values made up the total required supplies per person in each category of operation. 





Stores SUM (class I, class II, water) 
SUM (class I, 
class II, water) 
Fuel Class III Class III 
Ordnance Class V Class V 




With the per person supply demand established, the next step was to account for 
variations in unit sizes. As mentioned in the ground forces section, each ground element 
had an associated uniform distribution, which was then used in the Monte Carlo simulation 
to assign a unit size. Finally, the unit size was multiplied by the per person supply demand 
to establish a per unit, daily supply demand estimate as illustrated in Figure 69.
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 Ground Element Logistics
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We conducted 10,000 simulations, and organized the average results in Table 29 
and Table 30. These planning factor results were then used as inputs for the ground 
elements located in the AO demand signal. 
Table 29. Logistics per Person Results 
 
 




B. MARITIME DEMAND SIGNAL  
1. Forces  
The maritime force was divided into four groups: carrier strike group (CSG), 
expeditionary strike group (ESG), surface action group (SAG), and independent deployers. 
A CSG is normally made up of nuclear capable aircraft carrier (CVN), Destroyers (DDG), 
Cruisers (CG), and a large tanker. For this research, it is assumed that the tankers could be 
detached at any moment to provide logistics to other units in the AO. An ESG is made up 
of large-deck amphibious surface combatants, DDGs, and CGs. In a SAG any combination 
of DDGs, CG’s, frigates (FFGs), and littoral combat ships (LCS) is possible, and the most 
senior officer of the SAG would normally take command of the group. Lastly, an 
independent deployer could be any one surface combatant that has a robust self-defense 
capability to include submarines (SSNs). Below is a description of the maritime forces used 
in this research. 
a. Carrier Strike Group 
(1) CVN 
A CVN is a platform that provide a variety of aerial capabilities and is commanded 
by Strike Group Commander, usually a Rear Admiral (O-7). It is comprised of multi-role 
fighter aircraft, airborne command and control assets, and helicopters, and is made up of 
approximately 5,000 personnel. The CVN gives the U.S. the capable of launching a variety 
of aerial strikes on enemy combatants in areas in the world where the U.S. does not have 
air bases. 
(2) CG 
A CG is a multi-mission platform with a robust air defense capability that is 
commanded by a Captain (O-6). They are capable of helicopter operations, have a Vertical 
Launch System (VLS), and other offensive and defense weaponry. The VLS system is 
operated by Aegis which enables a CG to provide sensor coverage and missile strikes on 
enemy combatants or in the defense of other units. 
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(3) DDG 
A DDG is very similar to a CG. However, they are commanded by a Commander 
(O-5), have less firepower and air defense sensor coverage. They also have Aegis and VLS. 
b. Expeditionary Strike Group 
(1) Amphibious Assault Ships (LHD/LHA) 
The LHD/LHA provide the Marines with the capability of ship-to shore movement 
via aircraft and landing craft such as Landing Craft, Air Cushion (LCAC) and Landing 
Craft Utility (LCU) vehicles. They are the largest of the U.S. Navy’s amphibious ships and 
are capable of transporting MEU’s and MEB’s (DON n.d.). 
(2) Amphibious Transport Dock (LPD/LPD-17) 
The LPD/LPD-17 embarks and transports Marine units via aircraft, such as vertical 
take-off and landing aircraft (MV-22) and landing crafts such LCAC and Amphibious 
Assault Vehicles (AAV). These capabilities support a variety of missions such as 
expeditionary warfare, special operations, and air operations (DON n.d.). 
(3) Dock Landing Ship (LSD) 
 The LSD provide embarkation and transport to Marines to conduct 
amphibious assault operations. They are capable launching LCACs and aircraft in support 
of expeditionary missions (DON n.d.). 
c. Surface Action Group 
(1) Perry Class Frigate (FFG) 
The FFG is a multi-mission capable platform. It can perform undersea warfare 
(USW), aircraft operations, and anti-air warfare (AAW) missions (Pike 2000). 
(2) LCS  
The LCS is a modular, mission-focused platform that can operate near shore. It is 
outfitted with specific mission packages to conduct operation that include aircraft 
operations, mine countermeasure, anti-submarine warfare, or surface warfare. The mission 
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package also included the requisite armament, sensors, and personnel required to meet the 
specified mission assigned (DON n.d.). 
d. Independent Deployer (SSN) 
SSN’s are nuclear powered platforms designed to locate and destroy enemy surface 
and subsurface threats. They are multi-mission capable to include special operations, 
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR), and escort support to the CSG (DON 
n.d.). 
2. Logistics 
The planning factors for logistics (fuel, ordnance, and stores) for the above-
mentioned assets were inspired by the Naval Warfare Publication (NWP) Sustainment at 
Sea NWP 4-01.2. The NWP outlines nominal planning factors to support a CSG and ESG 
at the strategic, operation, and tactical logistic levels (DON 2007a).  
The levels of logistics are defined by the NWP as: 
1. Strategic. Strategic level logistics relate to deploying and sustaining 
forces as part of the implementation of national military strategy. 
Acquisition, transportation of material and personnel, and the levels of 
readiness of prepositioned material are meticulously planned. In the larger 
scheme, sustainability also includes the industrial base and the capacity to 
develop and produce military equipment, weapons, and systems in support 
of a long-term contingency or wartime operations. 
2. Operational. Operational level logistics includes the management, 
protection, coordination, and provisioning of material to supported forces 
using an established network of support sites, activities, and theater 
transportation. It provides the link between the strategic logistic capability 
and the tactical. 
3. Tactical. Tactical level logistics directly support the strike group (SG). 
It is derived from the organic capabilities of ships and from other elements, 
including shore based logistical assets and the CLF ships operating under 
the Military Sealift Command (MSC) Naval Fleet Auxiliary Force (NFAF) 
program and shore based logistic activities. Support activities at this level 
include maintenance, materiel trans-shipment, fueling, repair, engineering 
support, personnel support, and transportation. (DON 2007a, 20) 
195 
However, due to distribution restrictions on the NWP data, we developed our own 
estimate for this analysis. We were able to manipulate and develop a range and associate 
each asset’s planning factor with a triangular distribution. 
3. Modeling and Simulation for Maritime Logistics 
An identical methodology to the ground logistics model and simulation was used 
in developing a planning factor suitable for our research. As an input to the triangular 
distribution, we used the data delineated in Table 31 and input them as shown in Figure 70. 
Table 31. Maritime Triangular Distribution Inputs 














Stores 35 52.5 70 35 52.5 60 
DFM 0 0 0 0 0 0 
JP-5 2500 3750 5000 2500 3500 4500 
Ordnance 100 150 200 0 75 110 
CG 
Stores 0.5 0.75 1 0.5 0.75 1 
DFM 400 900 1200 300 700 850 
JP-5 0 25 45 0 15 25 
Ordnance 1 3 6 0 1.5 3.5 
DDG 
Stores 0.5 0.75 1 0.5 0.75 1 
DFM 600 900 1200 500 800 1000 
JP-5 8 25 45 0 15 25 
Ordnance 1 2 6 0 1 2.75 
LCS 
Stores 0.1 0.15 0.3 0.1 0.15 0.3 
DFM 300 450 600 200 400 500 
JP-5 20 30 40 0 15 25 
Ordnance 1 1.5 2.5 0 0.75 1.5 
LHD 
Stores 7 12.4 20 7 12.4 20 
DFM 900 1600 2100 700 900 1100 
JP-5 70 800 950 0 475 600 
Ordnance 20 30 40 0 10 20 
LPD 
Stores 3.5 5.25 6.5 3.5 5.25 6.5 
DFM 450 900 1300 400 500 600 
JP-5 10 300 450 0 175 350 
Ordnance 1 5 7 0 3 5 
LSD 
Stores 1 3 5 1 3 5 
DFM 200 500 850 175 300 425 
JP-5 1 75 90 0 45 65 
Ordnance 0.5 1.25 2.6 0 0.5 1.25 
LPD-17 Stores 3 4.5 7 3 4.5 7 DFM 700 1050 1300 600 900 1100 
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JP-5 10 800 900 0 450 600 





 Maritime Model Inputs
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Upon associating each random variable with their respective distribution, we 
conducted a Monte Carlo simulation with 10,000 iterations. The output of the model is 
reflected in Table 32. These values were then used as a demand signal for the logistics 
system in the AO. 
Table 32. Maritime Model Output 
Platform Type of Supply Assault Sustain 
CVN 
Stores (Stons/day) 60.89 51.81 
DFM (Bbl/day) 0.00 0.00 
JP-5 (Bbl/day) 3760.97 3541.34 
Ordnance (Stons/day) 150.47 21.46 
CG 
Stores (Stons/day) 0.62 0.83 
DFM (Bbl/day) 1045.21 315.16 
JP-5 (Bbl/day) 28.55 22.21 
Ordnance (Stons/day) 4.39 1.75 
DDG 
Stores (Stons/day) 0.70 0.79 
DFM (Bbl/day) 935.83 858.33 
JP-5 (Bbl/day) 33.64 13.84 
Ordnance (Stons/day) 2.53 1.08 
FFG 
Stores (Stons/day) 0.70 0.75 
DFM (Bbl/day) 700.00 600.00 
JP-5 (Bbl/day) 25.00 13.00 
Ordnance (Stons/day) 2.00 1.00 
SSN 
Stores (Stons/day) 0.15 0.15 
DFM (Bbl/day) 7.00 4.00 
JP-5 (Bbl/day) 0 0 
Ordnance (Stons/day) 2.00 1.00 
LCS 
Stores (Stons/day) 0.23 0.14 
DFM (Bbl/day) 380.85 461.79 
JP-5 (Bbl/day) 30.72 21.37 
Ordnance (Stons/day) 1.35 0.78 
LHD 
Stores (Stons/day) 15.76 10.45 
DFM (Bbl/day) 1286.65 875.55 
JP-5 (Bbl/day) 645.45 359.89 
Ordnance (Stons/day) 28.86 12.45 
LPD 
Stores (Stons/day) 5.95 5.85 
DFM (Bbl/day) 1125.42 549.63 
JP-5 (Bbl/day) 329.41 88.14 
Ordnance (Stons/day) 4.68 3.75 
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Platform Type of Supply Assault Sustain 
LSD 
Stores (Stons/day) 3.73 1.93 
DFM (Bbl/day) 582.80 252.93 
JP-5 (Bbl/day) 77.26 44.88 
Ordnance (Stons/day) 1.03 0.14 
LPD-17 
Stores (Stons/day) 5.40 4.86 
DFM (Bbl/day) 989.63 1051.13 
JP-5 (Bbl/day) 291.17 209.77 
Ordnance (Stons/day) 5.13 3.02 
 
C. AIR FORCES DEMAND SIGNAL 
1. Forces 
The air forces were divided into four separate groups: fighters, bombers, patrol 
aircraft and tankers. The number of sorties expected for fighters was estimated to be two 
per day during an assault phase and one per day during sustainment. The bombers, patrol 
aircraft and tankers were estimated to conduct one sortie per day for both assault and 
sustainment phases due to their fuel capacity and/or mission sets.  
a. Fighters 
(1) F-15 
The McDonnell Douglas F-15 Eagle is an all-weather tactical fighter aircraft 
utilized by the United States Air Force (USAF). It is primarily known for his ability to 
achieve air superiority as a fighter.  
(2) F-16 
The General Dynamics F-16 Fighting Falcon is a multirole fighter aircraft utilized 
by the United States Army (USA). It was designed as an air superiority day fighter and 
eventually evolved into a successful all-weather multirole aircraft.  
(3) F-18 
The McDonnel Douglas F/A-18 Hornet is an all-weather, carrier-capable, multirole 
combat jet designed to operate as both a fighter and attack aircraft. It is the primary fighter 
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aircraft for the United States Navy (USN) but is being phased out by the F-35 Lightning 
II. 
(4) F-22 
The Lockheed Martin F-22 Raptor is an all-weather, stealth tactical fighter 
developed for the USAF. It is the preeminent fighter aircraft in the Air Force arsenal.  
(5) F-35 
Currently serving as an all-weather stealth multirole combat aircraft, the Lockheed 
Martin F-35 Lightning II is the newest aircraft in the U.S. arsenal and is employed by the 
United States Marine Corps (USMC) and the USN. It is intended to perform both air 
superiority and strike missions while also providing electronic warfare, intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. 
b. Bombers 
(1) B-1 
The Rockwell B-1 Lancer is a supersonic variable-sweep wing, heavy bomber 
utilized by the USAF. Commonly referred to as the “Bone” it is one of three strategic 
bombers in the USAF fleet along with the B-2 Spirit and B-52 Stratofortress (Boeing n.d.).  
(2) B-2 
The Northrop Grumman B-2 Spirit known as the “Stealth Bomber” is a heavy 
strategic bomber with low observable stealth technology designed for penetrating dense 
anti-aircraft defenses. Its flying wing design makes it easily distinguishable from most 
aircraft in the sky (Northrop Grumman n.d.). 
(3) B-21 
The Northrop Grumman B-21 Raider is also a heavy bomber currently under 
development for the USAF and will be an upgrade to the B-2. 
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c. Patrol Aircraft 
(1) P-8 
The Boeing P-8 Poseidon is a modified Boeing 737 developed for the USN to 
conduct anti-submarine warfare (ASW), anti-surface warfare (ASuW), and shipping 
interdiction roles. It has a range of 1,381 miles and a top speed of 564 mph (Boeing n.d.). 
Its loadouts can include, but are not limited to, sonobuoys and Harpoon missiles. 
(2) E-8C 
The Northrop Grumman E-8 Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System 
(STARS) utilized by the USAF is an airborne ground surveillance, battle management and 
command and control aircraft. It can track ground vehicles, some aircraft, collects imagery, 
and relays tactical pictures to ground and air theater commanders. It has a similar range as 
the P-8 Poseidon and reaches a top speed of 587 mph (Northrop Grumman n.d.). 
d. Tankers (KC-46) 
The Boeing KC-46 Pegasus is a military aerial refueling and strategic military 
transport aircraft developed from the 767-jet airliner (Boeing n.d.). The USAF recently 
decided to replace older Boeing KC-135 Stratotankers with the KC-46 Pegasus.  
2. Logistics 
The estimated demand signal for fighter aircraft was determined utilizing the 
previously defined demand signal for a CVN in terms of JP-5 and ordnance. It was 
estimated that a CVN carries approximately 70 aircraft, and from there our team 
determined the amount of JP-5 in bbl/day and ordnance in short-tons/day for an individual 
fighter aircraft. Those values are listed in Table 33. 
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Table 33. Fighter Aircraft Demand Signal 
 
 
We formulated rough estimates for the fuel and payload capacities of the bombers, 
patrol aircraft and tanker. The B-21 is under current development and limited information 
is available regarding its fuel and payload capacities. Therefore, the team estimated the 
demand signal for the B-21 to be the exact same as that of the B-2. The estimated demand 
signal per aircraft per day during sustainment and assault phases is listed in Table 34. 
Table 34. Air Forces Model Output 
Air Forces Supply Type Sustain Assault 
F-15 
Fuel (bbl/day) 50 59.52 
Ordnance 
(stons/day) 0.88 2.38 
F-16 
Fuel (bbl/day) 50 59.52 
Ordnance 
(stons/day) 0.88 2.380 
F-18 
Fuel (bbl/day) 50 59.52 
Ordnance 
(stons/day) 0.88 2.38 
F-22 
Fuel (bbl/day) 50 59.52 
Ordnance 
(stons/day) 0.88 2.38 
F-35 
Fuel (bbl/day) 50 59.52 
Ordnance 
(stons/day) 0.88 2.38 
B-1 
Fuel (bbl/day) 414.98 829.97 
Ordnance 
(stons/day) 5.36 37.5 
B-2 Fuel (bbl/day) 261.25 522.50 
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Air Forces Supply Type Sustain Assault 
Ordnance 
(stons/day) 2.86 20 
B-21 
Fuel (bbl/day) 261.25 522.50 
Ordnance 
(stons/day) 2.86 20 
P-8 
Fuel (bbl/day) 32.85 32.85 
Ordnance 
(stons/day) 0.75 1.5 
E-8C 
Fuel (bbl/day) 50 29.76 
Ordnance 
(stons/day) 0 0.4 
KC Tanker 
Fuel (bbl/day) 664.22 664.22 
Ordnance 
(stons/day) 0 0 
 
D. TOTAL DEMAND SIGNAL 
To determine the total demand signal, we first reviewed the “Global War 2030” 
scenario  to determine the location of the assets (Jeffrey Kline, class notes, 2019). The main 
nodes in which logistics would be transferred to would consist of: Busan, South Korea; 
Yokosuka, Japan; Sasebo, Japan; Okinawa, Japan; Clark Air Force Base (AFB) located in 
the Philippines; Singapore; Darwin, Australia; Guam; a point 300 nm East of Guam; and a 
point 50 nm West of Guam. The 300 nm East of Guam and 50 nm West of Guam locations 
correlated to the George Washington and Reagan Strike Groups annotated in the “Global 
War 2030” scenario (Jeffrey Kline, class notes, 2019). By allocating each surface asset or 
ground force unit to one of these locations, we then determined the total demand signal 
during sustainment and assault phases for stores, in short-tons/day, DFM and JP-5, in bbls/
day, and ordnance, in short-tons/day. Table 35 lists the force disposition within the Pacific 
AO.
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Table 35. Force Disposition 
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Our team, however, did have to interpolate on the total and type of composition of 
ground forces throughout the Pacific AO. It was estimated that a total equivalent of two 
MEFs along with the equivalent of two Army brigades would be located within the AOs. 
The two MEFs were further broken down into a total of four MEBs and 8 MEUs. The 
Army brigades were estimated to generate a demand signal that was averaged among 
infantry, light, and airborne units. The total demand signal utilized in our model is 
annotated in Table 36.
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Table 36. Total Demand Signal 
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E. SYSTEM COST  
1. Ship Cost Methodology 
To facilitate a cost-benefit analysis regarding the choice of certain architectures, 
and provide valuable insight to decision makers, we chose to associate costs for each unit 
and tonnage of supplies. Each unit, both logistics and combatants, were considered in the 
cost breakdown shown in Table 37. While researching the unit cost for each unit, we 
converted the procurement price from the specified Constant Year (CY) dollars to today’s 
CY to account for inflation. Mislick and Nussbaum (2015) describe CY dollars as, “the 
purchasing power or value of the dollar in the specified constant fiscal year” (88). 
Therefore, the cost would reflect how much the price would be at today’s (2020) currency 
valuation. However, no learning curves were associated with the costs below. Using Unit 
theory for learning curves incorporates a decrease in unit cost due to learning in the 
production process (Mislick and Nussbaum 2015). That is, if there is a 90% learning curve 
associated with the production process, that is linked to a 10% decrease in production cost 
each time the number of units is doubled (Mislick and Nussbaum 2015) 
Table 37. Ship Cost Data 
Ship COST ($M) CY(XX) Inflation Factor COST (CY20$M) 
CVNa 5,200.00 CY97 1.46 7,592.00 
DDG-51b 1,185.53 CY05 1.31 1,554.95 
CGc 1,282.00 CY02 1.39 1,780.83 
LCSd 420.20 CY07 1.24 520.54  
LHDe 1,400.00 CY10 1.18 1,655.36 
LPDf 1,326.10 CY06 1.27 1,687.06 
LSDg 257.50 CY01 1.40 360.55 
LPD-17h 1,326.10 CY06 1.27 1,687.06 
T-AOEi 365.80 CY98 1.46 532.93 
T-AKEj 455.00 CY07 1.24 563.65 
T-AEk 333.33 CY01 1.40 466.73 
T-AFSl 333.33 CY01 1.40 466.73 
T-AOm 530.00 CY20 1.00 530.00 
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Ship COST ($M) CY(XX) Inflation Factor COST (CY20$M) 
MPFn 1,750.00 CY05 1.31 2,295.30 
T-5 Tankero 17.34 CY73 4.61 79.96 
JHSVp 186.92 CY08 1.21 226.12 
OSVq 4.00 CY20 1.00 4.00 
MOLAr 8.75 CY20 1.00 8.75 
Motherships 240.00 CY20 1.00 240.00 
Sea Train 
(4)t 80.00 CY20 1.00 80.00 
LMSRu 308.32 CY97 1.46 450.15 
LCUv 13.42 CY18 1.04 13.95 
ESBw/ESDx 500.00 CY19 1.02 510.00 
Orcay 10.75 CY19 1.02 0.97 
Information Sources: a(FI 2005); b(DOD 2006); c(FI 2002); d(DOD 2006); e(FI 2010); f(DOD 2006) 
Assumed same cost as LPD-17; g(FI 2001); h(DOD 2006); i(FI 2000); j(DOD 2011); k(St. Laurent 
2003); l(DOD 2006); m(O’Rourke 2018); n(Button et al. 2005); o(Staats 1973); p(DOD 2010); 
q(Atlantic Shipping n.d.).; r(Alexander et al. 2020); s(DiPatrizio 2014) Based off Blue Marlin cargo 
ship; t(Macias 2018); u(Cekala et al. 1997) Based off Sea Hunter; v(Eckstein 2018); w(Paolino 2019); 
x(Defense Industry Daily 2015); y(Werner 2019) Cost averaged between four USVs. 
 
To convert the CY dollars, we used the Naval Center for Cost Analysis (NCCA) 
Joint Inflation Calculator (JIC) (NCCA 2020). The JIC is an Excel document with the 
inflation indices associated to the services, specific categories of acquisition programs, and 
year, as shown in Figure 71. We then used the “General Inflation Index” to convert the 
price of each ship from the year it was procured to today’s currency valuation. The 
“Inflation Index” column in Table 37 was provided by the JIC and was used to convert 
from CYXX to CY20. The inflation index was then multiplied by the ships cost in CYXX.  
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 JIC Calculator. Source: NCCA (2020). 
2. Supply Cost Methodology 
Each logistics platform is associated with a specific cargo capacity, which is then 
multiplied by the cost per ton of supply lost if the enemy was successful in targeting, 
engaging, and killing the logistics platform. Therefore, adding the cost of supplies and the 
cost of the individual assets lost due to enemy action, could provide powerful insight for 
decision makers in weighing alternative logistic system architectures.  
In creating the data point for this analysis, we first began with stores and fuel, to 
consider JP-5 (Jet Fuel-5) and DFM (Diesel Fuel Marine). The data for fuel and stores was 
supplied by the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) and Naval Supply Systems Command 
as shown in Table 38. 
Table 38. Fuel and Stores Cost. Adapted from Norquist (2018); 
NAVSUP (n.d.). 
Supplies/Fuel Cost ($) 
JP-5a (per/bbl) 126.42 
DFMa (per/bbl) 126.00 
Stores (per/Ston)b 2,007.02 
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However, to create an average cost per tonnage of supplies, we took the given 
values above and converted them from barrels (bbls) to tons as shown in the following 
calculation, 




− × = . 
This same calculation was conducted for DFM and resulted in $923.58. We then 
average JP-5 and DFM to simplify model inputs to just one average fuel cost which was 
$925.12. The average cost per ton for fuel and stores is reflected in Table 39. 
Table 39. Average Fuel and Stores Cost per Ton 
Supplies Cost ($) 
Fuel (per ton) 925.12 
Stores (per Ston) 2,007.02 
 
The cost per tonnage of ordnance required extrapolation and regression analysis. 
Thomson and Mayo (1991) describe and analyze the expenditure and cost of ordnance 
through World War II. Values taken from historic cost and stock data shown in Figure 72 
and Figure 73 served as inputs to Table 40 which summarizes ordnance cost data in CY20 
dollars and estimates tonnage in stock. 
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 WWII Heavy Artillery Cost 
 
 WWII Stock on Hand 
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Table 40. Ordnance Cost Data 
Month Cost CY44/CY45 Inflation Factor (1970) Cost CY20($) 
Heavy Artillery 
(kilotons) 
Jan 10,312,000.00 5.2960 54,612,352.00 90 
Feb 12,327,000.00 5.2960 65,283,792.00 90 
Mar 17,888,000.00 5.2960 94,734,848.00 92 
Apr 24,708,000.00 5.2960 130,853,568.00 89 
May 26,643,000.00 5.2960 141,101,328.00 87 
Jun 32,999,000.00 5.2960 174,762,704.00 84 
Jul 32,939,000.00 5.2960 174,444,944.00 80 
Aug 36,515,000.00 5.2960 193,383,440.00 101 
Sep 40,534,000.00 5.2960 214,668,064.00 110 
Oct 43,006,000.00 5.2960 227,759,776.00 123 
Nov 53,120,000.00 5.2960 281,323,520.00 190 
Dec 53,931,000.00 5.2960 285,618,576.00 150 
Jan 65,289,000.00 5.2960 345,770,544.00 200 
Feb 67,939,000.00 5.2960 359,804,944.00 260 
Mar 77,038,000.00 5.2960 407,993,248.00 270 
Apr 82,573,000.00 5.2960 437,306,608.00 295 
 
Upon determining the expenditure and cost associated per month in 1944–1945, we 
then converted the cost using the JIC. However, 1944–1945 inflation indices could not be 
found, so an approximated inflation index of 5.296 from 1970 was used, therefore, these 
values are gross assumptions. These values were then used in an Excel linear regression 
model.  
Figure 74 shows the linear regression model, with the associated equation that was 
used to determine the cost of ordnance per ton. However, the units of the artillery were in 
kilo tons, therefore, we needed to convert it to tons by dividing it by 1000. 
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 WWII Heavy Artillery Cost Regression 
Table 41 shows the output of the cost per tonnage of logistics for each category. 
We average the ordnance, fuel, stores to have an average cost per tonnage of supplies to 
equate to $5,252.60. This data will become increasingly valuable when analyzing and 
determining which architecture is cost effective. 
Table 41. Logistics Cost per Ton 
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APPENDIX D.  PACIFIC THREAT REGION 
Our team deferred to the Technology Team’s expertise and experience with 
operations within the Pacific Area of Operations (AO) to derive a regional breakdown of 
the Pacific AO. This would later assist in the determination of threat densities in which our 
transit routes would pass through. The regions are listed in Table 42 along with the 
approximate square nautical miles. Indonesia does consider approximately 1,909 square 
nautical miles due to land, but all other regions only consider water as part of the area 
Table 42. Pacific AO Regional Breakdown 
Region Approximate Area (nm2) 
Sea of Japan 284,000 
East China Sea 320,000 
South China Sea (North) 672,000 
South China Sea (South) 321,000 
Philippine Sea 2,331,000 
Indonesia 1,091,000 
 
Figure 75 was developed to illustrate these regions. The Sea of Japan was outlined 
and shaded in orange, East China Sea green, South China Sea (North) red, South China 
Sea (South) purple, Philippine Sea yellow, and Indonesia white. Figure 75 also depicts 
enemy weapons range arcs. The red arc closest to mainland China is an approximated range 
marker for the DF-21 ballistic missile and the red arc just a little further from mainland 
China delineates the DF-26 ballistic missile range. These were determined by referencing 
the “Global War 2030” scenario (Jeffrey Kline, class notes, 2019). Also depicted in Figure 
75 are range rings for the J-20 stealth fighter, stationed out of Fiery Cross Reef, and the H-
6 bomber stationed out of Anging and Nanchange Airbases. These assets pose the greatest 
air threat to logistics in terms of range and payloads. The combat range of the J-20 stealth 
fighter is 1,000 km with an additional 180 km range from the YJ-83 ASCM and the combat 
range for the H-6 bomber is 3,000 km with an additional 400 km range from the YJ-12 
ASCM (Jeffrey Kline, class notes, 2019). 
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Original map obtained from Google Earth, 2020. 
 Pacific AO Regional Breakdown with Enemy Weapons Ranges 
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APPENDIX E.  CHINESE ORDER OF BATTLE 
To determine the threat densities and lethality of the People’s Liberation Army 
Navy (PLAN) operating within the Pacific AO, we compiled data and provided the number 
and location of PLAN assets within the various regions, as well as those assets outside the 
Pacific AO. We listed the types of weapons and payload each asset carried and annotated 
if the asset carried any additional, smaller assets, such as a helicopter, that could add to the 
asset’s lethality or search and detect capability. This data was estimates based on our own 
operational experience and compiled after consulting the “Global War 2030” scenario 
(Jeffrey Kline, class notes, 2019). The compiled data is listed in Table 44, Table 45, Table 
46, Table 47, and Table 48. Availability assumptions were made based solely on our 
operational experience and are listed in Table 43. This data helped provide a reasonable 
estimate to the maximum number of assets the Chinese would have available at any given 
time. 
Table 43. PLAN Asset Availability 
Asset Availability (%) 
Aircraft Carriers 75 
Submarines 90 
Surface Combatants 80 
Amphibs 90 
Fighter Aircraft 75 
Patrol Aircraft 75 
Bombers 75 
Transport/Strategic Lift Aircraft 80 
UAVs 90 
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Table 44. PLAN Maritime Force Disposition 
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Table 47. PLAN Aircraft Carrier Loadout 
 
 
Table 48. PLAN Air Force Weapons Loadout and Additional Assets 
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To enable incorporation of this data into our model, we then simplified it as shown 
in Table 49. These models served as input valued to our modeling efforts when considering 
force-on-force interaction. 
Table 49. Simplified Chinese Order of Battle Inputs for Modeling 
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APPENDIX F.  RADAR CROSS-SECTION REDUCTION 
A logistics asset’s radar cross-section (RCS) affects the probability of detection by 
a radar system, which increases the susceptibility of the asset. RCS is effectively the size 
of a target as viewed by a radar system. It is a function of the physical size, reflectance, 
and retrodirectivity of an object. Reflectance is a function of the surface materials of a 
target which determine how much energy is absorbed and how much is reflected. 
Retrodirectivity refers to electromagnetic radiation that the target reflects directly back to 
the radar system that transmitted it. Detection by a radar system relies on a target’s 
retrodirectivity. In other words, reflectance deals with how much energy is reflected and 
retrodirectivity deals with the direction the energy is reflected. Decreasing either or both 
reflectance and retrodirectivity reduces the probability of detection by a radar system. It is 
worth analyzing the effect of implementing RCS reduction measures on logistics assets if 
increased survivability of a particular asset is desired. RCS reduction 
has become intimately associated with the term “stealth.” Major 
contributors to radar cross section include the body, hull, or fuselage of the 
object; extensions such as wings, fins, sails, or mast; protuberances such as 
pods (sensor or weapon), nacelles, external weapons (gun barrels), or 
ordnance (such as bombs and missiles); propellers, engine inlets, or exhaust 
ducts; and sensor apertures (including the cockpit of manned vehicles) and 
antennas. (Harney 2013, vol 6, 367) 
The United States Navy currently utilizes a variety of radar absorbent materials 
(RAM) and radar absorbing structures (RAS) to minimize the RCS of its assets. RAMs 
affect the reflectance aspect of RCS and are 
non-conducting, low dielectric constant materials are essentially transparent 
at radar frequencies, while highly conductive materials act like metals and 
strongly reflect electromagnetic energy at radar frequencies. (Harney 2013, 
vol 6, 383) 
RAMs must have low enough conductivity levels to allow radar energy to penetrate the 
material, but high enough to prevent significant amounts of radar energy from escaping. 
“Materials that satisfy these criteria include ferrites, carbon, salts of retinyl Schiff bases, 
and small-particulate metal powders” (Harney 2013, vol 6, 383). Ferrites are ceramic 
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materials, carbon composites consist of graphite fibers embedded in an organic matrix, 
salts of retinyl Schiff bases can be incorporated into other materials to make coatings or 
tiles, and an “iron ball” is a coating consisting of small iron particles. In conclusion, 
utilizing these types of materials via direct incorporation to the structure of a logistics asset, 
incorporation into appliques, or as coating could achieve reductions to 10% of the original 
reflectivity. 
RAS is a combination of absorption characteristics of RAM with the absorption 
characteristics of reflecting structures. Geometric structures, such as acute wedges, require 
radar energy to reflect multiple times within the structures prior to exist, resulting in a 
significant overall attenuation to the radar energy that is available to return to the radar 
receiver. Figure 76 illustrates the path of radar energy when it enters wedge-shaped 
cavities. This structure will reduce the reflectance of the surface to the fourth power, so 
you can see how drastically you can reduce the RCS of an asset by implementing RAS. 
 
 Multiple Reflections in Wedge-Shaped Cavities. Source: Harney 
(2013, vol. 6, 385). 
Another RAS utilized are bent ducts preventing straight line paths from one end to 
the other. RAM is also used in conjunction with this as well to achieve significant overall 
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attenuation of radar energy. This too results in a very low output intensity minimizing the 
probability of detection to enemy radar. Figure 77 shows a depiction of such a structure. 
 
 A Sinuous Duct Radar-Absorbing Structure. Source: Harney 
(2013, vol. 6, 385). 
Another RCS reduction measure utilized in today’s military waveguide-below-
cutoff structures placed on intakes and exhausts. This is a structure that consist of large 
openings filled with many smaller short waveguide structures that have cutoff frequencies 
below with electromagnetic radiation cannot propagate and results in reflection. An 
alternative to this would be the use of screens, which are not quite as effective. 
RCS reduction can also be achieved without using RAM or RAS by simply 
designing the platform in a manner that results in radar energy to reflect in directions away 
from the radar observing angle. Figure 78 illustrates geometric RCS reduction; it is this 
method that should be utilized to the maximum extent possible. 
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 Geometric RCS Reduction. Source: Harney (2013, vol. 6, 377). 
One example of geometric RCS reduction currently employed in the U.S. fleet is 
the DDG1000, Zumwalt-class Destroyer. It is an advanced stealth warship whose unique 
RCS reduction measures reduce its 610-foot long and 80-foot wide signature to that of a 
small fishing boat (Patterson and Lendon 2014). The key characteristic of the DDG1000 
that gives such a drastic RCS reduction is its tumblehome hull-form and composite 
superstructure. 
The hull-form features angled sides that slope inwards from the water, instead of 
widening, towards the ship’s centerline. This allows for both an RCS reduction as well as 
lower observability (Global Security n.d.-b). 
The superstructure utilizes both shaping and material (such as carbon fiber and 
balsa wood) to reduce RCS and encloses all radar apertures and communication antennas 
(Jacob 2014). The structure is also designed with a specialized foam core which absorbs 
selective radio frequencies (Lundquist 2012). The material cost of this type of 
superstructure is significant. For this reason, the Navy sought to reduce cost on the third 
destroyer of this class by utilizing steel in place of the composite (LaGrone 2013). 
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The LPD-17, San Antonio-class amphibious transport dock ship is also an example 
of a relatively new instance in where the Navy invested in RCS reduction. Some of this 
reduction was focused around the masts as they act as a major contributor to a ship’s overall 
RCS signature. The LPD-17 was a functional replacement to the LPD-4, Austin-class; 
LSD-36, Anchorage-class; LKA-113, Charleston-class; and the LST-1179, Newport-class 
amphibious ships. In 1995, as part of the Navy’s efforts to develop the next generation of 
ships’ masts, an integrated process team was sponsored as a joint effort by the Officer of 
Naval Research, Naval Sea Systems Command, and Space and Naval Warfare Systems 
Command. This team was formed to design and integrate the Advanced Enclosed Mast/
Sensor (AEM/S) system on the LPD-17 with the goal of proving that composite masts 
could be built for large warships at an affordable cost (Benson 1998). The AEM/S system 
uses advanced composites to produce a mast structure that encloses the existing legacy 
antenna systems of the ship standing at 28 meters tall and 10.7 meters in diameter (Mouritz 
et al. 2001). The structure utilizes composite materials that are sandwiched with frequency 
selective surface (FSS) layers that filter electromagnetic waves, allowing the transmission 
and reception at desired frequencies while rejecting threat radar signals (Doerry 2010). In 
a developmental design, the structure was hexagonal in shape with 10-degree angled sides 
(widest at the middle) for the top and bottom halves. The top half comprised the composite 
sandwich FSS materials with integrated communications infrastructure. The lower half was 
made with RAS comprised of a carbon reflective layer sandwiched between the structural 
material laminate and a balsa core, as illustrated in Figure 79. The result was a significant 




 Illustration of an AEM/S Mast. Source: Solitario (2003). 
In comparison to conventional material mast structures, the composite mast 
structure design studies have shown that a weight reduction of 20–50% can be achieved. 
In terms of cost, the fabrication of composite material is significantly higher in contract to 
traditional steel or aluminum structures, as illustrated in Figure 80. The other benefit to this 
design is that the enclosed structure protects radars and communications antennas from 
weather exposure and provides all-weather access for repair. This results in a significant 
reduction to repair, maintenance, and replacements costs as well as lowering the risk of 
failure. Overall, this design aids in reducing the ship’s overall RCS signature, minimizes 
corrosion, improves fatigue performance, and improves the performance of all sensors 
located on the structure by reducing electrical blockage. 
 
 Cost of Utilizing Composite Materials in Shipbuilding. Source: 
Critchfield, Judy, and Kurzweil (1994). 
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Sensitivity analysis on RCS was conducted using the survivability model developed 
in this capstone project. As an example, a vessel on the sea route from Palau to Manila was 
modelled to illustrate the impact of different RCS values on the probability of detection by 
radar-equipped aircraft or ships. Generally, as RCS increases, the detection range increases 
to a maximum limited by the radar horizon. Figure 81 illustrates how the search sweep 
width of a radar-equipped aircraft varies for targets with varying RCS. The aircraft was 
assumed to be flying at 3,000 meters altitude against a target height of ~30 meters. At high 
RCS values, the sweep width was limited by the radar horizon of ~450 km. As RCS 
decreased, sweep width decreased to a minimum of 50 km for 1 m2 RCS. 
 
 Sweep Width for Different RCS Values 
The radar detection ranges were fed into the detection model which is based on 
random search theory to produce the probability of detection (PD) curve shown in Figure 
82. For a one-hour search period of the relevant AO, the PD ranged from 2% to 18% for 
different RCS values. As RCS decreased, the probability of detection decreased and if the 
vessel went undetected, it was not engaged, hence leading to higher survivability. 
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 Probability of Detection for Different RCS Values 
The routes in this capstone study were all longer than a one-hour transit due to their 
distances and the transit speeds of the ships studied. For instance, the route from Palau to 
Manila was 976 nautical miles long which took 27 hours to complete for the 35-knot 
JHSV—the fastest vessel studied. As a result, even with a low 2% PD per hour, the vessels 
were all eventually detected and engaged. Therefore, the RCS changes did not have a major 
impact on survivability for these routes. However, for short routes with shorter transit 
times, the difference in PD did have a significant impact. Figure 83 illustrates these results. 
For an 1,800 nautical mile route with nominal cruise missile threats, survivability increased 
slightly from ~63% to ~69%. Significantly, the improvement only became apparent when 
RCS was decreased to very low values. Survivability was largely determined by the single-
shot probability of kill of the weapon system. On the other hand, for a 100 nautical mile 




 Survivability for Different RCS Values 
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APPENDIX G.  ACOUSTIC NOISE REDUCTION 
The logistics assets’ associated noise levels translate to a level of susceptibility to 
the threat, and, in particular, to enemy submarine attack. Therefore, it is worth analyzing 
the feasibility of implementing noise level reduction measures on assets. The United States 
Navy currently utilizes the prairie-masker air system on combatants to make them less 
susceptible to threat detection and attack by preventing the classification or identification 
of a ship by its acoustic signature. 
The prairie air system reduces cavitation around propeller tips by emitting air 
through tiny holes at the edges of each propeller blade as depicted in Figure 84. Cavitation 
occurs because of the propeller speed, and when ships are traversing at higher speeds, 
higher levels of cavitation occur. The air emitting from this system reduces the pressure 
drop and makes it less likely to have explosive vaporization or bubble formation occur. 
The result of the prairie air system is a production of low-level white noise, which is much 
more difficult to detect than cavitation. 
 
 Prairie Air System for Reducing Propeller Noise. Source: Harney 
(2013, vol. 6, 403). 
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It is also worth stating that the pump-jet propulsion systems, like those on the LCS 
and Virginia-class fast-attack submarines, would not require this system as it does not use 
propellers. This system propels the vessel forward by creating a jet of water. This pump-
jet propulsion system “produces less cavitation…which means an even lower acoustic 
signature”; a worthwhile consideration when it comes to reducing an asset’s acoustic 
signature (Globe Composite n.d., par. 5). 
The masker air system reduces the radiated noise of a vessel by emitting air bubbles 
around the hull as illustrated in Figure 85. These air bubbles strongly attenuate the acoustic 
noise that is being emitting from the ship. The result is that any acoustic emission coming 
from inside the ship travels a much shorter distance, decreasing the enemy’s detection 
range from acoustic sensors (Harney 2013). 
 
 Masker Air System for Reducing Radiated Noise. Source: Harney 
(2013, vol. 6, 404). 
We conducted sensitivity analysis on the noise levels of Blue logistic vessels using 
the survivability model developed in this study. Of the twenty vessels considered in the 
study, the quietest is the Orca (90 dB) and the loudest is the T-AOE (147 dB). Consequently, 
the sensitivity analysis considered a range of 90 to 147 dB noise level. Based on the study’s 
sonar model, for a route with a nominal noise environment, a vessel emitting 147 dB of 
noise can be detected at 30 nautical miles (nm). As the noise level decreases, the detection 
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range decreases at an exponential rate: 6 nm at 140 dB, 0.6 nm at 130 dB. The relationship 
between noise levels and detection range is illustrated in Figure 86 and Figure 87. 
 
 Sonar Detection Ranges for Different Noise Values 
 
 Sonar Detection Ranges for Different Noise Values 
(Logarithmic Scale) 
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The sonar detection ranges were applied to random search theory to derive a 
probability of detection (PD) by Red submarines. As noise levels decrease, the PD decreases. 
The PD is also a function of the number of Red submarines. Higher numbers of Red 
submarines increase the PD. For instance, the journey from Palau to Singapore crosses 
regions with a greater number of Red submarines than the journey from Palau to Manila, 
resulting in a higher PD. Figure 88 and Figure 89 illustrate the relationship between the PD 
per hour rate by Red submarines and the noise levels of Blue logistics vessels. It also shows 
the difference in PD between the Palau-Manila and Palau-Singapore routes. For a one-hour 
search period, the PD rate ranges from 0.00001% to 18% per hour as noise levels increase 
from 90 dB to 147 dB. 
 
 Probability of Detection for Different Noise Levels 
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 Probability of Detection for Different Noise Levels 
(Logarithmic Scale) 
The overall PD based on the journey time is calculated from the PD per hour rate. 
Of note, a long journey time can result in a significant overall PD leading to engagement 
by Red submarines and thus low survivability rates. For instance, the relatively low PD per 
hour rate of 7% for a 147 dB T-AOE on the 27-hour Palau-Manila route still translates to 
a poor 35% survivability rate against Red submarines.  
For the study’s threat environment, especially the route lengths and the assumption 
of Red submarine numbers, decreasing the noise level of Blue vessels has a significant 
impact on survivability rate. For the Palau-Manila route, once the noise level of the Blue 
vessels drops below 120 dB, the sonar detection range drops to 0.06 nm, the PD rate drops 
to 0.014% per hour and the survivability rate approaches 100%. The survivability rates 
against submarines for this route and for the Palau-Singapore route are shown in Figure 90. 
While sharing a similar underlying modelling logic, sonar has much shorter 
detection ranges than radar. Consequently, noise reduction has a more significant impact 
on PD and survivability than RCS reduction. That said, the model does not factor for the 
real-world possibility of pairing off-board sensors with Red submarines. 
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 Survivability Rates for Different Noise Values 
A 2016 thesis at the Naval Postgraduate School focused on the evaluation of LCS, 
a ship equipped with prairie and masker air systems, for open-ocean anti-submarine 
warfare. The noise reduction noted in that research was -10 dB for each system (Valerio et 
al. 2016). Therefore, when incorporating nose reduction values into our model, we utilized 
a total noise level reduction of -20 dB to simulate concurrent use of both systems to analyze 
the effect on logistics survivability. 
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APPENDIX H.  BETWEENNESS CENTRALITY: TOP-TEN NODES 
Table 50 shows the top ten nodes by betweenness centrality that were identified 
during our network analysis. 
Table 50. Top Ten Nodes by Betweenness Centrality 
Node Value Node Value Node Value 
Uncontested LCS JHSV 
Singapore 0.192 Singapore 0.189 Palau 0.432 
Manila 0.179 Guam 0.158 Guam 0.384 
Guam 0.089 Manila 0.158 
Puerto 
Princesa 0.279 
Palau 0.079 Okinawa 0.105 
Bandar Seri 
Begawan 0.263 
Cebu 0.047 Darwin 0.079 Kwajalein 0.258 
Zuoying 0.047 
Diego 
Garcia 0.068 Cebu 0.226 
Puerto 
Princesa 0.047 Cebu 0.063 Yokusuka 0.221 
Okinawa 0.042 Palau 0.058 Singapore 0.205 





Princesa 0.053 Darwin 0.189 
T-AOE T-AO T-AKE 
Palau 0.411 Guam 0.268 Palau 0.326 




Garcia 0.216 Singapore 0.216 
Cebu 0.274 Darwin 0.174 
Diego 
Garcia 0.216 




Begawan 0.247 Manila 0.153 Kwajalein 0.184 
Singapore 0.226 
Bandar Seri 
Begawan 0.132 Darwin 0.174 
Diego 
Garcia 0.226 Yokusuka 0.126 Cebu 0.163 
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Node Value Node Value Node Value 
Yokusuka 0.216 
Puerto 
Princesa 0.111 Yokusuka 0.142 
Darwin 0.184 Okinawa 0.068 
Bandar Seri 
Begawan 0.132 
LHA LSD LPD 
Guam 0.268 Guam 0.237 Guam 0.242 







Palau 0.200 Manila 0.142 
Bandar Seri 
Begawan 0.153 
Darwin 0.174 Palau 0.132 
Puerto 
Princesa 0.147 
Kwajalein 0.158 Kwajalein 0.126 Kwajalein 0.126 
Bandar Seri 
Begawan 0.132 Cebu 0.121 Darwin 0.121 
Yokusuka 0.126 Darwin 0.116 Yokusuka 0.095 
Manila 0.111 Yokusuka 0.095 Manila 0.084 
Puerto 
Princesa 0.111 Okinawa 0.063 Okinawa 0.079 
OSV SEATRAIN MOTHERSHIP 
Guam 0.226 Singapore 0.237 Singapore 0.263 
Singapore 0.221 
Bandar Seri 
Begawan 0.216 Guam 0.216 
Diego 















Princesa 0.111 Palau 0.147 
Manila 0.105 Cebu 0.084 Okinawa 0.132 
Darwin 0.105 Okinawa 0.074 Darwin 0.132 
Yokusuka 0.079 Yokusuka 0.068 Manila 0.111 
Zuoying 0.053 Kwajalein 0.058 Kwajalein 0.105 
MOLA T-AK T-AKR 
Bandar Seri 
Begawan 0.242 Guam 0.268 Guam 0.268 
Okinawa 0.184 Singapore 0.216 Singapore 0.216 
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Palau 0.168 Palau 0.179 Palau 0.179 
Singapore 0.163 Darwin 0.174 Darwin 0.174 













Cebu 0.037 Cebu 0.095 Manila 0.089 
T-AKR(RORO) LCU ESB 
Guam 0.268 Singapore 0.226 Guam 0.268 
Palau 0.221 Manila 0.179 Singapore 0.216 




Garcia 0.216 Okinawa 0.111 Palau 0.179 
Darwin 0.174 
Puerto 
Princesa 0.089 Darwin 0.174 




Begawan 0.132 Cebu 0.058 Kwajalein 0.158 




Princesa 0.105 Yokusuka 0.032 Yokusuka 0.126 
Manila 0.068 Phuket 0.026 Manila 0.105 
ESD ORCA 





Garcia 0.216 Cebu 0.126 
Palau 0.179 Manila 0.100 





Kwajalein 0.158 Okinawa 0.079 
Bandar Seri 
Begawan 0.132 Singapore 0.068 
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Node Value Node Value Node Value 
Yokusuka 0.126 Zuoying 0.047 
Manila 0.105 Sasebo 0.037 
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